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October 1978 will mark the 30th anniversary of the initial appearance of WORLD POLITICS. Through the years, the study of international relations and national development has evolved in a series of changing emphases on conceptual approaches, subject matter, and analytical techniques. The editors believe that the 30th anniversary of the journal provides an appropriate opportunity to encourage an evaluation of the themes and methods developed over the past generation, and in particular a discussion of those that seem most promising for the years ahead. They therefore would like to mark this occasion by devoting all or part of an issue to papers concerned with a critique of and the outlook for research trends in international relations and national development.

The editors have chosen to open the proposed anniversary issue to all prospective contributors rather than to commission papers for this purpose. They invite the submission of manuscripts that focus on broad retrospective and prospective views of the study of world politics. Papers received in response to this invitation will be given priority, but must conform to our regular rules and will be handled under normal editorial procedures. Manuscripts submitted for the anniversary issue should be so marked; they should be received before October 1, 1977, and should preferably be no longer than 10,000 words, including footnotes.

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THE CONTRIBUTORS

MARC HOWARD ROSS is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Bryn Mawr College. He has written *The Political Integration of Urban Squatters* (1973) and *Grass Roots in an African City: Political Behavior in Nairobi* (1975). His current work includes a study of comparative agenda building and a book on political anthropology. ELIZABETH L. HOMER is a doctoral candidate in political science at Bryn Mawr College. She is at present working for the Mass Transit Administration of the Maryland Department of Transportation in Baltimore.

HOWARD H. LENTNER is an Associate Professor at Baruch College–CUNY and the Ph.D. Program in Political Science at the City University of New York Graduate Center. His book, *Foreign Policy Analysis: A Comparative and Conceptual Approach*, was published in 1974. He is currently writing a book on the role of the Prime Minister in Canadian foreign policy.

RONALD T. LIBBY is a Lecturer in the Department of Political and Administrative Studies at the University of Zambia. He is currently engaged in research on a theory of change in southern Africa.

GEORGE E. HUDSON is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Wittenberg University. He is currently working on a study of Soviet military policy.

WILHELM BLEEK is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Munich. He is the author (with Kurt Sontheimer) of an introductory text on politics in East Germany, *Die DDR—Politik, Gesellschaft, Wirtschaft* (4th, rev. ed. 1975). At present he is working on a study of East Germany's Deutschlandpolitik from 1949 to 1961.

JOHN M. STARRELS is Assistant Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at the George Washington University. He is currently doing research on Western European industrial policy.

Dr. Robert S. Jordan and Dr. Thomas G. Weiss regret their failure to acknowledge the debt that the article "Bureaucratic Politics and the World Food Conference: The International Policy Process" in the April 1976 issue owes to an earlier paper presented by Professor Jason L. Finkle of the University of Michigan at the 1974 National Conference of the American Society for Public Administration. The conclusions presented in their article drew substantively from Professor Finkle's paper, entitled "Bureaucratic Politics and the UN Population System," which is an early and innovative attempt to analyze the United Nations from the perspective of "bureaucratic politics." Dr. Jordan and Dr. Weiss wish to apologize to Professor Finkle and to the readers of *World Politics* for this lapse on their part.

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ABSTRACTS

Galton's Problem in Cross-National Research

By M. H. ROSS and E. HOMER

Galton's problem raises questions about the nature of explanation in cross-national research using aggregate data. When political units such as states interact, to what extent can correlations between two traits or behaviors, such as socioeconomic development and political stability, be explained in terms of functional relationships within political systems, and to what extent are they the result of diffusion or borrowing among them? This article explores the logic of Galton's problem and then evaluates several empirical solutions to it, using data drawn from three different types of cross-national samples. The solutions juxtapose explanations based on internal (functional) relationships and external (diffusion) patterns, and suggest that previous research which has ignored diffusion may have led to incomplete or incorrect conclusions.

Foreign Policy Decision Making: The Case of Canada and Nuclear Weapons

By H. H. LENTNER

Foreign policy decision making is the result of a complex political process in which the political values and style of the chief executive play a large part. The case of Canada's decision, in 1963, to acquire nuclear weapons illustrates that external events and pressures generated by Canada's international obligations were processed through complex political interactions. The Government of Prime Minister Diefenbaker was unable to take the nuclear weapons decision because of two splits in the Cabinet, only one of which was pertinent to nuclear weapons policy. The decision was taken by Leader of the Opposition Pearson alone and in conformity with his personal values, because of his political style which commanded deference. The approach used combines historical detail with political analysis.

External Co-optation of a Less Developed Country's Policy Making: The Case of Ghana, 1969–1972

By R. T. LIBBY

The author advances the thesis that the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and creditor countries structured the context in which their client, Ghana—a less developed country—formulated its economic policy between 1969 and 1972. The intergovernmental organizations and creditor countries failed to take Ghana's domestic political situation into account, however. When the country became heavily dependent upon the IGO's and creditors for financial assistance to enable the government to survive a disastrous shortfall in foreign exchange earnings, it was forced to accept extreme and politically dangerous measures in order to secure assistance. The policies that were adopted were catastrophic, and destroyed what remained of the democratic government's public support. This dramatic change in public climate made the government fatally vulnerable to a military coup d'état.

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Soviet Naval Doctrine and Soviet Politics, 1953–1975

By G. E. HUDSON

The two major and interrelated questions this study poses are: (1) How has Soviet naval doctrine developed and adapted to the demands of the nuclear age?; and (2) How do the changes in Soviet naval doctrine relate to the context of Soviet foreign policy and domestic politics? The article demonstrates that Soviet doctrine has accommodated to the challenges of the nuclear age by combining the tenets of traditional and modern warfare. Changes in naval doctrine have come about because of a need to meet the competition of the United States in world politics, and as a response to active interest-group pressure within the Soviet political system. Soviet naval doctrine does not necessarily "mirror" Western doctrine, but reflects a distinct, Soviet view of naval utilization.

From Cold War to Ostpolitik: Two Germanys in Search of Separate Identities

By W. BLEEK

For over a quarter-century, two separate states have existed in Germany. By fighting over "unity" and "unification," the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic have in fact stabilized and legitimized their separate sociopolitical orders. This impact on the domestic politics of both states has been the main function of inter-German relations. Only recently has positive identification replaced negative orientation to the counter-state. The "German question" provides an example of "nation building" as a historical process of both the disintegration of old and the building up of new identities.

Comparative and Elite Politics

By J. M. STARRELS

This review evaluates two recently published works on East German political recruitment from the vantage point of future comparative research on the role of the G.D.R. within the European postindustrial order. The conclusion presents several possible ways of providing a larger comparative framework for the future study of the East German polity.

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GALTON'S PROBLEM IN CROSS-NATIONAL RESEARCH

By MARC HOWARD ROSS and ELIZABETH HOMER*

GALTON'S problem raises questions about the nature of explanation in cross-national research using aggregate data.[1] Are correlations between two traits or behaviors, such as economic development and political stability, to be explained by functional relationships within political systems, or in terms of diffusion and borrowing arising from interactions between countries? An explanation that relies on the effects of internal characteristics of states, such as economic development or political organization, can be contrasted with one based on the external events or pressures on a national political system. Most commonly, cross-national researchers offer interpretations of the first sort, or functional explanations, while ignoring the second type, or diffusion explanations. In this article, we first explore the logic of Galton's problem and then evaluate several empirical solutions, using data drawn from three different types of cross-national samples. In each of our solutions we consider the impact of both diffusion and function. Comparison of these solutions with previous explanations suggests that failure to consider diffusion may often have led to erroneous inferences and incorrect or incomplete theoretical interpretations.

I. The Logic of Galton's Problem

Edward Tylor, an anthropologist, in 1889 presented a paper that examined relationships between marriage laws and descent patterns using data drawn from a cross-cultural sample.[2] He explained his find-

* We wish to thank Professors Michael Weinstein and Charles D. Elder for the extensive technical comments they provided. In addition, we wish to thank Professors Raoul Naroll, Fred Pryor, and Jennie-Keith Ross for their ideas.

[1] For a discussion of Galton's problem in cross-cultural analysis see Raoul Naroll, "Galton's Problem," in Naroll and Ronald Cohen, eds., *A Handbook of Method in Cultural Anthropology* (New York: Columbia University Press 1973), 974-89; and Raoul Naroll, Gary L. Michik, and Frada Naroll, "Hologeistic Theory Testing," in Joseph G. Jorgensen, ed., *Comparative Studies by Harold E. Driver and Essays in his Honor* (New Haven: HRAF Press 1974), 121-48, which give a good overview of the problem. For a detailed discussion of some of the methodological issues involved, see James M. Schaefer, ed., *Studies in Cultural Diffusion: Galton's Problem* (New Haven: HRAF Press 1974).

[2] Edward E. Tylor, "On a Method for Investigating the Development of Institutions Applied to the Laws of Marriage and Descent," *Journal of the Royal Anthropo-*

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ings in terms of a functional relationship between the two traits. In a critique of the paper, Sir Francis Galton raised the possibility that the correlation Tylor found might have resulted from contact between the cultures in the sample, and questioned the extent to which Tylor's cases were truly independent. "It might be," he said, "that some of the tribes had derived them [the traits being studied] from a common source, so that they were duplicate copies of the same original."[3] Lack of independence presents two problems. First, it might bias the results; second, it affects statistical analyses by making the size of the sample of independent cases uncertain. Because of the influence of Galton's criticism, few anthropologists engaged in quantitative cross-cultural research for the next fifty years.[4] In recent decades, there has been a renewed interest in the sort of cross-cultural research Tylor conducted. However, as a result of the extensive concern with Galton's problem, almost all researchers in anthropology have drawn their samples in such a way as to minimize the effects of diffusion, in order to make a functional interpretation of their results less problematic.[5]

Naroll suggests that cross-unit correlations can be attributed to function, to pure borrowing, or to semi-diffusion.[6] Because of interactions among units, especially among modern nation-states, it is difficult to think of any case where a correlation between two traits or behaviors could be attributed only to processes internal to those societies, or "pure" function. Therefore, Naroll argues that explanations in cross-unit research must be based either on pure borrowing or on semi-diffusion. Pure borrowing occurs when traits or behaviors spread through contact but are not functionally linked to other traits in the borrowing society. Thus, high correlations are found in samples where contact and diffusion are high, but there will be no correlations in a more diverse sample that eliminates the effects of diffusion. For example, Naroll reports data from Klimek's studies in California which found

logical Institute, XVIII (1889), 245-72; reprinted in Frank Moore, ed., *Readings in Cross-Cultural Methodology* (New Haven: HRAF Press 1963), 1-25.

[3] Tylor (fn. 2), 272.

[4] One exception may be found in L. T. Hobhouse, G. C. Wheeler, and M. Ginsberg, *The Material Culture and Social Institutions of the Simpler Peoples* (London: Chapman and Hall 1930).

[5] For example, George P. Murdock, *Social Structure* (New York: Macmillan 1949); John W. M. Whiting and Irvin L. Child, *Child Training and Personality* (New Haven: Yale University Press 1953); and Keith Otterbein, *The Evolution of War: A Cross-Cultural Study* (New Haven: HRAF Press 1970). For an overview of substantive findings using the cross-cultural method, see Raoul Naroll, "What Have We Learned from Cross-Cultural Surveys?" *American Anthropologist*, Vol. 72 (December 1970), 1227-88.

[6] Naroll (fn. 1), 974-75.

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that patrilineal totemic clans appear exclusively in tribes which play flagolets, use carrying frames made of sticks and cords, make plate pottery, use a squared muller, and favor twins.[7] In a worldwide sample, the correlations are reduced to zero. Naroll says that the only sensible explanation for Klimek's correlations is joint diffusion. Intuitively, diffusion seems reasonable in this case because we can see no good reason why the form of clan organization ought to be systematically related to the other cultural traits Klimek observes. The problem is more serious, however, when we uncover a relationship between two characteristics that could plausibly be related functionally—such as political instability and socioeconomic development, or defense spending per capita and GNP per capita—but where we cannot *a priori* eliminate the diffusion explanation.

Semi-diffusion occurs where traits diffuse through contact, but only to cultures where there is an appropriate or requisite functional basis. As a political example, a number of writers have suggested the case of democracy, which can be successfully adopted only by nations with certain requisites, such as a highly educated population, a minimum level of wealth, and perhaps certain political traditions.[8] If such a functional basis for borrowing exists, then the correlation between traits or behaviors should still hold in a sample of units that have minimal interactions; a complete explanation for a relationship would need to rely on both function and diffusion.

Naroll and others have now devised more than nine "solutions" to Galton's problem for use in cross-cultural studies.[9] The essence of most

[7] Naroll, "Some Thoughts on Comparative Method in Cultural Anthropology," in Hubert M. Blalock Jr., and Ann B. Blalock, eds., *Methodology in Social Research* (New York: McGraw-Hill 1968), 259; and Naroll (fn. 1), 976.

[8] For example, see Seymour Martin Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 53 (March 1959), 69-105.

[9] In addition to the works of Naroll cited above, see his "Two Solutions to Galton's Problem," *Philosophy of Science*, XXVIII (January 1961), 16-39; and "A Fifth Solution to Galton's Problem," *American Anthropologist*, Vol. 66 (1964), 863-67; Naroll and Roy G. D'Andrade, "Two Further Solutions to Galton's Problem," *American Anthropologist*, Vol. 65 (1963), 1053–67; George P. Murdock, "World Ethnographic Sample," *American Anthropologist*, Vol. 59 (August 1957), 664-87; David J. Strauss and Martin Orans, "Galton's Problem: A Critical Appraisal," *Current Anthropology*, XVI (December 1975), 573-94; Dean Keith Simonton, "Galton's Problem, Autocorrelation and Diffusion Coefficients," *Behavior Science Research*, X (1975), 239-48; Rolf Wirsing, "Measuring Diffusion: The Geary Method and the Dacey Method," in Schaefer (fn. 1), 197-219; and Fredrick L. Pryor, "Toward a More Simple and General Solution to Galton's Problem: The Diffusion Possibility Method," *American Ethnologist* (forthcoming). The number of proposed solutions to Galton's problem is proliferating rapidly. Keeping an accurate count of them is increasingly difficult as it is not clear which solutions ought to be considered independent inventions and which represent duplication from a common original, due to high levels of interaction within the academic community!

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of these solutions is the selection of cases in a way that minimizes the effects of direct borrowing or diffusion among the units in the sample. Geographical proximity is highly correlated with interaction and presumably with diffusion; therefore units in the sample are selected from geographically separated areas. The logic of these "sampling" solutions is that function and diffusion are not juxtaposed with one another: the second is removed in order to examine the first. Vermeulen and de Ruijter contend that functional explanations are nomothetic, while diffusion or historically based explanations are ideographic.[10] Most cross-cultural research, according to them, has relied upon an ontological dualism which they criticize: "Exceptions in the nomothetic order may always be 'explained' by viewing them as disturbances due to the influence of historical factors or diffusion."[11] In a reply to Vermeulen and de Ruijter, Naroll accepts their criticism of his earlier analyses as incorrect juxtapositions of diffusion and function, and says that he now considers Galton's problem "simply as the problem of counting the number of statistical cases."[12]

Our reading of Galton's problem is somewhat different, and leads to a second type of solution. Diffusion seems to require a "sampling" solution because researchers consider diffusion as somehow getting in the way of functional or "real" explanations. The diffusion of traits or behaviors across units is not a problem to be "removed," however.[13] Diffusion can provide the basis for as general an explanation as functional relationships. The challenge is, as Przeworski and Teune point out, to replace historical particularities and place names with the general variables that they represent.[14] In this way, functional explanations emphasize intra-system processes, and diffusion explanations stress

[10] C. J. J. Vermeulen and A. de Ruijter, "Dominant Epistemological Presuppositions in the Use of the Cross-Cultural Survey Method," *Current Anthropology*, XVI (March 1975), 34.

[11] *Ibid.*, 35.

[12] Naroll, "Reply to Vermeulen and de Ruijter," *Current Anthropology*, XVI (March 1975), 42.

[13] Not all proposed solutions employ the strategy of removing diffusion effects as an initial step. Naroll's cluster test, Naroll (fn. 9, "Two Solutions . . ."), Naroll and D'Andrade's matched-pair method (fn. 9), and Driver and Chaney's test derived from the matched-pair method, all estimate the relative importance of both diffusion and function. See Harold E. Driver and Richard P. Chaney, "Cross-Cultural Sampling and Galton's Problem," in Naroll and Cohen (fn. 1), 990-1003. Interestingly, under the influence of Kroeber, cross-cultural research in anthropology for many years consisted mainly of mapping patterns of diffusion and borrowing between cultures of a single region. Richard P. Chaney, "Comparative Analysis and Retroductive Reasoning or Conclusions in Search of a Premise," *American Anthropologist*, Vol. 75 (October 1973), 1359-60.

[14] Adam Przeworski and Henry Teune, *The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry* (New York: John Wiley 1970).

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inter-system ones; however, each may have the same level of generality.

Vermeulen and de Ruijter indicate that simply to identify the presence of diffusion or other historical processes does not constitute an explanation of human behavior.[15] Instead of trying to "remove" the effects of diffusion, a solution to Galton's problem may involve the inclusion of additional variables[16] in the analysis, to give diffusion and function, or external and internal variables, the same explanatory status.[17] It also forces a specification of the nature of diffusion rather than simply an acknowledgment of its existence. Diffusion results from contact between nations, but the specific kind of contact can take a variety of forms. For example, it may involve such diverse principles as imitation, role modeling, reference-group behavior, relative deprivation, status anxiety, learning, rational evaluation of alternatives based on observation, imposition by force, or the power of new ideas. By adding additional variables representing one or more of these principles to our analysis, we can be explicit about the basis on which diffusion takes place rather than simply considering its presence or absence.[18]

GALTON'S PROBLEM IN POLITICAL RESEARCH

Galton's problem is not only of interest to anthropologists.[19] It also threatens cross-national and other cross-unit research in political science. To date, some cross-national researchers have acknowledged

[15] Vermeulen and de Ruijter (fn. 10), 49.

[16] Gillespie also sees two general types of solutions to Galton's problem in comparative political analysis: one entails incorporating into the analysis additional variables that measure the relative impact of diffusion and function; a second involves the selection of cases in such a way as to approximate independence. John V. Gillespie, "Galton's Problem and Parameter Estimation in Comparative Political Analysis," paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, April 29–May 2, 1973, p. 17. Charles D. Elder, in a personal communication, has suggested labeling the two solutions a "sampling" solution and an "additional variables" solution.

[17] Although some cross-cultural researchers have paid equal attention to functional and diffusion explanations in their empirical solutions to Galton's problem (see fn. 13), Driver is the only one who has incorporated additional variables measuring diffusion into his analysis. In one study, he uses a sample of 277 ethnic units from North America to reconsider the relationship between residence rules and kin avoidance that Tylor originally investigated. He finds diffusion (what he calls geographical-historical factors) to be relatively more important than psycho-functional ones in explaining his correlations. What is of importance here is the use of variables measuring both diffusion and function in the same study, and his use of partial correlation in assessing the relative impact of each type of variable. Harold E. Driver, "Geographical-Historical *Versus* Psycho-Functional Explanations of Kin Avoidances," *Current Anthropology*, VII (April 1966), 131-60.

[18] Charles D. Elder, in a personal communication, has pointed out that the grouping of diverse phenomena under the common heading "diffusion" may mask independent processes.

[19] Naroll (fn. 1), 974; Richard E. Hildreth and Raoul Naroll, "Galton's Problem in Cross-National Studies" (mimeo), 1971.

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Galton's problem, but have not coped with it empirically.[20] The few cross-national studies that evaluate the relative efficacy of diffusion and functional explanations for the same political behavior have considered specific substantive questions, but have offered no framework for analyzing the general problem.[21]

[20] Przeworski and Teune (fn. 14), 51-53, cite Naroll's articles and say that the problem is relevant to comparative political research, but offer no solutions to it. John V. Gillespie writes, "In macro-cross-national research, we must separate the variables that are the product of historical interaction of political systems from those that might be hypothesized as the internal conditions producing a given system attribute." See "An Introduction to Macro-Cross-National Research," in John V. Gillespie and Betty A. Nesvold, eds., *Macro-Quantitative Analysis: Conflict Development and Democratization* (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications 1971), 24; Allan D. Grimshaw, "Comparative Sociology: In What Ways Different from other Sociologies?" in Michael Armer and Allan D. Grimshaw, eds., *Comparative Social Research: Methodological Problems and Strategies* (New York: John Wiley Interscience 1973), 7. After quickly describing the problem, Joseph W. Elder offers no empirical solutions, only the view that, "The problems of unit comparability and unit independence promise to remain with cross-cultural research for many years." See "Problems of Cross-Cultural Methodology: Instrumentation and Interviewing in India," *ibid.*; John V. Gillespie (fn. 16). Stein Rokkan suggests that comparative research can resolve Galton's problem insofar as comparativists "build the communication-diffusion-innovation variables directly into their models and to focus their comparative analyses on units developed through the merger of smaller societies of the type studied by anthropologists." See "Cross-Cultural, Cross-Societal and Cross-National Research," in Rokkan, ed., *Main Trends of Research in the Social and Human Sciences* (Paris: Mouton/UNESCO 1970), 668. Although we agree with this assessment of what the components of a solution might be in cross-national research, we question Rokkan's assertion that this is found in the work of comparativists such as Lipset, Almond, Deutsch, Huntington, or Holt and Turner. These scholars have pointed out the potential importance of historical diffusion and communications processes, but they have hardly provided systematic solutions to treating the relative importance of internal and external determinants of national behavior. Arend Lijphart points out that Galton's problem involves the question of the independence of cases in comparative research and suggests that this indicates that researchers should use the comparative method that involves a smaller number of cases rather than statistical studies. They can then pay more attention to details that are likely to be overlooked in aggregate analysis. See Lijphart, "The Comparable-Cases Strategy in Comparative Research," *Comparative Political Studies*, VIII (July 1975), 171-72. Finally, William B. Moul presents data drawn from Banks and Textor which show high correlations between former colonial affiliation and a number of measures of modernization and political development as a way of illustrating the importance of diffusion in cross-national data. He stresses the lack of consideration of diffusion as a basis for explanation in most cross-national research on political development. See "On Getting Something for Nothing: A Note on Causal Models of Political Development," *Comparative Political Studies*, VII (July 1974), 150-55.

[21] Most cross-national research only employs intra-national data which are then correlated across nations, despite the professed theoretical interest in international relations for interactive processes which Rokkan (fn. 20) cites. For a sampling of typical cross-national research, see Gillespie and Nesvold (fn. 20); Rudolph J. Rummel, "The Dimensionality of Nations Project," in Richard Merritt and Stein Rokkan, eds., *Comparing Nations: The Use of Quantitative Data in Cross-National Research* (New Haven: Yale University Press 1966); Charles Lewis Taylor, Michael C. Hudson, and others, eds., *The World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators* (2d ed., New Haven: Yale University Press 1972); Donald G. Morrison and Hugh M. Stevenson, "Integration and Instability: Patterns of African Political Development," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 66 (September 1972), 902-27. One fascinating study relies almost exclusively on either interactive data or data based on scores for pairs of nations, rather

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One area where the relative impact of internal and external variables on behavior has been evaluated is in research on the "coup contagion" hypothesis. Coups d'états are alternatively explained by pressures within political systems and by extra-national variables measuring diffusion or contagion. In an early empirical study, Putnam found little support for a diffusion model in Latin America; socioeconomic variables (internal) were significantly related to military intervention in politics, while several measures of outside influence or modeling behavior showed no relationship with his measure of military intervention.[22] Midlarsky, also looking at Latin America, but over a longer period of time, finds evidence that coups diffuse, at least during certain time periods.[23] Furthermore, the influence of a coup on other states in the region depends in part on the status and previous record of political stability of the country where the coup occurs. Midlarsky sees no evidence of diffusion in Africa, however. Li and Thompson, using several mathematical models, find additional evidence for the hypothesis of coup contagion in some but not all regions of the world.[24] Unlike Putnam, neither Midlarsky nor Li and Thompson explicitly juxtapose functional and diffusion explanations. Putnam's study measures diffusion only in terms of the size of various outside military training programs in each state and cannot be considered a fully adequate test of the diffusion hypothesis.

Adoption of particular policies is a second dependent variable that political scientists have analyzed through comparison of functional and diffusion explanations. Collier and Messick compare explanations for the adoption of social security programs, using a sample of 59 countries.[25] Although social security programs were originally adopted in the more advanced industrial states, Collier and Messick find that the later a country adopts a social security program, the lower its level of socioeconomic development at the time. The functional explanation that stresses the role of industrialization, urbanization, and the growth of political demands by workers is only weakly supported since they find an extremely wide range of variation in their three indicators of

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than the score of a single country: Roger W. Cobb and Charles D. Elder, *International Community: A Regional and Global Approach* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston 1970).

[22] Robert D. Putnam, "Toward Explaining Military Intervention in Latin American Politics," *World Politics*, xx (October 1967), 83-110.

[23] Manus Midlarsky, "Mathematical Models of Instability and a Theory of Diffusion," *International Studies Quarterly*, xvi (November 1970), 60-84.

[24] Richard P. Y. Li and William R. Thompson, "The 'Coup Contagion' Hypothesis," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, xix (March 1975), 63-88.

[25] David Collier and Richard E. Messick, "Prerequisites Versus Diffusion: Testing Alternative Explanations of Social Security Adoption," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 69 (December 1975), 1299-1315.

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development (percentage of the labor force in agriculture, percentage in industry, and national income level) at the time of adoption. The diffusion explanation receives strong support both from a map showing the extent to which programs spread within single regions in short periods of time, and from an analysis of the bases of diffusion at different points in time and in different regions of the world.

Using data from the American states, Walker examines diffusion as a possible source of program innovations.[26] His dependent variable is the score for each state based on the date of adoption for as many as 88 different programs. He first finds that both demographic and political structure variables are significantly related to a state's level of innovation, but suggests that such an analysis tells us little about how innovations actually spread between early and late adopters. Looking at the data to identify initiation and emulation, Walker finds clearly identifiable regional pace setters and diffusion of innovations within regional clusters throughout the country. Gray, using similar data on the American states, finds an extremely good fit for an equation based on interaction in twelve different policy areas; furthermore, through separate analysis of the different policy areas, she suggests different patterns of diffusion across issue domains.[27] Finally, like Walker, Gray suggests the importance of an explanation based both on functional linkages and diffusion. The former may be more relevant in accounting for innovation, particularly in understanding the most and least innovative states, "while user interaction might better account for the order of the states falling in the middle range of innovativeness."[28]

Although these few studies using aggregate data consider both functional and diffusion explanations, they do not provide a general framework for handling Galton's problem such as those offered to anthropologists by Naroll, D'Andrade, Murdock, and others. First, the studies by Midlarsky, Collier and Messick, Walker, and Gray all rely on longitudinal or over-time data; that fact limits the applicability of their solutions for many aggregate-data analysts who, for various reasons, rely on cross-sectional data. Second, each of the studies cited above is facilitated by use of a dependent variable—coups in the one case and

[26] Jack L. Walker, "The Diffusion of Innovations Among the American States," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 63 (September 1969), 880-99.

[27] Virginia Gray, "Innovation in the States: A Diffusion Study," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 67 (December 1973), 1174-85; see also Jack L. Walker, "Comment: Problems in Research of the Diffusion of Policy Innovations," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 67 (December 1974), 1186-91; Gray, "Rejoinder to 'Comment' by Jack L. Walker," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 67 (December 1973), 1192-93.

[28] Gray (fn. 27), 1182.

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specific policies in the others—whose presence or absence at a particular point in time is easily coded. Most cross-national data, however, involve continuous (or at least ordinal) variables. Third, none of these existing studies makes an effort to evaluate in a general way the relative effects of diffusion and function. Collier and Messick come the closest, although they use separate tests and do not consider both explanations simultaneously.

II. Some Empirical Solutions

The solutions presented by Naroll and his colleagues are a starting point for an empirical consideration of Galton's problem in cross-national research. Some differences between the kinds of data used in cross-cultural studies and those used in cross-national research should be briefly noted, however. First, anthropologists usually work with small cultural groups whose relative geographical isolation across culture areas reliably implies lack of contact. No such assumption can safely be made concerning even the most remote countries in the contemporary international system. Second, almost all cross-cultural research in anthropology relies upon dichotomous data where a trait is coded either absent or present, or high or low, in a particular culture. Some of the tests Naroll has devised cannot be suitably applied to the continuous data commonly used in most cross-national research. Third, many of the solutions involve samples that include only a small proportion of the total population of cultural units. In contrast, because of the relatively small number of national units, cross-national research typically includes a large proportion of the available population.

Our starting point is that all cross-national researchers need to build into their designs ways of testing for the effects of both diffusion and function, as these constitute either rival or partial explanations of their results.[29] Either might provide an adequate explanation for the cross-national distribution of any single characteristic or of the correlation between any two or more traits. Furthermore, as we shall see shortly, in many cases a superior explanation may combine both diffusion and function.

To examine Galton's problem, we have used three different data bases: (1) a regional sample of data on 27 characteristics for 32 black African

[29] Resolving Galton's problem does not necessarily make explanation of any set of findings easy. "Galton's problem is just one of the many competing hypotheses that must be eliminated in successful cross-cultural research." Colin Loftin, "Galton's Problem as Spatial Autocorrelation: Comments on Ember's Empirical Test," *Ethnology*, XI (October 1972), 432.

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nations taken from Morrison and others, *Black Africa*.[30] We chose this sample because of the virtual absence of missing data and the theoretically interesting variables considered; (2) a worldwide sample of 80 nations adopted from the study on instability by Feierabend and Feierabend;[31] and (3) a much smaller world sample of nine countries chosen according to techniques that parallel Murdock's sampling method in an attempt to achieve what Przeworski and Teune call a "most different systems" design.[32] This sample, which will generally be too small for much cross-national research, does, however, represent a "sampling" solution for controlling for diffusion effects in certain cases, and shows another way of dealing with Galton's problem in cross-national data.

Measuring diffusion through "additional variables." Virtually all studies using cross-cultural data in anthropology, or the diffusion of innovations in sociology and international relations, show the importance of geographical proximity in diffusion.[33] Proximity is important because it tends to be associated with interaction, and we expect that innovations will spread when they are associated with high interaction. Such interaction is likely to be highest when two nearby countries share a common culture. To measure diffusion, then, we have modified Naroll's linked pair test.[34] We paired each nation in our sample with another

[30] Donald G. Morrison, Robert C. Mitchell, John N. Paden, and Hugh M. Stevenson, *Black Africa: A Comparative Handbook* (New York: Free Press 1972).

[31] Ivo K. Feierabend and Rosalind L. Feierabend, "Aggressive Behaviors Within Polities, 1948–1962: A Cross-National Study," in Gillespie and Nesvold (fn. 20), 141-66.

[32] Przeworski and Teune (fn. 14), 34-39.

[33] Everett M. Rogers, *Diffusion of Innovations* (New York: Free Press 1962); Everett M. Rogers and F. Floyd Shoemaker, *Communication of Innovations* (New York: Free Press 1971); Harold E. Driver, *Indians of North America* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1961); Harold E. Driver and Richard P. Chaney, "Cross-Cultural Sampling and Galton's Problem," in Jorgensen (fn. 1), 109-21; Steven J. Brams, "Transaction Flows in the International System," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 60 (December 1966), 880-98.

[34] In Naroll's linked pair test, "The societies in a cross-cultural sample are aligned geographically. . . . With respect to each trait being studied, each tribe is correlated with its neighbor. . . . Thus we are getting a measure of similarity between neighbors. . . . This measure can be compared with similarly generated coefficients of correlation between substantive traits." If the correlation between neighbors' scores is significant, these effects of diffusion can be removed through the use of partial correlations "in which the influence of diffusion as measured by the linked pair method is the control factor." Naroll (fn. 1), 984-86. The partial correlation solution Naroll proposes initially (p. 986), is statistically useless, as is pointed out in Colin Loftin, "Partial Correlation as an Adjustment Procedure for Galton's Problem," *Behavior Science Research*, x (1975), 131-41; see also Strauss and Orans (fn. 9), 578. Rolf Wirsing has shown how partial correlations can be used in conjunction with the linked pair test: "Second-order Partials as a Means to Control for Diffusion," *Behavior Science Research*, x (1975), 143-59. His formula for computing the second-order partials is incorrect,

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nation in the sample in three different ways: (1) Each country was paired with the geographical neighbor in the sample with which it shares the longest border. When there is no common border, it was paired with the geographically closest country in the sample. (2) To try to account not only for proximity, but also for propensity to interact, each country was paired with the geographically closest neighbor with which it shares the major language. If a country has two neighbors with the same major language, the one sharing the longer border with it was chosen. In cases where no neighbor shared the language, pairings were made on the basis of the second language spoken in either country.[35] (3) Each country in the sample was paired with the country in the sample with which it had the highest volume of trade. Other measures, such as the exchange of persons, mail flows, diplomatic exchange, and common membership in international organizations could certainly also serve as indicators of interaction and hence as indirect measures of diffusion. In fact, we would suggest that specific researchers should try to identify the most likely bases of diffusion for the substantive variables they are considering and include these in their collection of data.

To evaluate the effect of diffusion for each variable, the score for each nation is simply correlated with the score on the same characteristic for the country with which it was paired. The data in Table 1 show the correlations in several substantive areas for the African sample, and suggest that there is a good deal of diffusion across our variables. At the same time, our three measures of diffusion are not equally powerful.[36] The pairing based on the closest country with the same lan-

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however, as Wirsing neglects to square the r terms under the radical signs in the denominator (p. 151). Rather than aligning countries geographically, we have paired countries in our sample with other countries on the basis of several different criteria (see text). Hildreth and Naroll (fn. 19, p. 30), suggest that the linked pair method is not an adequate test of the relative importance of diffusion and functional association. Their comment is appropriate for a sample, but not when the entire population is included in the study, as is the case here and in much cross-national research. One unresolved problem is that if the results do show significant effects of diffusion, the actual number of independent cases will be lower than the actual sample size and the probabilities of finding a significant correlation by chance will be higher than they should be. See Naroll, Michik, and Naroll (fn. 1), 128-29.

[35] In the African sample, the pairings were made on the basis of the language spoken by the colonial power immediately prior to independence. This variable was intended to indicate the general political and cultural patterns of mutual attention that developed within the continent. Liberia and Ethiopia were not paired with any other nations because of their lack of a colonial experience. Somalia was dropped because of the uniqueness of its colonial history. Therefore, the sample size is reduced to 29 for the analyses involving this variable.

[36] The statistically significant negative correlations between the nature of a country's legal system and that of the country with which it is paired are curious. They might

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TABLE 1

CORRELATIONS SHOWING DIFFUSION ON 27 VARIABLES IN DATA ON BLACK AFRICA[a]

	Variable[b]	*Neighbor with longest common border*[c]	*Neighbor with longest border sharing major language*[c]	*Partner in sample with most trade*[c]
ELITE	Elite instability (11.2)	.16 (32)	.31* (29)	.20 (30)
COMMUNAL	Communal instability (11.3)	.19 (32)	.16 (29)	.06 (30)
TURMOIL	Domestic turmoil (11.4)	.10 (32)	.06 (29)	.20 (30)
DEATHS	Deaths in political violence (11.5)	.13 (32)	.00 (29)	—.06 (30)
DOCTORS	Inhabitants per physician (4.8)	.53**(32)	.56**(29)	—.06 (30)
GNPCAP	GNP per capita (4.3)	.37* (32)	.23 (29)	.09 (30)
RADIOS	Radios per 1000 population (6.1)	.33* (32)	.45**(29)	—.16 (30)
PAPERS	Newspaper circulation per 1000 population (6.3)	.07 (32)	.36* (29)	.17 (30)
PHONES	Telephones per 10,000 population (6.5)	.16 (32)	.39* (29)	—.06 (30)
CALORIES	Calories per capita[d] (4.11)	.63**(22)	.00 (15)	.20 (30)
LITERACY	Percent literate (5.16)	.39**(32)	.51**(29)	.28 (30)
CITYPOP	Percentage of population in cities over 20,000 (15.2)	.23 (32)	.25 (29)	.03 (30)
LEGSIZE	Size of the legislature (7.1)	.07 (32)	.30* (29)	.05 (30)
ETHNIC	Ethnic representativeness of Cabinet at independence (7.2)	—.17 (32)	.35* (29)	—.21 (30)
LOCGOV	Organization of local government administration (appointed-elected) (7.4)	—.18 (28)	.00 (24)	—.14 (27)
LEGAL	Structure of national legal system (unitary-pluralistic) (7.5)	—.56**(30)	—.47**(26)	—.19 (29)
LEGFRACT	Legislative fractionalization at independence (8.5)	.11 (32)	.48**(29)	.19 (30)
LEVHIER	Levels of hierarchy in local community organization (average across ethnic units) (16.4)	.25 (32)	.52**(29)	.17 (30)
VARHIER	Variation in nation in hierarchy levels in local community (16.4)	.50**(32)	.47**(29)	.14 (30)
TYPHIER	Type of hierarchy system in local community (average across ethnic units) (16.7)	.32* (32)	.09 (29)	.21 (30)
VARTYPE	Variation in hierarchy system in local communities (16.7)	.30 (32)	.27 (28)	—.12 (27)
GOVSPEND	Government spending per capita (9.5)	.23 (32)	.29 (29)	—.06 (30)
PCTGSPEND	Government spending as a proportion of GNP (9.4)	.40**(32)	.41**(29)	—.22 (30)
TAXES	Direct taxes as a percentage of government revenue (9.9)	—.10 (28)	.27 (24)	.20 (25)
ARMY	Armed forces manpower per 100,000 population (10.3)	.36* (32)	.45**(29)	.13 (30)
SECURITY	Internal security forces per 100,000 population (10.4)	.44**(32)	.43**(29)	.15 (30)
DEFBUD	Defense budget as a percentage of government expenditure (10.7)	.55**(32)	.63**(29)	.14 (30)

* Significant at the .05 level
** Significant at the .01 level

[a] The raw data are from Morrison et al., *Black Africa* (fn. 30).
[b] The full definition of each variable is found in Morrison; the number in parentheses refers to the number of each variable in Morrison.
[c] Size of sample in parentheses.
[d] This variable is from Taylor, Hudson, et al., *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators* (fn. 21).

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guage is the most powerful measure of diffusion: the correlations are statistically significant in 16 of the 27 situations, and in some cases are quite sizable. Simple proximity, as measured by the neighbor with the longest common border, shows 12 significant correlations, while the correlations with a country's largest trade partner in the sample are not significant at all.[37] Therefore, in subsequent analyses we used the closest neighbor with shared major language as our measure of diffusion.

In his discussion of the linked pair method, Naroll suggests that after countries are aligned in some fashion, the functional linkage between two traits can be obtained by removing the effects of diffusion through the use of partial correlation. After inspecting the correlation matrix for the African data, we chose a number of potentially interesting bivariate correlations and sought to determine the extent to which the original (supposedly functional) relationships are unchanged after the effects of diffusion are removed. Table 2 shows both the zero-order correlations and the second-order partials which remove the effects of diffusion on both substantive variables. In most cases the correlation falls; however, in a few cases the original correlation actually rises, showing that diffusion can deflate as well as inflate a correlation.[38]

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be understood in terms of several alternative hypotheses: (1) in creating a legal system, states are careful to do things differently from their neighbors, possibly because they do not want to repeat the defects in neighboring systems; (2) the correlation reflects the impact of an unspecified third variable, which, when controlled for, reduces the correlation to zero.

[37] When the colonial language alone (French or English) is correlated with each of the substantive variables, seven of the relationships are significant; thus, while colonial traditions may have had some influence in Africa, they are not as important as simple neighboring or as neighboring plus language commonality.

[38] Most research has assumed that diffusion increases the size of a correlation. See Edwin E. Erikson, "Galton's Worst: A Note on Ember's Reflection," in Schaefer (fn. 1), 63-83. A situation where diffusion lowers a correlation is less obvious intuitively. The easiest way to think about this case is to realize that two variables may diffuse somewhat independently of each other, or that only one variable may diffuse, so that changes in one will not be highly related to changes in the other. When the effect of these changes is removed through partial correlation, the relationship between the two variables may increase. The common assumption that diffusion will only raise a correlation is limited to those situations where two traits diffuse together. When the patterns of diffusion are different, the effect on the substantive correlation is not predictable. This is the case in the correlation in Table 2 between communal conflict and defense spending. The zero-order correlation is .40; the second-order partial, removing the effects of diffusion, is .73. Only one of the substantive variables, defense spending, shows high diffusion (.63); the diffusion score for communal conflict is only .16. The two diffusion measures are unrelated (.15). The other two correlations needed in computing the partials are between communal violence and the diffusion measure for defense spending (−.24), and between defense spending and the diffusion measure for communal violence (.18). There is some evidence that in cases where the correlation between the two diffusion measures is very high, the partial correlation procedure may

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TABLE 2

SIMPLE CORRELATIONS AND SECOND-ORDER PARTIALS REMOVING EFFECTS OF DIFFUSION ON SELECTED CORRELATIONS IN AFRICAN SAMPLE[a]

Variables			*Zero-Order Correlations*[b]	*Second-Order Partial Correlations*[b]
DEFBUD	×	PHONES	−.32* (32)	−.11 (29)
DEFBUD	×	GOVSPEND	−.28 (32)	−.16 (29)
DEFBUD	×	LITERACY	−.45**(32)	−.05 (29)
DEFBUD	×	COMMUNAL	.40**(32)	.73**(29)
DEFBUD	×	ELITE	.31* (32)	.34* (29)
ETHNIC	×	GNPCAP	.43**(32)	.55**(29)
ETHNIC	×	LOCGOV	−.34* (32)	−.49**(29)
PCTGSPEND	×	DOCTORS	−.36* (32)	−.31 (29)
PCTGSPEND	×	TYPHIER	.37* (32)	.20 (29)
ARMY	×	CITYPOP	.30* (32)	.19 (29)
ARMY	×	ELITE	.28 (32)	.19 (29)
CITYPOP	×	GOVSPEND	.67**(32)	.65**(29)
SECURITY	×	GOVSPEND	.52**(32)	.46**(29)
LEGFRACT	×	DEATHS	.46**(32)	.47**(29)

* Significant at the .05 level
** Significant at the .01 level

[a] The data used in computing the correlations come from Morrison et al., *Black Africa* (fn. 30). For complete definitions of each variable, see the code numbers in Table 1, which refer to the variable numbers in Morrison.
[b] Size of sample in parentheses.

Seven of the twelve zero-order correlations that were statistically significant no longer are.

So far, our procedures have been no different than those suggested by Naroll and Wirsing (except that we have used the entire population rather than a sample) in their discussions of the linked pair method and the use of partial correlation. For each variable, we initially examined the correlation between each country's score and the score of the country with which it was paired to find the degree to which each variable diffuses. In the second-order partial correlation analysis, we removed the effects of diffusion in the bivariate relationships so that

be biased in favor of the diffusion explanation because it removes variance attributed to the diffusion of each variable individually as well as that which is due to their association in the neighboring country, Wirsing (fn. 34), 156. Some of the latter variance, however, may be due to functional association. To avoid this, Loftin (fn. 29), 133-35, proposes analyzing the correlation between residuals, as does Elder (personal communication). Loftin also points out that diffusion may lead to underestimation of the standard error because samples appear more homogeneous than the population from which they are drawn (fn. 29), 429.

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the correlation between the two variables might be explained in functional terms.

Regression Analysis. The foregoing procedure can be understood more generally under the framework of regression analysis, as Loftin and Ward point out.[39] In the following equation,

$$Y_i = a + bX_i + E_i \qquad (1)$$

Y_i is the ith observation of the dependent variable Y; X_i is the ith observation of the independent variable X; a and b are constants representing the intercept and the slope of the linear regression; and E_i is the ith error term or disturbance variable of E which represents all factors influencing the dependent variable other than the independent variable. In equation (1), diffusion variables are not explicitly part of the model. They can be added quite easily, however, as Loftin and Ward show.[40] The partial correlation solution may be stated in regression terms as:

$$Y_i = a + bX_i + cX_j + dY_j + E_i \qquad (2)$$

where X_j and Y_j are the variables measuring diffusion of X and Y (such as the score of the geographically closest neighbor sharing the same language).

Viewing Galton's problem in terms of a regression model has several advantages. First, we can state our assumptions about the relationships between the variables explicitly. Second, we are able to use multiple regression to examine the relative impact of diffusion and functional variables on any particular dependent variable, instead of trying to "remove" the effects of diffusion to analyze the results solely in functional terms. Under this approach neither the diffusion nor the functional explanation is considered somehow "better" than the other. Using the regression model, we can distinguish between three situations: (1) the independent variable is significantly related to the dependent variable, while the diffusion variables are not; (2) the diffusion variables are significantly related to the dependent variable while the substantive ones are not; and (3) both the substantive and diffusion variables are significantly related to the dependent variable and the results allow us to evaluate the relative impact of each.

When certain assumptions of the regression model are not met, either the partial correlation or the multiple regression solutions may

[39] Colin Loftin and Sally K. Ward, "An Evaluation of Wirsing's Adjustment Procedure for the Effects of Galton's Problem," *Behavior Science Research* (forthcoming).
[40] *Ibid.*

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be biased. In particular, when the disturbance variable (E_i) is correlated with any of the independent variables, the estimates of the regression coefficients may be biased.[41] This fact is not at all trivial in dealing with Galton's problem because we might expect to find situations where the disturbance term is affected by a variable that also affects one of the independent variables. (We might say that the same variable affects the diffusion of each in a parallel manner.) Where this seems to be taking place, one solution is to specify additional independent variables that are then explicitly brought into the model. The inclusion of two additional variables, X_j and Y_j, in equation (2) above is a first step toward doing this. If we have reason to believe that there may be several bases of diffusion in any situation, additional independent variables should be specified until the disturbance variable is again normally distributed and uncorrelated with any of the independent variables.

Using the African data, we ran two sorts of regressions. The first involved only a single substantive variable and two diffusion variables (one for the dependent and one for the independent variable); the second involved as many as four substantive variables plus a diffusion variable for each one. The multiple regressions were first calculated using all possible independent variables. When the results showed the contribution of one or more variables to be insignificant, these variables were dropped and the regression recalculated, so that the only variables retained in the final equations presented in Table 3 are those where the *F*-ratio is 2.00 or larger.[42] The data in Table 3 show the variation in the effects of function and diffusion; the selected results presented here clearly indicate all three types of outcomes described above. Because of space limitations, we will discuss only one regression of

[41] *Ibid.*

[42] In the presence of multicollinearity, or high correlation among the independent variables, the variances (or standard errors) of the estimated coefficients will be relatively high. Though the estimates are unbiased, they are imprecise, so that the hypothesis that the estimated coefficients do not differ from zero often cannot be rejected. Large standard errors and nonsignificant relationships may be due to other causes as well as to multicollinearity. When multicollinearity is present, one available strategy is to combine highly correlated variables in a single index and estimate their joint effects. In short, without additional information there is little that can be done about the problem. Jan Kmenta, *Elements of Econometrics* (New York: Macmillan 1971), 390. Rockwell discusses various criteria that have been proposed to indicate the presence of multicollinearity and suggests using the Haitovsky test of the singularity of the matrix. When a matrix is significantly nonsingular, multicollinearity can be rejected as a problem. Richard C. Rockwell, "Assessment of Multicollinearity: The Haitovsky Test of the Determinant," *Sociological Methods and Research*, III (February 1975), 308-20.

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each type from Table 3 and suggest in only the broadest manner the directions a satisfactory explanation might take.

FUNCTIONAL EXPLANATION IS ADEQUATE

(1) The simplest case, and the rarest in our data, occurs when variation in a dependent variable is accounted for by an intra-system variable, suggesting a functional explanation. That is the sort of finding generally offered in cross-national research. For example, as is shown in Table 3, the number of deaths in domestic political violence is negatively related to the level of government spending as a proportion of GNP, and unrelated to the neighbor's political violence or level of government spending. The functional explanation for this finding might be similar to that offered by the Feierabends: that in systems where the provision of social services is low, frustration builds up and subsequent politically based aggression is likely to be high.

EXTERNAL (DIFFUSION) VARIABLES ARE IMPORTANT

(2) The second group of regressions in Table 3 represents situations where the diffusion variables enter into the equations, but the substantive variables are unimportant. Here we are pushed to propose explanations that involve inter-system processes. It would not, however, be appropriate to argue that intra-system processes can be ignored here: any complete explanation would have to suggest how and why the inter-system processes produce certain internal effects. The identification of diffusion, then, is not an explanation in itself, only a start toward developing one. Further, we should identify general processes of diffusion rather than consider all diffusion as simply historical accident and unsystematic in character.[43]

In African nations, the size of the defense budget as a proportion of government expenditure is predicted by a diffusion variable: the size of the neighbor's defense budget as a proportion of his government spending. Similarly, the proportion of the population serving in the army is best predicted by the proportion of the neighbor's population in the army. Interestingly, in both cases, the substantive variables measuring government expenditure and development (as indexed by the population living in cities) are not statistically significant. It seems that the forces determining a country's defense policies are external to

[43] Vermeulen and de Ruijter (fn. 10) are right in suggesting that most cross-cultural studies have tended to treat diffusion in this manner, but we wish to stress that explanations that include diffusion processes may be just as nomothetic as functional explanations.

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TABLE 3

SELECTED MULTIPLE REGRESSION TO EVALUATE THE RELATIVE CONTRIBUTION OF INTERNAL (FUNCTIONAL) AND EXTERNAL (DIFFUSION) VARIABLES IN AFRICAN SAMPLE[a]

Dependent Variable	*Independent Variables in Regression Equation*	*Regression Coefficient*	*Beta*	*Standard Error*		*Independent Variables Not Entering Equation (F-level below 2.00)*
(1) Intra-system (function) variables are the best predictors of the dependent variable:						
DEATHS	PCTGSPEND	−.20	−.43	.08	$R = .43$	*N*DEATHS[b]
	intercept	6.61			$R^2 = .18$	*N*PCTGSPEND
GOVSPEND	CITYPOP	2.43	.67	.52	$R = .67$	*N*CITYPOP
	intercept	4.70			$R^2 = .45$	*N*GOVSPEND
DEATHS	LEGFRACT	.05	.46	.02	$R = .46$	GOVSPEND
	intercept	1.53			$R^2 = .21$	LITERACY
						*N*DEATHS
						*N*LEGFRACT
						*N*GOVSPEND
						*N*LITERACY
(2) Inter-system (diffusion) variables are the best predictors of the dependent variable:						
DEFBUD	*N*DEFBUD	.67	.63	.16	$R = .63$	GOVSPEND
	intercept	3.14			$R^2 = .40$	*N*GOVSPEND
ARMY	*N*ARMY	.74	.45	.28	$R = .45$	CITYPOP
	intercept	43.27			$R^2 = .19$	*N*CITYPOP
PCTGSPEND	*N*PCTGSPEND	.46	.41	.20	$R = .41$	LITERACY
	intercept	8.84			$R^2 = .17$	*N*LITERACY

(3) Both intra-system (function) and inter-system (diffusion) variables enter the equation:

LEGFRACT	*N*LEGFRACT	.52	.44	.23	$R = .58$	*N*LITERACY
	LITERACY	.65	.34	.39	$R^2 = .34$	GOVSPEND
	intercept	6.89				*N*GOVSPEND
						LEGAL
						*N*LEGAL
ETHNIC	*N*ETHNIC	.72	.75	.13	$R = .87$	*N*LITERACY
	*N*LOCGOV	20.29	.60	4.72	$R^2 = .76$	
	GNPCAP	.23	.55	.05		
	LITERACY	— .61	— .30	.26		
	LOCGOV	— 10.28	— .29	4.72		
	*N*GNPCAP	— .12	— .27	.06		
	intercept	— 11.51				
SECURITY	*N*CITYPOP	3.11	.47	1.00	$R = .80$	*N*SECURITY
	RADIOS	.56	.36	.21	$R^2 = .64$	PCTGSPEND
	CITYPOP	2.23	.35	.91		*N*PCTGSPEND
	*N*ARMY	— .32	— .37	.16		*N*RADIOS
	ARMY	.16	.31	.08		
	intercept	29.42				

[a] The data are from Morrison et al., *Black Africa* (fn. 30). For complete definitions of each variable, see the code numbers in Table 1 which refer to the variable numbers in Morrison.

[b] An *N* preceding the name of the variable refers to the measure of diffusion for that variable, the score received by the country each state is paired with in terms of geographical and cultural proximity.

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the country, as arms-race theory would predict. African states are sensitive to the arms expenditures and military buildups of neighboring states that are culturally similar. Internal variables, such as level of resources and development, are less effective predictors of defense outlays and army size.

BOTH INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL VARIABLES ARE INVOLVED

(3) The third section of Table 3 shows situations where both substantive and diffusion variables enter into the regression equation. Here a complete explanation must consider both. It must account for both the intra-system pressures represented by the substantive variable(s) and the inter-system pressures created by the processes of diffusion as in situation (2) above. Diffusion and function are not incompatible with each other here, but do represent two different sorts of processes in a political system, which need to be combined into a single explanation.

A relatively simple example is the case where the degree of legislative fractionalization (representation of many parties) at independence is related to two variables: the degree of fractionalization of the neighbor's legislature at independence (diffusion), and the country's own literacy rate (function). The fractionalization of a neighbor's legislature may reflect the working of norms concerning the representation of minorities or minority views among mutually responsive neighbors. The association between literacy and legislative fractionalization suggests that the institutionalization of political diversity may be more widely held in states where there is a greater spread of education and democratic norms, as Lerner and others have hypothesized.

These examples show the importance of including both external (diffusion) and internal (function) variables in cross-national studies. In several cases, the results indicate that conclusions based only on internal variables—the most common feature of cross-national political research today—are inadequate. Frequently, diffusion processes are also at work, and explanations must consequently take them into account. In some cases, they will not be particularly important, as is shown in our first group of regressions.[44] Our point is only that they need to be considered among the plausible rival hypotheses that can explain a set of findings. To illustrate further how such an analysis might be done, we will now re-examine data from a well-known cross-national study which failed to include any diffusion variables.

[44] Cobb and Elder report a similar finding when they show that various forms of interaction between European states, such as mail flows, student exchange, and trade are virtually unrelated to the development of positive attitudes toward states for whom the interaction levels are high (fn. 21), 96-99.

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Diffusion versus function in explaining instability. Feierabend and Feierabend have found a positive relationship between 8 indicators of socioeconomic development and political stability in a sample of 84 nations.[45] They suggest a functional explanation: that greater political stability is achieved in the more developed countries because the level of systematic frustration and subsequent aggression (in the form of political violence and extra-legal activity of various sorts) is lower. An alternative explanation for instability, based on processes of diffusion, suggests that the correlation is due to modeling behavior in neighboring states, most of whom tend to have relatively similar levels of development. A more sophisticated explanation might combine the two to argue that instability diffuses selectively and only to countries with certain requisite conditions. To test these competing explanations, we have reanalyzed the data used in the Feierabends' study.[46] We first paired each country in the sample with its geographically closest neighbor sharing the same major language.[47] As the Feierabends report, and as our reanalysis of their data shows, there is a significant positive relationship between socioeconomic development and political stability.[48] However, Table 4 also shows significant effects of diffusion for each variable, as a country's score is highly correlated with the score of the country with which it is paired on the same variable. Interestingly, the diffusion scores are higher for the socioeconomic variables than for the measure of instability.

To remove the effects of diffusion, we then calculated the second-order partial correlations between instability and each of the socioeconomic variables. The results presented in Table 4 (column 3) show a sharp *decrease* in all the correlations that were originally significant. Only the correlations between instability and newspaper circulation per capita, telephones per capita, and literacy rate remain significant, although the absolute value of the correlations decreases. Clearly, the effects of diffusion make the status of a functional explanation incomplete and highly tenuous. A complete account would have to include

[45] Feierabend and Feierabend (fn. 31), 154.

[46] The list of the 84 nations used in the study and the instability scores for each is provided in Feierabend and Feierabend (fn. 31), 146. The data for the measures of socioeconomic development are from Bruce M. Russett and others, *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators* (New Haven: Yale University Press 1964).

[47] When no neighbor in the sample spoke the same language, pairing was made on the basis of second-language speakers.

[48] The Feierabends report their findings using dichotomized data and chi square tests (fn. 31), 154. We have treated the data as at least ordinal in nature and present Pearson correlations. Only in the case of persons per physician does the significance of the results differ. When we use Spearman rank-order correlations, there are no differences at all with their results at the zero-order (Table 5).

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TABLE 4

INSTABILITY AND SOCIOECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, SIMPLE CORRELATIONS AND SECOND-ORDER PARTIALS

	Zero-Order Correlations		*Second-Order Partial Correlations*
	Score on Variable by Score for Closest Neighbor Sharing Major Language[a]	*Instability*[a]	*to Remove Diffusion in Correlation with Instability*[a]
Instability	.19* (81)	1.00 (81)	—
Newspaper circulation	.74** (81)	— .49** (82)	— .32** (81)
Calories per day	.73** (80)	— .30** (81)	— .04 (80)
Doctors per capita	.70** (75)	.02 (80)	.05 (75)
Telephones per capita	.78** (75)	— .49** (79)	— .31** (75)
Literacy rate	.86** (81)	— .34** (82)	— .23* (81)
Radios per capita	.76** (77)	— .32** (80)	— .10 (77)
Percentage urban population	.55** (77)	— .25** (79)	— .11 (77)
GNP per capita	.86** (81)	— .43** (82)	— .18 (81)

* Significant at the .05 level
** Significant at the .01 level

[a] Size of sample in parentheses.

the effects of both diffusion and function. To juxtapose the two types of variables more systematically, we ran a series of regressions using three independent variables each time: one of the seven substantive variables (excluding doctors where the simple *r* was insignificant), a neighbor's score on the same substantive variable, and a neighbor's instability score. The results, which are certainly suggested from the simple correlations, show that in four of the cases the substantive variable is the most important one in the regression equation; in the other three, the most important variable is one of the diffusion measures. From these results, we again see that both diffusion and functional processes are needed to account for political instability. The exclusive focus on internal (functional) variables in the Feierabends' research, as in most other cross-national analyses, is a failure in part because it does not consider the real effects that Galton foresaw more than three-quarters of a century ago.

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Diffusion in the "most different systems" design: A "sampling" solution. Following the lead of Murdock[49] and Przeworski and Teune,[50] we developed a third sample to control for diffusion so that the resulting correlations might be interpreted in functional terms. Murdock identifies 60 ethnographic regions in the world; he suggests that researchers doing cross-cultural investigations select randomly within each region, and that no sample include more than one culture from each area. The same logic is behind the "most different systems" design advocated by Przeworski and Teune. This design maximizes variance in the dependent variable and then tries to identify the independent variables that account for it. By including only units from different areas in the sample, the effects of diffusion are limited, if not eliminated, and any resulting relationships can be more easily interpreted in terms of intra-systemic effects.[51]

We initially had some doubt about whether this strategy made any sense at all in an international system where the possibilities and realities of interaction, and hence diffusion, between even two distant countries are far greater than the chances of diffusion in an ethnographic sample.[52] Nonetheless, we became persuaded that the endeavor was at least interesting enough to try, although we are not fully certain about how the results ought to be interpreted. As a basis for sampling, we began with Russett's study which empirically identifies eight major trade regions in the world.[53] One country from each region was included in our sample; we added an African state, since Africa is underrepresented in his data.[54]

The substantive problem is the same one we just examined using the worldwide sample: the relationship between political instability and

[49] Murdock (fn. 9).

[50] Przeworski and Teune (fn. 14), 34-39.

[51] Vermeulen and de Ruijter advocate a strategy of "stratified random sampling in which the different strata represent different levels of the independent variable under study" (fn. 10), 37. This strategy has some common elements with the "most different systems" design.

[52] Naroll is cautious and does not rule out the possibility of diffusion between even the two most remote cultures in his samples, but there does seem to be more face validity to this design in cross-cultural than in cross-national research as a way of ruling out diffusion effects.

[53] Bruce M. Russett, "Delineating International Regions," in J. David Singer, ed., *Quantitative International Politics* (New York: Free Press 1968), 317-52.

[54] We first aimed at getting a core country in each of Russett's regions. In order to try to maximize regional differences and minimize diffusion effects, it was replaced, however, if it was also in another of Russett's regions. In addition, we wanted states for which there would be no missing data. In adding an African country, we selected what seemed to be the most representative one for which the Feierabends' instability score existed. The countries included in the final sample are: El Salvador, South Korea, Thailand, Colombia, Lebanon, Turkey, Norway, Argentina, and Ghana.

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levels of socioeconomic development. Table 5 presents the correlations that can be compared to those in the larger worldwide sample used by the Feierabends. Instead of finding all eight relationships significant, we now find that *none* are. Furthermore, this is not just an artifact of the smaller sample size which requires a higher correlation to achieve significance. Of the eight correlations that were significant and no longer are, six are smaller in this "most different systems" sample, and one of the two that is larger is in the opposite direction than predicted by the Feierabends' theory.[55] Although the Feierabends' sample is based

TABLE 5

INSTABILITY BY SOCIOECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, FEIERABENDS' AND "MOST DIFFERENT SYSTEMS" SAMPLES COMPARED; SPEARMAN RANK-ORDER CORRELATIONS

	Feierabends' Sample[a]	*Most Different Systems Sample*[a]
Newspaper circulation	— .37**(82)	.29 (9)
Calories per day	— .29**(81)	.17 (9)
Doctors per capita	.24**(80)	.33 (9)
Telephones per capita	— .36**(79)	.19 (9)
Literacy rate	— .41**(82)	— .07 (9)
Radios per capita	— .35**(80)	— .07 (9)
Percentage urban population	— .22* (79)	.26 (9)
GNP per capita	— .37**(82)	— .14 (9)

* Significant at the .05 level
** Significant at the .01 level

[a] Size of sample in parentheses.

on almost nine times as many cases, the smaller sample based on Russett's trade regions may be considered more useful because the effects of diffusion, which are quite important in the Feierabends' data, have been partially removed. We would expect this sort of reversal to occur in other cross-national studies as well. We selected the Feierabends' data as an example because they allowed for a relatively clear examination of our methodological point: that diffusion effects need to be estimated empirically along with the intra-system process,

[55] Table 5 presents the Spearman rank-order correlations for both the Feierabends' and the "most different systems" samples. Because the smaller sample severely violated the assumptions of normality, the Pearson r should not be used. The correlation coefficients are actually not very different, however. Only the relationships between instability and telephones per capita and GNP per capita are statistically significant for the "most different systems" sample when the Pearson r is used.

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as in the previous examples, or else controlled for, as in the "most different systems" design.

Although the "most different systems" sampling design does show the strong diffusion effects in the worldwide data, we think it is inferior to the "additional variables" design which uses partial correlation and regression. First, it is not safe to contend that in a sample drawn from contemporary states in the international system we have effectively ruled out diffusion effects, as Murdock and Naroll have been able to do using cross-cultural samples. Their research strategies rely heavily on geographical proximity as a basis of diffusion, but in the international system diffusion may take place on other grounds as well.[56] Second, this design is inferior because it makes difficult the development of an explanation that can include both diffusion and functional processes. Here we first "rule out" diffusion and then look at function. Instead, as Vermeulen and de Ruijter argue, we need to integrate both into a single explanation.

III. Conclusions

Most approaches to Galton's problem have attempted first to eliminate effects of diffusion and then to consider the remaining relationship between two variables as an effect of function. Our approach to Galton's problem is somewhat different: in most of the solutions we discuss, we have attempted to test for the effects of diffusion and function simultaneously, to compare their relative strengths, and, where necessary, to propose that explanations ought to be based on both processes. The ways in which states were paired in our tests for diffusion were based on both theoretical reasonableness and the availability of data. Creative researchers will surely develop additional measures of diffusion, some of which may have a general utility, such as those used here, and some of which may be relevant to particular traits or behaviors. In addition, we expect to see new techniques for evaluating diffusion and functional effects.

One method recently developed in anthropology may be adapted to continuous data. This strategy attempts to measure diffusion in several directions at once through use of a matrix rather than through pairing a country with only one other.[57] When using interactional data such as

[56] The effect of geographical proximity in the international system is not quite clear. See, for example, the discussion in Cobb and Elder (fn. 21), 26-28, 88-90; Mohr (fn. 20).

[57] Rolf Wirsing (fn. 9) presents techniques that are variations on methods used by geographers. Pryor (fn. 9) calculates a diffusion possibility matrix in which each unit (culture, nation) receives a score based on the degree to which it shares traits likely

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diplomatic exchange or trade, the matrix method may provide a more sophisticated measure of the pattern of diffusion in the international system than the measures used here. Ultimately, good diffusion measures may be difficult to develop, particularly for the spread of behavior or traits that are not material in origin. For example, the rise of independence movements after World War II, first in Asia and then in Africa, and the spread of student discontent in the late 1960's in both the developed and the underdeveloped countries, seem clear examples of diffusion. They are not particularly well explained simply by pressures within nations. Geographical proximity, common language, trade, mail flows, diplomatic exchanges, and other commonly used measures of diffusion would probably not be good indicators in these instances. Additional measures of diffusion must be developed if cases like these are to be understood.[58]

The measures of diffusion used here and by Naroll place the heaviest emphasis on geographical proximity. As a result, our tests for diffusion may be overly severe in certain situations in that they identify a correlation as resulting from diffusion when that is not the case. This error is most likely to occur when the variables under study are systematically related to ecological or environmental conditions which do in fact cluster throughout the world. For example, since soil types and weather conditions are clustered geographically, variables that are likely to be related to them, such as farming technologies, will also be likely to cluster. On the basis of the correlation alone, clustering is not necessarily evidence for diffusion.[59] If our tests for diffusion are

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to promote diffusion, such as closeness or common language, with each other unit in the sample. He then offers a variety of tests that calculate the degree to which the diffusion possibility scores are related to the actual distribution of the substantive traits under study. Michael Weinstein has suggested to us that each country in the sample might receive a diffusion score for each variable based on the scores for all other countries in the sample, weighted by their similarity in terms of cultural traits, their proximity, or any other plausible ways in which the trait at hand might have diffused.

[58] Our discussion is relevant primarily for cross-sectional data. When time-series data are available, techniques such as those used by Midlarsky (fn. 23) or Gray (fn. 27) should be particularly useful in identifying, if not explaining, how diffusion works.

[59] Naroll makes this point in his first article on Galton's problem (fn. 9, "Two Solutions . . ."), 30-31. Vermeulen and de Ruijter argue, however, that Naroll and others are guilty of categorizing ecological and geographical clustering of traits as diffusion (fn. 10), 34. This problem might be handled empirically by including variables that measure these traits in the analysis. Unless the correlations among the independent variables are extremely high, the researcher can then test the alternative hypotheses. Erikson offers the suggestion that certain types of variables are more likely than others to diffuse and to create higher and lower risks of incurring Galton's problem (fn. 38), 78-81. For a further discussion of differential diffusion rates across substantive areas, see Stanley Witkowski, "Galton's Opportunity: The Hologeistic

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overly severe in the case of ecological and environmental variables, they probably are not severe enough here because we had to pair each country with a single partner and thus could not account for either indirect influence or multiple sources working simultaneously. As mentioned above, a matrix-type method such as that developed by Wirsing or Pryor might be more appropriate to handle this problem.

A final question raised by Galton's problem is that of the statistical consequence of analyzing samples where the cases are not independent. Do neighboring nations having similar scores on a number of traits represent independent units that should all be included in a sample? Anthropologists doing cross-cultural work have generally answered this question in the negative.[60] Political scientists engaged in cross-national research have used other criteria for sample selection, such as membership in the United Nations or the availability of data. If cross-national researchers were to accept the verdict of most anthropologists, the question of appropriate sampling units would need to be resolved.[61] For most practical purposes, a sample as small as the one we drew on the basis of Russett's trade regions is impractical. Possibly a general answer is not called for, but sampling units can be defined on the basis of substantive variables under study. The most radical solution suggests that all cross-national—and possibly much other cross-unit—research is inappropriate because of the lack of independence of cases.[62] Although this last position strikes us as extreme for the moment, we would welcome discussion of it among people involved in cross-unit research. As Naroll points out, the same problems that confront an-

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Study of Historical Processes," in Schaefer (fn. 1), 84-112. The independence of different processes of diffusion is seen in the correlation matrix of the diffusion measures in the African sample, where the variation in both the magnitude and, in a few cases, the direction of the diffusion is large.

[60] Several authors have suggested techniques which try to correct for diffusion through the estimation of an adjusted sample size which is lower than the actual *N*. See Strauss and Orans (fn. 9), and Simonton (fn. 9).

[61] Not all anthropologists consider Galton's problem important. For example, see Vermeulen and de Ruijter's quote (fn. 51). Melvin Ember also suggests that random sampling is all that is needed, even if some of the units in the sample happen to be in close contact with each other. See "An Empirical Test of Galton's Problem," *Ethnology*, x (January 1971), 98-106. Loftin's (fn. 29) and Erikson's (fn. 38) responses to Ember show the weakness of this position.

[62] Several anthropologists have suggested that the most important problem is the nature of the units under study in cross-cultural research and the degree to which they can be compared. Known as Flower's problem, this question is beyond the scope of this paper. See Barbara Frankel, "Reply Comment on Vermeulen and de Ruijter," *Current Anthropology*, xvi (March 1975), 39; J. A. Barnes, "Comment on Strauss and Orans," *Current Anthropology*, xvi (December 1975), 585.

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thropologists are present in cross-unit work in the other social sciences. Our purposes in selecting cross-national data to illustrate Galton's problem are first, to demonstrate its relevance, and second, to suggest some uncomplicated empirical methods for estimating the relative importance of diffusion and function.

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FOREIGN POLICY DECISION MAKING: The Case of Canada and Nuclear Weapons

By HOWARD H. LENTNER*

IMPORTANT foreign policy decisions in the Canadian parliamentary system are ordinarily made by the Cabinet under the leadership of the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for External Affairs; in decisions concerning defense, the leadership includes the Minister of National Defence. In the literal and legal sense, this proposition is true, but it fails to reveal a very complex process involved in making these decisions.

One important decision in 1963—to accept nuclear weapons—is analyzed here in order to gain insight into the decision-making process. The decision was an unusual one, for it was essentially made by the Leader of the Opposition and required the operation of the electoral process for implementation. In trying to develop a general explanation of the foreign policy process, however, one must include the exceptional case. Thus the events examined in this study, and their unique character, are interesting primarily as they reveal how foreign policy is made in Canada, in any parliamentary system, and, finally, in any political system.

The dependent variable in this case is clear and simple: it is the decision of Lester B. Pearson, as Leader of the Opposition, to adopt a position on behalf of the Liberal Party in favor of the acceptance of nuclear weapons for Canada. The independent and intervening variables are less clear. Despite a good deal of writing on the topic,[1] there is no broadly accepted explanation of why Pearson made the decision and what factors led to it. Controversy surrounds his motives. His supporters—mostly Liberals—are perplexed and seek explanations that bring about some consistency between this decision and what they believe to be Pearson's broader values. His opponents—mostly Progressive Conservatives—regard him as cynical at best, or manipulated by

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[1] The most complete narrative of this case is in Peyton Lyon, *Canada In World Affairs*, XII, 1961–1963 (Toronto: Oxford University Press 1968), 66-223. Pearson's own account of his decision is in chap. 3 of *Mike: The Memoirs of the Rt. Hon. Lester B. Pearson*, Vol. 3, 1957–1968, ed. J. A. Munro and A. I. Inglis (Toronto and Buffalo: University of Toronto Press 1975).

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the United States at worst. There is also no settled explanation of Prime Minister Diefenbaker's behavior in the course of these events. Perhaps the most widely accepted explanation is Peter Newman's thesis that a flaw in Diefenbaker's character—that is, his inability to be decisive—was responsible for his predicament.[2]

The thesis of this article is that the explanation of this decision must be sought in a rather complex political process in which personal political style played a large part. Following a review of the facts, I shall undertake a systematic treatment of the different independent and intervening variables. I shall assess the impact of variables upon one another, and conclude the article with an attempt to weigh the relative significance of the variables at work.

Review of the Facts

The Diefenbaker ministry, through Canada's membership in NATO and NORAD, had undertaken in the late 1950's and early 1960's to acquire several weapons systems that would have been effective only if armed with nuclear warheads. There was a time lag between the initial arrangements and the date at which they were expected to be put into effect. Before February 1959, "[a] great deal of time and effort had been devoted by ministers and officials to the use to be made of nuclear weapons by Canadian forces or by U.S. forces on Canadian soil or in Canadian airspace."[3] The result of these efforts was "a statement which had been gone over by ministers and officials in the U.S.-Canadian Cabinet Committee on Defence,"[4] made by Prime Minister Diefenbaker to the House of Commons on February 20, 1959:

> The full potential of these defensive weapons is achieved only when they are armed with nuclear warheads. The government is, therefore, examining with the United States government questions connected with the acquisition of nuclear warheads for Bomarc and other defensive weapons for use by the Canadian forces in Canada, and the storage of warheads in Canada. Problems connected with the arming of the Canadian brigade in Europe with short range nuclear weapons for NATO's defence tasks are also being studied.[5]

[2] Peter C. Newman, *Renegade in Power: The Diefenbaker Years* (Toronto/Montreal: McClelland and Stewart Limited 1963). See esp. chap. 23.

[3] Confidential interview, January 31, 1975.

[4] *Ibid.* The Canada-United States Committee on Joint Defence, composed of Cabinet officials of the two governments, was established as a result of conversations in Ottawa between President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Diefenbaker in July 1958. Its first meeting was held in Paris on December 15, 1958.

[5] Canada, House of Commons, *Debates*, February 20, 1959, p. 1223.

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The ministers involved in developing the statement on the principles that would govern the use of nuclear weapons in Canada were Prime Minister John G. Diefenbaker, Minister of Finance Donald Fleming, Minister of National Defence Douglas Harkness, and Secretary of State for External Affairs Sidney Smith. Shortly after Mr. Diefenbaker's announcement in Commons, a crucial change in personnel occurred. Dr. Smith died on March 17, and the Prime Minister—after holding the External Affairs portfolio himself for nearly three months—on June 4 appointed Howard C. Green to be Secretary of State for External Affairs. (It should be noted that Mr. Diefenbaker had been the external affairs chairman of the Conservative caucus after the demise of Gordon Graydon in 1953, and that he had previously served as his own foreign minister for three months in 1957.)

Green was a determined advocate of disarmament. Because he saw an inconsistency between this advocacy and the emplacement of nuclear weapons on Canadian soil, he opposed Canada's acquisition of nuclear warheads. Diefenbaker attempted to work out an arrangement with the United States under which the nuclear warheads for the weapons systems in Canada would be stored in the United States and delivered to Canadian sites only at the time their actual use was imminent. Mr. Green would have agreed to such an arrangement, but he was never certain that the Prime Minister would finally decide in his favor. At the same time, Green "was not worried about the weapons in NATO." He indicated in a recent interview that he might have resigned if Mr. Diefenbaker had not decided his way on the nuclear weapons issue, but he never told this to Mr. Diefenbaker.[6]

For the Prime Minister, this problem of a split in his Cabinet over the nuclear weapons issue was compounded by another split which, although analytically discrete, became enmeshed in the first. The 1962 elections had resulted in a minority government. A number of ministers, eventually under the leadership of George Hees, attempted to oust the Prime Minister.[7] Defence Minister Harkness, who was the leading advocate of nuclear weapons for Canada, was not a member of the anti-Diefenbaker faction. "Actually, Harkness warned [Green] about the group and asked what should be done." Green has stated, "This group got mixed up in the nuclear weapons question—the nuclear issue was really only used as a means to an end. I don't know how the Cabinet would have decided on nuclear weapons alone."[8]

[6] Interview with the Honourable Howard C. Green, August 16, 1974.

[7] The events involved in this unsuccessful venture are described in Newman (fn. 2), chap. 24.

[8] Interview with Green (fn. 6).

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Prime Minister Diefenbaker found that he could not adhere to the policy he had announced on February 20, 1959, "because he didn't think he could carry the Cabinet and carry the country. He began to seek a compromise to see if he could finesse the issue rather than face it. The compromise didn't work."[9] Diefenbaker's problem with Cabinet unity became acute during the Cuban missile crisis, and his behavior gave the appearance of indecisiveness.

The Canadian Government in that crisis had "dithered"; Canada was the single American ally who did not immediately back up and cooperate with the United States.[10] "The issue was . . . the Canadian attitude toward the alert [of NORAD]. . . . Diefenbaker was not as perplexed about that issue as he was over nuclear weapons."[11] Green was opposed to placing the Canadian component of NORAD on alert. In his words, "We felt we shouldn't do anything to urge the Americans on, not to interfere with them, but not egg them on."[12] "Green is a strong-minded man and doesn't easily give in," and Diefenbaker was unwilling to disagree openly with him. "He felt it was more a matter of time in bringing Green around."[13] Diefenbaker, then, was not actually indecisive in the Cuban missile crisis, but he appeared to be so, and this added to his problem in trying to resolve the issue of nuclear weapons.

The crisis revealed the conceptual flaw in Mr. Diefenbaker's compromise: even if there had been an agreement, there would not have been any possibility to bring in the warheads to make them an effective deterrent. To some people, the Government's action showed that Canada was not fulfilling its commitments to its allies. Defence Minister Harkness continued to press for the acquisition of weapons and eventually, on February 3, 1963, resigned.

The attempt to oust the Prime Minister had fizzled by mid-January, but Mr. Diefenbaker faced a broader political problem. Not only had the splits in the Cabinet become public; in addition, a press conference by General Lauris Norstad on January 3, and a statement by the U.S. State Department on January 30, made Diefenbaker's political problem much more difficult by clearly taking the position that Canada had a commitment to accept nuclear warheads. Moreover, Lester Pearson,

[9] Confidential interview, July 29, 1974.

[10] Although the American component of NORAD was ordered on alert on October 22, the Cabinet did not order a similar alert for the Canadian component until October 24. Robert Spencer, "External Affairs and Defence," *Canadian Annual Review* (1962), 129-30.

[11] Confidential interview, June 19, 1975.

[12] Interview with Green (fn. 6).

[13] Confidential interview, June 19, 1975.

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the Leader of the Opposition, made a speech at Scarborough, Ontario, on January 12, in which, contrary to previous Liberal policy, he announced that the Liberals would fulfill the commitments which had been made by the Government. Eventually, the Liberals were elected and implemented the promise made by Pearson.

The process that led Mr. Pearson to make up his mind was an independent one, although its timing was largely coincident with the events in which Mr. Diefenbaker was involved. The Liberal position on nuclear weapons had been sufficiently ambiguous to preserve Pearson's freedom of choice, but it was widely interpreted as antinuclear. The Opposition relied for its information largely on American sources and was not privy to information from the Government.

Paul Hellyer, the Liberal Party's leading defense critic, visited Europe in November 1962, after having been denied permission by Pearson in previous attempts. In contrast to the impression he gained on his last visit, in 1955, that "troop morale was very high," his "first impression was that morale was very bad among our troops." He was told that Canada's "commitments were not fulfilled" and that "we are in default."[14]

When he returned to Ottawa, Hellyer reported to Pearson and to the Liberal caucus. "There was also a private meeting with Walter Gordon, Tom Kent [Pearson's closest political advisers], and some people from the staff side of the Leader's office" at dinner in the New Zealand Room at the House of Commons. He spoke for some time and explicitly dealt with the issue of the Canadian commitment. His view is that, "by the end of the meeting, I would think that they pretty well knew what it was all about."[15] Following that meeting, Hellyer prepared a memorandum arguing for the acceptance of nuclear weapons and sent it to Pearson.[16]

In the memorandum, commenting on the CF-104, he stated, "The military people at SHAPE are very concerned about the indecision of the Canadian government. So far (when we were in Paris) they have not reported to the Council in a way which will bring the matter into the international political arena. If a decision is not reached, it will not be long before they will consider such a report unavoidable." In addition to pointing out the incipient pressure from allies, which was likely to diminish Canadian prestige, Hellyer stated his own views as

[14] Interview with the Honourable Paul T. Hellyer, February 1, 1975.
[15] *Ibid.*
[16] Memorandum, Hellyer to Pearson; quotations are from a copy made available to the author by Mr. Hellyer.

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to the alternatives available: "There is no question but that we could have adopted a non-nuclear role four years ago and still have made a real contribution to the total effort [of the alliance]. To make that choice now, however, for immediate implementation would involve a very great disruption and the immediate expenditure of hundreds of millions of dollars on new equipment. It would be a decision of such magnitude that I do not believe it practicable." Hellyer also argued that acceptance of the weapons would not involve proliferation; his reaction to the disarmament question was that "the more we have to throw on the table [in disarmament negotiations] the greater the likelihood of success." Although he continued to question the usefulness of the Bomarc, he held that "if there is one thing that is more useless than an armed Bomarc, it is an unarmed Bomarc." Taking the position that "we must uphold the honour and integrity of our word as a nation," he concluded, "I recommend that the Liberal Party state categorically that Canada should sign a bi-lateral agreement with the United States and fulfil its commitments forthwith."

On December 5, Hellyer and Judy LaMarsh—who had accompanied him to Europe—met with Pearson, and Hellyer made his views public in an address on December 8, 1962. In that speech, he made two points that were especially significant. First, he pointed out that one weapons system, the CF-104 aircraft, was scheduled to go on alert in NATO on April 30, 1963, and that it took six months for training and arrangements of technical details *after* a bilateral agreement was signed for the system to become operational. He argued that November 1, 1962—six months before—had therefore constituted a critical deadline for the signing of a bilateral agreement; consequently, Canada was now "in default in respect to our commitment." He concluded that "Canada should sign a bi-lateral agreement with the United States which will permit a supply of atomic weapons to Canadian forces as required." The second significant point was that Hellyer rejected conceiving of the issue as a moral question, and argued that political and military considerations should govern the decision.[17]

In view of the fact that Pearson was influenced by Hellyer's arguments, it is interesting to note that Hellyer deliberately avoided giving him advance notice of the speech. Hellyer has stated, "[Pearson always wanted] to postpone decisions. I mailed a copy of the speech the same

[17] "An Address to the Western Ontario North Liberal Association by the Hon. Paul T. Hellyer, M.P." (mimeo), Walkerton, December 8, 1962, pp. 9, 11, 12-13. [Hereafter referred to as the Walkerton speech.]

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day. It was designed so he could not prevent it from happening. All he could do was react to it."[18]

The Walkerton speech was discussed at one of the meetings of the Liberal caucus in December,[19] and, according to Hellyer, had the support of an overwhelming majority of the caucus. Although he does not remember precisely what Pearson's reaction was, Hellyer speculates that Pearson took the position that he would work out something.[20]

Hellyer also conferred with John Gellner, a commentator on military affairs for the *Globe and Mail*, with whom he sometimes discussed defense matters. On this occasion, Hellyer asked him to give his views in writing.[21] Gellner prepared a paper which he gave to Hellyer under cover of a letter dated December 21, 1962. Gellner indicated that if the Liberals did not accept his views, "then I would like to feel free to advance my ideas under my name and in my own way."[22] Hellyer and Gellner discussed the latter's paper at length and then forwarded it to Pearson under cover of a hand-delivered letter on December 31, 1962. Hellyer indicated that the paper would have to be rewritten if the Liberals wanted to use it, and Gellner "would be willing to spend a day in Ottawa to help with re-writing if required."[23] Hellyer hoped to bolster his views, feeling that "Pearson had more respect for Gellner's views than mine."[24]

Hellyer then left the country for a vacation and had no further conversation with Pearson. He played no part in preparing Pearson's Scarborough speech and was not notified that Pearson was going to make it.[25]

Pearson received Hellyer's and Gellner's letters and the latter's enclosed paper on New Year's Eve; on New Year's Day he made up his mind to change Liberal policy in the direction of fulfilling Canada's nuclear commitments.[26] His decision was made without consulting

[18] Interview with Hellyer (fn. 14).

[19] There were meetings on December 14, 19, and 20. It is not certain at which of these the matter was discussed. Dates are taken from Pearson's *Appointment Book*, December 1962. I wish to express my gratitude to Mr. Geoffrey Pearson for allowing me access to selected materials in his father's papers.

[20] Telephone interview with Hellyer, June 19, 1975.

[21] A letter from Pearson to C. M. Drury, M.P., January 2, 1963, states that Gellner's paper was prepared at Pearson's and Hellyer's request. Lester B. Pearson papers, Leader of the Opposition files, Nuclear Policy, Part 2, Volume 94, File 806.2.

[22] Letter, John W. Gellner to Paul W. [sic] Hellyer, December 21, 1962, *ibid.*

[23] Letter, Hellyer to Pearson, December 31, 1962, *ibid.*

[24] Interview with Hellyer (fn. 14). [25] *Ibid.*

[26] *Ibid.* The precise date is based on hearsay, but it is not inconsistent with other evi-

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anyone else, but in the context of previous influences which had prepared him to make the crucial choice.

Pearson himself has said that there were two things that happened "to bring the matter to a head." The first was the Cuban missile crisis. "Some people [in the United States thought] Canada was an unreliable ally." The second was Hellyer's report on NATO. As secondary influences, Pearson cited the split in the Government, and the Gallup poll showing that a majority of respondents was in favor of accepting nuclear weapons. "These factors," he stated, "did not inhibit me."[27] Elsewhere, Pearson indicated that "it became clear to me last autumn [1962] that until our role was changed we should discharge it by clarifying our policy on nuclear weapons."[28]

Pearson had also been getting reactions to the Cuban missile crisis from his colleagues, as well as urgings to clarify the Liberal Party's position on nuclear weapons.[29] However, except for Hellyer and R. S. Malone, whose role will be discussed later, the people who brought their concerns to the attention of Pearson did not take clear positions. Rather, they asked for clarification and leadership. It is perhaps not surprising, then, that Pearson was more impressed with reactions in the United States. As the Leader of an opposition party in which there had been little clear thinking on the issue over the course of several years, Pearson realized that there was a need for clarity.[30] But, except from Hellyer, he did not receive support or assistance in facing his problem; from all others in the party, he received only deference.

Having decided on the central issue, however, Pearson did receive

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dence. Hellyer recalls that the Honourable J. W. Pickersgill told him that Pearson had indicated to him that he had decided on New Year's Day 1963 to declare in favor of accepting nuclear weapons. Pickersgill recently stated, "I am not absolutely sure when Mr. Pearson told me of his decision . . ." and referred me to Hellyer, who "could probably establish for you the precise date on which Mr. Pearson made his decision and he might also be able to throw some light on the question you ask about whether or not Mr. Pearson told me on New Year's Day, 1963." Letter to author, May 28, 1975. Pearson states in his memoirs (fn. 1), Vol. 3, 71, "Over the 1962 Christmas holiday period I concluded I must make a speech in January to announce our decision."

[27] *Ibid.*, 69-71.

[28] Press conference, August 16, 1963. Pearson papers, Speeches file, Vol. 25.

[29] See esp. letter from Drury to Pearson, October 31, 1962, and letter from Mitchell Sharp to Pearson, November 29, 1962. Pearson papers, Leader of the Opposition files, Nuclear Policy, Part 2, Vol. 94, File 806.2.

[30] Pearson prepared an 11-page memorandum, dated February 27, 1962, in which he tried to bring together his own views on defense with "those of others who have recently given me their's on this subject. Professor Lepan of Queen's University, Professor Max Cohen of McGill, Mr. Tom Kent, Walter Gordon and Paul Hellyer." Covering memorandum, Pearson to Lepan, February 27, 1962, *ibid.* In the section of the memorandum dealing with nuclear weapons, Pearson largely reviewed the positions of those advising him and did not come to any firm conclusions.

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political advice on how to present his position to the public, and on subordinate issues. On January 2, he gave copies of Gellner's paper to C. M. Drury, J. W. Pickersgill, and Tom Kent. That evening Pickersgill read the paper, making extensive marginal notes on it. The following day, just before leaving Ottawa for Paris, he prepared and gave to Pearson a memorandum outlining his views.

Pickersgill took the position that Gellner's paper was inappropriate for an opposition party because it

> included a detailed statement of future plans . . . and would simply provide a target for opponents of all kinds.
>
> But what is far more *serious*, most of these proposals would be misunderstood by servicemen and would lose votes . . .
>
> Above all we should avoid suggesting that we are going to try to talk ourselves out of existing commitments (however desirable that might be if we were in office). If we do that we will be back in another morass almost as bad as the one we are trying to get out of.[31]

Pickersgill's thinking on how to present and how not to present the issue is elaborated in his memorandum of January 3, and is worth quoting at length.

> You have already decided what our position must be on existing commitments and there was no dissent in caucus. But let it be said simply and decisively and without qualifications about trying to get out of it. That I regard as vital. I think it almost as important to put this nuclear weapon issue in the perspective of our total *political* defence commitment and to make it clear that Canada is not and will not ever become a nuclear power on its own; that our commitment relates exclusively to our position in an alliance for the defence of the continent and of the free world and that our position in the alliance, which we had a large part in forming, depends upon the confidence of the allies, particularly the U.S., in our *loyalty* and our *reliability*.
>
> I am almost equally concerned *as a practical politician* about retaining the support of the armed forces without which we cannot win an election. . . .[32]

Pearson gave copies of Pickersgill's memorandum and Gellner's paper to Walter Gordon on January 4, after talking with him on the phone about them. On the same day, he sent the documents to Captain David W. Groos, a Liberal candidate in Vancouver, under cover of a letter which indicated that Gordon would be in Vancouver "at the end of next week" and would "like to talk with you about defence and other questions."[33]

[31] Marginal note, January 2, 1963, *ibid.*; emphasis in original.
[32] Memorandum, Pickersgill to Pearson, January 3, 1963, *ibid.*; emphasis in original.
[33] *Ibid.*

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Richard O'Hagan of Pearson's staff was impressed with Pickersgill's memorandum and argued that Pearson's statement must be clear and simple. He also discussed the relative political (news coverage) advantages of timing the statement on the 12th or 15th of January.[34]

Over the years, Pearson had had many discussions on the defense issue with an old friend, Brigadier R. S. Malone, who at the time of the decision on nuclear weapons was publisher of the Winnipeg *Free Press*. Pearson evidently used Malone as a sounding board for ideas. At the beginning of 1963, Malone thought that Pearson had "come round considerably. Privately, he accepted my view that if we were right to have troops in NATO, they should have weapons equal to the other forces in the field, but he still hedged a bit on the question of nuclear warheads on Canadian soil. . . . From recent statements by Mike, I think he is now starting to accept this view a bit also . . . I hope so."[35]

However, Malone "was astonished" when, in a private meeting in Ottawa a few days before the Scarborough speech, Pearson "confided that he thought Canada should have nothing to do with nuclear weapons. He felt it was a moral issue . . . [and] he intended to come out against them for Canada." Malone argued vigorously for his position and against Pearson's arguments. Pearson told him he did not accept those views, and the conversation ended with Malone's statement that Pearson was "making a big mistake" and that "I feel certain our papers will have to attack your stand."[36]

Several days after Malone had left Ottawa for Toronto to visit his mother, Pearson telephoned him at his mother's house at about 11 p.m., on January 11, telling him that "he was going to follow my advice." He then read him portions of the speech to be given at Scarborough the next day. Malone objected to a phrase, "until such time as we can *re-negotiate* our position." After a heated exchange of words, Pearson rejected Malone's position and the conversation ended with Malone's words, "Well, that's my advice if you want it. . . . He [Pearson] hung up the receiver on me pretty abruptly."[37]

Pearson did actually drop the phrase in his speech the following day, although he called for a re-examination of "the whole basis of

[34] Memorandum, O'Hagan to Pearson, January 7, 1963, *ibid.* O'Hagan was apparently not aware of what Pearson's decision was.

[35] Letter, Malone to Willis C. Armstrong, January 2, 1963; copy made available to the author by Brig. Malone.

[36] Letter, Malone to author, April 18, 1975.

[37] *Ibid.* It has been impossible to confirm Malone's version of this incident, for I was not able to find a draft of the speech. The only copy in the Pearson papers is a printed copy apparently prepared after the speech was actually delivered.

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Canadian defence policy."[38] His speech nevertheless included a clear promise to work out a bilateral arrangement with the United States for the transfer, under American custody, of nuclear weapons to Canada and to Canadian forces in Europe. Following the indecisive election, which gave the Liberals only a minority in Parliament, the new Government did negotiate these arrangements, which were concluded with "an exchange of notes on August 16."[39]

Variables and Hypotheses

This analysis uses as a guideline a model derived from a broad analytical framework which holds that foreign policy decisions in a parliamentary system are made through a political process, at the center of which is the prime minister.[40] Decisions are the result of an interaction between the prime minister and political elites. Foreign policy is not confined to the making of decisions, however, for it also includes two other kinds of acts. The first is the mobilization of resources, which involves primarily the relationship of the prime minister and the political elites with the mass public and interest groups. The second is the implementation of decisions, involving the relationships between the prime minister and the political elites on the one hand, and the bureaucracy on the other. Finally, the model suggests that the foreign policy process takes place within the context of international situations. One therefore needs to account for systemic effects and the influence of external events and actors.

The model allows the analyst to isolate variables and to examine the evidence for each in turn. However, before proceeding to identify the variables, I should point out that the model does not attempt to establish a simple, straight-line relationship between independent and dependent variables. The reason is that such an approach does not reveal the complex interdependence of variables upon each other and their embedment in the political process associated with foreign policy making.

A description of the situation within which the variables operated and the decision was made sets the boundaries for the problem to be analyzed, and thus provides a guideline to other kinds of cases that

[38] "An address by The Honourable Lester B. Pearson, P.C., M.P., Leader of the Liberal Party of Canada," delivered at a luncheon meeting of the York-Scarborough Liberal Association, Toronto, Ontario, January 12, 1963. [Hereafter referred to as Scarborough speech.]

[39] Robert Spencer, "External Affairs and Defence," *Canadian Annual Review* (1963), 332.

[40] The analytical framework is laid out in Lentner, *Foreign Policy Analysis: A Comparative and Conceptual Approach* (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill 1974).

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may be compared to the one studied here. The actors, their roles, the conditions of their interaction, and the scope of the situation are identified. The origins of pressures in favor of decision are described, and the characteristics of those pressures are analyzed. The duration of the issue is noted.

The first category of variables includes external events, external actors, and interactions. The public event which triggered the pressure for decision was the Cuban missile crisis, but an equally important event in terms of the interaction of the political elites was Hellyer's trip to Europe. The most important external actor was the United States, and the actions of its agents are analyzed.

The second category of variables includes those associated with bureaucratic politics. In this particular case, the bureaucracy was involved formally only in the early stages leading to the Canadian undertakings, although the informal bureaucratic impact on Mr. Hellyer was immense. The frustration of the bureaucracy will be examined, and attention will be given to the interaction between the bureaucracy and the political elites.

The third category of variables comprises the relationships of the political elites and the mass public and interest groups. Prime Minister Diefenbaker's public political problem over the nature of the commitment, the role of mass public opinion, the elections of 1962 and 1963, and the polls will be examined. Mr. Pearson's response to public opinion and his relations with particular individuals outside the political arena will be analyzed.

The fourth category of variables is made up of the relationships between the Prime Minister and political elites. If the hypothesis holds that the primary explanation for decisions may be found here, this category should prove to be the most important one. The dual split in the Government must be examined, and the relationship between the Government and the Opposition needs to be analyzed. The major question to be answered is: Why did Prime Minister Diefenbaker *not* make the decision? The second question is: Why did Mr. Pearson *make* the decision? Thus, the analysis includes the relationship of Pearson to his colleagues, especially Hellyer, Pickersgill, Paul Martin, and Walter Gordon.

Because the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition were so centrally involved, their personalities, values, and political styles are examined as the final category of variables. It is hypothesized that these characteristics are the crucial variables interacting with the political processes, especially those related to decision making.

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In attempting to formulate hypotheses to explain the decision, one is naturally led to consider the explanations which have been offered by others. As I have indicated earlier, the literature as a whole is fairly confusing; but it may be useful to indicate what factors and events have been offered to explain Mr. Pearson's decision.

As indicated above, Pearson himself identified the opinion of U.S. elites in the wake of the Cuban missile crisis and Hellyer's report on NATO as the most important factors, with the Canadian political situation as a secondary explanation. Peyton Lyon attributes the decision to three influences: Canadian performance in the Cuban missile crisis, the decline of Canadian credit in NATO, and General Norstad's remarks at his press conference of January 3, 1963.[41]

Other interpretations emerged from interviews. Former External Affairs Secretary Green asserted, "What Pearson did could not have been done by anyone with principles."[42] Another interviewee stated, "I think it was an entirely political decision, with the primary purpose of getting power. I think his thinking on the problem of nuclear weapons would have led him to reject them. This was true as late as December 15, 1962."[43] Another person commented, "I don't think the decision was prompted by anything other than a need for a decision."[44]

In contrast, a close political colleague of Pearson remarked, "I never thought for a moment that Pearson would adopt the policy for political reasons. He honestly thought we had a commitment to NATO. He was greatly impressed by the Norstad speech. Just before, he had spent a weekend in New York and might have talked to friends."[45]

Robert Spencer has written, "Evidently powerfully influenced by a conviction that at the time of the Cuban crisis Canada had not met its obligations and was endangering the Atlantic alliance by failing to live up to its commitments, [Pearson's] views had crystallized following discussions at a conference on international tensions that he had attended in New York a week earlier."[46]

One thread that holds all of these views together is that Pearson's decision was a personal one. Various influences on him are identified, but no political process is associated with the decision, even though it committed a political party which hoped to form a government in the future. This consensus may be explained in one of two ways. It may be the result of a journalistic approach to political analysis which tends to

[41] Lyon (fn. 1), 138.
[42] Interview with Green (fn. 6).
[43] Confidential interview, August 26, 1974.
[44] Interview with John Munro, August 27, 1974.
[45] Confidential interview, January 30, 1975.
[46] Spencer (fn. 39), 286-87.

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personalize events without seeking deeper and structural explanations. Or, the identification of this decision as a personal one may reflect an insight into Pearson's political style. If the latter alternative is correct, it would suggest that Pearson's political style was one which commanded deference and won affection from his colleagues.

I have taken this alternative as a hypothesis in the present analysis, but I also suggest that political style operates within the context of a political process. Exploration of these hypotheses, however, prompts a further investigation of Mr. Pearson's values. It is thus worthwhile in the present context to try to resolve the question of whether his decision on nuclear weapons was consistent with Mr. Pearson's broader beliefs and values, or whether, as some critics have charged, he "betrayed" whatever principles he might have had. In a case study such as this one, it is not possible to answer that question definitely; but my analysis may contribute to a broader inquiry and will help to explain Mr. Pearson's behavior—not just in this one case but throughout his career.

To summarize the argument: the ensuing analysis of the evidence will show that the decision was made by Pearson alone, and in conformity with his basic values. He was able to make it because of the political process which Prime Minister Diefenbaker was unable to control, and he was able to make it alone because of his political style. The second-order political decisions concerning the format, timing, and specific content of his Scarborough speech, however, were influenced by others, and this fact reveals another dimension of Pearson's political style. The Government's predicament resulted from a variety of factors in the political process and was not the result exclusively of a flaw in Diefenbaker's character. The Prime Minister's political style was a contributing factor, but it was a single variable operating in the context of a political process. The events that helped to shape the decision were both external and internal. United States intervention had little to do with the decision, but had a great deal to do with mobilization of the Canadian population. Finally, the context and boundaries of the decision were fixed by a situation that had been shaped by the interactions of the Canadian Government and the governments of its allies.

The Situation

The international situation, although linked to the global system, was a bilateral one, involving just the United States and Canada. The condition of their interaction on the nuclear weapons issue was integra-

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tive, with the United States playing the role of dominant partner, and Canada the deferential partner. The undertakings of the Diefenbaker Government, in the context of two institutions—NORAD and NATO—had the effect of moving the situation further in the direction of integration.[47]

Pearson's intuitive understanding of the situation may account for his pre-1963 position on nuclear weapons for Canadian forces in NATO. He took the stand that there should be no nuclear weapons for Canadian forces in NATO unless the United States were willing to surrender control to the NATO Council.[48] For a political leader in opposition, this position had the advantage of rejecting nuclear weapons without seeming to, for obviously the United States would not accede to the requirement asked; but it was also compatible with Pearson's view of NATO and Canada's place within it.

The situation was structured through Canada's acceptance of NATO's 1957 decision to use tactical nuclear weapons for the defense of Western Europe; joining NORAD in 1957; ordering, in 1958, Bomarc-B missiles for installation on Canadian soil; accepting, in 1959, a strike-reconnaissance role for Canadian forces in Europe; purchasing CF-104 aircraft in 1959; purchasing Honest John rockets for Canadian forces in Europe in 1960; and entering into negotiations with the United States for the purpose of concluding a bilateral agreement that would govern the transfer and use of nuclear weapons.[49]

The pressures for the decision to accept nuclear weapons and to conclude the bilateral treaty originated in these undertakings. Although the issue was not a crisis in its proportions or its nature, time pressures were created—as Mr. Hellyer pointed out in his Walkerton speech—when the bureaucratic routines[50] for delivery and deployment of the weapons systems were implemented on certain dates. Moreover, the Canadian military bureaucracy felt frustrated when it became apparent that its expectations, built up by the foregoing undertakings, were not being met. Another pressure arising from the above was the role of advocacy conferred on the Minister of National Defence. Finally—although apparently least severe—some pressures were generated from the United States.[51]

[47] See Lentner (fn. 40), 67-90, for an elaboration of the meaning of the terms used in this paragraph.

[48] Lyon (fn. 1), 99.

[49] *Ibid.*, 78.

[50] See Graham T. Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Boston: Little, Brown 1971), for analyses of the nature and impact of bureaucratic routines.

[51] American expectations were generated not simply by the public actions, but also by private assurances from Prime Minister Diefenbaker to President Kennedy in 1961

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Although some public groups also exerted a counterpressure, the main opponent was Howard Green, who himself was suspicious of these groups.[52] The issue of nuclear weapons was seized upon by those in the Cabinet who wanted to depose Prime Minister Diefenbaker.

External Events, External Actors

The situation engendered its own pressures, but the events of the Cuban missile crisis—events that originated in Moscow—created the pressure which made it impossible for Prime Minister Diefenbaker to continue to manage his political problems. Those events made it clear for all, in particular Mr. Pearson, to see the need for resolving the ambiguity over the issue of nuclear weapons for Canada.

Instead of immediately giving its support to American policy, like every other deferent partner in NATO, Canada had not done so. Prime Minister Diefenbaker's brief statement in the House shortly after President Kennedy's speech of October 22, 1962, called for United Nations intervention and a fact-finding mission composed of neutrals. Upon a protest by Washington, the Canadian Government withdrew its permission for Soviet planes enroute to Cuba to land in Canada, and implemented a search "for war materials" of "aircraft from Soviet bloc countries." The Canadian component of NORAD was finally ordered on alert on October 24. The outcome of the crisis in Canada was summarized by Robert Spencer: "Fear of adding to the tension and of sharpening the crisis appears to have held the government back; and Canada emerged from it with its defence policies in disarray, its reputation a little tarnished, but its nuclear virginity intact."[53]

The Cuban missile crisis was a public event that had an impact on Mr. Pearson. Another public event was General Norstad's press conference of January 3, 1963; it helped to set the course of public opinion which would, in the spring in 1963, enable Mr. Pearson to come to power and implement his decision. However, on a prior occasion, in private, General Norstad's views had an indirect but more salient impact on the actual decision. When Mr. Hellyer visited Europe, his strongest impressions came from Canadian troops, but he also conferred with NATO's Supreme Commander. "I took the opportunity to see

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that he would prepare the Canadian public for the acceptance of nuclear weapons. Diefenbaker proceeded to do this, but he stopped when his relations with Kennedy became strained.

[52] Interview with Green (fn. 6).

[53] Spencer (fn. 10), 127-36; quote from p. 136.

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Norstad," Hellyer has stated, "and he showed me the whole thing: what the commitment was and our fulfillment [of it]."[54]

Mr. Pearson was also affected by the views of Americans who, evaluating Canadian behavior in the October crisis, questioned the reliability of Canada as an ally. There is no evidence to identify to whom Mr. Pearson talked; he may have gained his impressions solely from newspapers. But, if he did talk with anyone, the people were probably government officials, and possibly even President Kennedy.

If the latter speculation were correct, the scope for allowing Mr. Pearson to be sensitized to the issue through this channel of communication was indirectly provided by the Prime Minister. Mr. Diefenbaker had disrupted his relations with President Kennedy by threatening to make public a presidential working paper which had come into his possession.[55] In addition to providing an opening for American intervention on the side of the opposition, Mr. Diefenbaker's actions also cut off the possibility of intervention on his behalf. Handled skillfully, the President might have been helpful to the Prime Minister in managing his political problem. However, the situation—which to a large extent had been structured by the Canadian Government—made it unrealistic to expect that American intervention could be precluded. The problem for Mr. Diefenbaker was to control it and to use it for his own purposes. In that task he failed, and American intervention was used against him.

Despite the fact that other instances of American intervention cannot be regarded as independent variables shaping Mr. Pearson's decision, four additional events should be considered, because they are pertinent to the mobilization of the electorate which helped to bring Mr. Pearson to power. The first of these events was General Norstad's press conference on January 3, 1963.[56]

As retiring commander of NATO, General Norstad made courtesy calls at the national capitals of member countries, Canada being the last on his itinerary. To his surprise, the press questioned him extensively on the Canadian nuclear commitment. His answers made it clear that he thought Canada had a commitment to arm its weapons systems with nuclear warheads; this event put the Government on the spot publicly.[57]

[54] Interview with Hellyer (fn. 14).

[55] The story of this incident and its impact on the relations between the two men is told by Newman (fn. 2), 264-67.

[56] The most complete account of this conference is Lyon (fn. 1), 131-38, although his interpretation of its impact on Pearson is mistaken.

[57] Spencer (fn. 39), 284-86.

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Mr. Pearson's reactions to the press conference are recorded in marginal notes on his copy of the transcript.[58] The notes indicate that he believed that Canada had a commitment to provide its Starfighter squadrons with nuclear weapons. They also reveal that in Norstad's remarks he found justification for the Liberal Party's previous position on nuclear weapons. Finally, his notes express Pearson's strong agreement with Norstad's stand in favor of strengthening the authority of the alliance. The notes may be interpreted by different readers in diverse ways, but they seem to show Mr. Pearson as a man who had made up his mind on the commitment issue. They also show that he was continuing to look for arguments that justified his position politically, and they show his consistent wish to have the weapons under NATO, rather than American control.

The second event that had an impact on the public debate in Canada was a press release by the U.S. Department of State (January 30, 1963), "which challenged many of the points made by the Prime Minister five days earlier."[59] The following day, there was an emergency debate in Parliament, and on February 3, Minister of National Defence Harkness resigned. The deep division in the Cabinet was thus revealed. On February 5, the Government fell, defeated in a Commons vote.[60]

The third event was the release, on March 29, 1963, of testimony by U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, dated January 30, to the effect that the Bomarcs in Canada would draw Soviet missiles and were vulnerable. "Mr. McNamara had kicked Mr. Pearson in the teeth and had given Messrs. Douglas [Leader of the New Democratic Party] and Diefenbaker explosive political ammunition which both proceeded to detonate." Pearson parried this by indicating that the Bomarcs were Diefenbaker's problem, and Mr. Harkness supported Pearson.

According to Robert Spencer, "it hardly seemed that the influence of the State Department's press release or of Mr. McNamara's indiscreet testimony were of critical importance. The confused state of public opinion on questions of defence and foreign policy was probably accurately reflected in the uncertain nature of the results."[61]

The fourth event was the Liberals' use of polls by the Harris public opinion organization in the election campaign. The impact of the surveys is impossible to assess definitively, but Newman asserts that "[t]hey were considered key contributions to the Liberal victory of 1963."[62]

[58] Pearson papers, Leader of the Opposition files, Vol. 164, Department of National Defence, Debate Material.
[59] Spencer (fn. 39), 293.
[60] The fall of the Government is described in Newman (fn. 2), 369-74.
[61] Spencer (fn. 39), 311-13.
[62] Newman (fn. 2), 267.

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The only events that may be considered as independent variables affecting Mr. Pearson's decision, then, are the Cuban missile crisis, American reaction to Canada's behavior in that crisis, and Mr. Hellyer's behavior following his trip to Europe. I will examine the relative weight of these variables and their interaction with other variables in the concluding section of this article.

Bureaucratic Politics

Graham Allison and other scholars have developed a framework or conceptual scheme that is termed the "bureaucratic politics model."[63] In his seminal work, Allison made clear distinctions among the "rational actor" model, the "organizational process" model, and the "bureaucratic politics" model.[64] Halperin's emphasis, both in his own work and in that done with Allison, is on the last-named, but their work absorbs elements of the second model. Moreover, the term, "bureaucratic politics," is misleading, especially in its latter-day use, for it deals with the behavior not only of what are ordinarily understood as bureaucratic organizations and their personnel, but also of political elites. The meaning of bureaucratic politics as used in this article is different.

The model used in this research makes a clear distinction between political elites and bureaucracies. The personnel are different, their bases of legitimacy and authority are different, and their functions are different. I believe that this model is applicable to the United States, upon which Allison and Halperin focus; it certainly is applicable to Canada. In the Canadian political system, there is a sharp distinction between officials (civil servants) and ministers (politicians). At the highest levels of government, there is a good deal of interaction, with officials often attending meetings of Cabinet committees. Thus, it is not always easy to draw the line between behavioral functions. The line is even more obscure in Washington, where members of the Cabinet are appointed and have no independent political base. In Ottawa, the distinction is held firmly in the minds of officials, shaping their role definitions and affecting their behavior.

In this article, then, bureaucratic politics refers only to the political

[63] See Graham T. Allison and Morton H. Halperin, "Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications," in Raymond Tanter and Richard Ullman, eds., *Theory and Policy in International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1962), 40-79. Also see Allison (fn. 50); Halperin, with the assistance of Priscilla Clapp and Arnold Kanter, *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press 1974).

[64] Allison, "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 58 (September 1969).

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behavior of bureaucrats, who usually act through their organizations, but sometimes as individuals. They do interact with political elites. Their function is basically to implement policy, but they get involved in the decision-making process—which remains the function of the political elite[65]—for various reasons which will not be elaborated here. A bureaucrat is a person who works in a government organization from which he derives his legitimacy and his roles. He is recruited on the basis of merit and is not elected. Insofar as he has political power, it is derived not from an electoral constituency or from electorally related skills and assets, but rather from his place in the organization, his expertise, and his capacity to bargain within the bureaucracy and, if properly placed, with the government.

Officials and ministers had worked together to develop policy guidelines for Canada's involvement with nuclear weapons. Their discussions had been held in private. Although there is no evidence available one way or the other, it may be assumed that friction and bargaining were minimal. The discussions presumably must have reinforced in the minds of the participants the expectation that Canadian forces would be equipped with nuclear weapons. In view of the fact that the assignment of these weapons would fall under the jurisdiction of the Department of National Defence, the impact must have been greatest on Mr. Harkness and officials from that department. Further undertakings to acquire weapons systems and the actual delivery of those systems, even without nuclear armaments, must have had the further effect of generating the same expectations throughout the armed forces. The Government's policies, then, generated substantial expectations in a major segment of the bureaucracy, and the delay in signing a bilateral agreement with the United States inevitably led to an increasing frustration. It must have occurred to many soldiers that the Government was assigning them a mission but not the means for implementing it. This circumstance is a classic formula for precipitating action by a bureaucracy in opposition to the government which theoretically controls it. What instruments did the military bureaucracy have?

One of the most important was the advocacy of the Minister in the Cabinet. At the point where he was totally frustrated, he resigned and participated in the political debate in the 1963 election campaign.[66] Another instrument was in the hands of high-level officials who, according to Howard Green, "worked on [officials in the Department of]

[65] See Stephen D. Krasner, "Are Bureaucracies Important? (Or Allison Wonderland)," *Foreign Policy*, No. 7 (Summer 1972).

[66] See Spencer (fn. 39), 288-312.

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External Affairs." Officials in the Department of External Affairs, however, supported Mr. Green, who has asserted, "If there were any who didn't [support me], I didn't know about them. I have no reason to suspect disloyalty."[67] The permeation of frustration throughout the military bureaucracy enlarged the arena beyond Ottawa, to Europe. An outlet was found in Mr. Hellyer when he visited the troops in Europe. Finally, the armed forces are not simply bureaucrats but also citizens whose votes were identified by Mr. Pickersgill as crucial, and tapped by Mr. Pearson's decision.

There was nothing sinister in any of this activity. Each of the actors in the drama was simply doing his job. But the incompatibility of objectives and duties led to inevitable conflict. If there was a failure, it was a failure of management on the part of Prime Minister Diefenbaker who, although perhaps realizing the problem of frustration in the bureaucracy, ran out of time and resources to arrange a compromise.[68]

The Mass Public and Interest Groups

The mass public in Canada tends to be deferential toward the Government; it also tends to be uninterested in foreign affairs.[69] There are exceptions,[70] but in the present case the generalization seems appropriate. Interest-group activity tends to fall into a pattern of elite accommodation.[71] In this instance, mass public opinion may be characterized as striving to be deferential, but confused by the ambiguity of the leadership. Elite opinion tended not so much to exercise influence as to be used by Mr. Pearson. Interest-group activity was minimal.

The question of nuclear weapons for Canada had been introduced for public debate by Prime Minister Diefenbaker in the House of Commons on January 20, 1959, but mass interest did not develop until the fall of 1962, even though "[t]hroughout 1962 the nuclear arms issue monopolized the discussion of defence [in the House of Com-

[67] Interview with Green (fn. 6).

[68] Negotiations for a bilateral agreement were conducted for several months following the Cuban missile crisis. See Spencer (fn. 39), 292.

[69] This statement is made in the context of a view of Canadian political culture analyzed in Lentner, "Canada and the U.S.," a series of articles in *The Toronto Daily Star*, August 19, 20, 21, 1970, and in Lentner and Thomas J. Lewis, "Revolutionary Terrorism in Democratic Society," *Freedom At Issue* (May-June 1971).

[70] See Donald Barry, "Interest Groups and the Foreign Policy Process: The Case of Biafra," typescript, and my forthcoming book on the role of the Prime Minister in the conduct of Canadian foreign policy.

[71] See Robert Presthus, *Elite Accommodation in Canadian Politics* (Cambridge, England: At the University Press 1973).

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mons]." There had been little debate on defense in the 1962 electoral campaign. In general, there was "continued confusion over defence policy."[72]

The Cuban missile crisis, one of the most public events of history, generated more attention to the issue. In November 1962, the Voice of Women, the Canadian Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, and the Royal Canadian Air Force Association lobbied or demonstrated on behalf of their views. The public debate continued with Hellyer's Walkerton speech and a speech by C. M. Drury in the House on December 14. Other speeches and newspaper articles and editorials contributed to the discussion.[73]

Mr. Pearson also received impressions of public opinion from his colleagues. Mitchell Sharp wrote a thoughtful letter describing the state of elite opinion in Toronto,[74] and Walter Gordon reported to Pearson that he "had found a positive reaction" to Hellyer's Walkerton speech in a door-to-door canvas in Toronto.[75] These soundings may have been more important than public opinion polls.[76] Although in his memoirs Pearson suggested that the Gallup poll was a factor in his thinking, he had earlier stated that it was not.[77]

The Ottawa press corps was instrumental in structuring the public debate by its questioning of General Norstad, and the public and press response was vocal as Pearson made his Scarborough speech and the electoral campaign got under way. Pearson received a good deal of mail in response to the speech. However, the public's activity was not a factor in his decision. In the election of 1963, mass public opinion had the only authoritative expression it can have; as Spencer has noted, it expressed confusion by electing a minority government.

Politicians have relations not only with masses of people and impersonal interest groups; they also have friends outside government and politics who may be able to influence them. Pearson's friendship with R. F. Malone falls into this pattern. As described above, however, Malone did not really influence Pearson. Instead, Pearson used him to test arguments—even, as we have seen, taking a stand against

[72] Spencer (fn. 10), 88, 107-8, 115. [73] *Ibid.*, 143-45.

[74] November 29, 1962. Pearson papers, Leader of the Opposition files, Nuclear Policy, Part 2, Vol. 94, File 806.2.

[75] Interview with Hellyer (fn. 14).

[76] Barry (fn. 70), found that such impressions tended to be a more important influence on ministers in the Biafra case.

[77] In an interview for *Inquiry*, a television program on station CBOT, on January 29, 1963, in response to a question about the Gallup poll, Pearson said, "That had nothing to do with my statement [at Scarborough]. When I decided that this statement had to be made, . . . I didn't even know what the Gallup poll results were."

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his own position. The absence of a direct line of influence does not mean, however, that the relationship is an unimportant one. To a politician, someone to test ideas against who is not directly involved in the decision-making process, and whose motivation does not include an aspiration to political office, can be a valuable asset.

Elite Politics

In the realm of foreign and defense policy, important decisions are the result of a process of interaction among political elites. Members of the political elite hold office by virtue of an electoral process and therefore derive their power to some degree from a base independent of the position they hold in an organization. The political system concedes them authority to occupy certain offices, and they have the responsibility to discharge certain functions. In a democratic system, they are held accountable by elections. Although they interact with, draw on, and use the bureaucracy, the political elite is conceptually—and in Canada empirically—distinct from the bureaucracy. Thus, there is a political process of political elites which is separate from bureaucratic politics. The most prominent and powerful member of the political elite in Canada is the Prime Minister. An analysis of political elite interaction may be organized in terms of his relationships with other members of the political elite.

The victory of the Progressive-Conservatives in the 1957 election had been a personal triumph for Mr. Diefenbaker. The Prime Minister, in addition to shouldering the overwhelming task of organizing a government,[78] held the External Affairs portfolio himself. It was in this period that Canada joined NORAD and accepted NATO's decision to use tactical nuclear weapons in the defense of Europe. The Prime Minister's political sensitivity as well as his intention to continue to control the area of foreign affairs were illustrated by his intervention at Sidney Smith's first press conference after the latter's appointment as Secretary of State for External Affairs.[79] Mr. Diefenbaker's political position was solidified by the sweeping electoral triumph of 1958.

Dr. Smith was included in the group that devised the guidelines for

[78] The Conservatives had not held office since 1936, and the problems of simply becoming familiar with government operations must have been immense. As a symbol of the lack of familiarity with government, there is the fact that not a single member of the new Cabinet had ever before seen the Cabinet room.

[79] Diefenbaker's intervention at Smith's first press conference is described by James Eayrs in *The Art of the Possible: Government and Foreign Policy in Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1961), 27-28.

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Canada's nuclear weapons policy. It was really only after his death, and with the appointment of Howard C. Green as his successor, that a division in the Cabinet arose over nuclear weapons policy. Green was the leading advocate of nuclear virginity, and Minister of National Defence Harkness the proponent of nuclear consummation. Diefenbaker, an intuitive rather than an intellectual politician, sought a compromise between these positions.[80]

The problem for Mr. Diefenbaker was not just one of nuclear weapons policy and relations with an ally, but also one of unity in his Cabinet. Two sources of the latter problem can be identified: Mr. Diefenbaker's personnel policy, and fate. From 1953 to 1957, Mr. Diefenbaker had served as the external affairs chairman of the Progressive-Conservative Party caucus. After he became Leader, he did not recruit another person to take on that function. It was not until September 1957, after he took office, that Mr. Diefenbaker recruited Dr. Smith. At the time of his recruitment, Dr. Smith was President of the University of Toronto. Whether through lack of priority in Mr. Diefenbaker's scheme of things or from lack of qualified personnel, the Progressive-Conservatives were short of manpower in a crucial area. Fate then played its part through two deaths: Gordon Graydon's in 1953 and Smith's in 1959. It is apparent that the selection of Mr. Green to succeed Smith was based not on policy grounds in which nuclear weapons policy played any part, although Green and Diefenbaker held a similar outlook on most political matters.

Diefenbaker supported both Green and Harkness when there was no incompatibility in their views. For example, he supported Harkness "in the Cuban crisis, but they parted ways as the nuclear weapons crisis came to a climax."[81] In the clash over nuclear weapons, Diefenbaker sought a compromise; his inability to achieve it in effect bolstered Green's position.

Under different circumstances it might have been possible to achieve that compromise; but the election of 1962 had returned a minority government which prepared the way for the anti-Diefenbaker movement in the Cabinet. Although not successful in the end, this movement severely complicated the nuclear weapons issue by employing it to change the locus of political power. George Hees and Wallace McCutcheon and their collaborators were probably not interested in nuclear weapons policy, but their use of the issue exacerbated the Prime Minister's political problem.

[80] Confidential interview, July 29, 1974. [81] *Ibid.*

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Scope was thus created for the Liberals to act. The contacts between the Government and the Opposition were minimal. On October 25, 1962, "Pearson attended a forty-minute session of the cabinet's defence committee which was briefed by the Chiefs of Staff,"[82] but otherwise the Opposition Leader received no information from the Government.[83]

Whether Hellyer's trip to Europe had been consciously timed by Pearson because he saw the opening created by Diefenbaker's political problems, or whether it was fortuitous or instinctive is not known. However, it is clear that the timing of the trip was Pearson's. Hellyer has testified, "I had intended to go to Europe two or three times, but Pearson did not allow me."[84] Upon his return, Hellyer reported to Pearson and his colleagues. In the absence of a clear decision, he then began to operate independently, following the public track in his Walkerton speech and the private track in sending a memorandum to Pearson and in mobilizing Gellner to influence Pearson.[85] Hellyer's influence, then, seems to have rested on the force of his arguments and not on any personally or even officially close relationship with Pearson.

The relations between Pearson and his close political adviser Walter Gordon on this issue at the time of the decision seem to have been unimportant. There is evidence that Gordon told Pearson of the favorable grass-roots reaction to Hellyer's Walkerton speech, and that Pearson gave copies of Gellner's and Pickersgill's memoranda to Gordon. However, neither Pearson nor Gordon in later years remembered any discussions on the subject.[86] Although Gordon had previously been one of Pearson's major advisers on nuclear weapons policy, he apparently did not focus on the issue at the end of 1962 and the beginning of 1963.

[82] Spencer (fn. 10), 132.

[83] One of the strongest impressions which arises from reading the Leader of the Opposition files of the Pearson papers is the absence of any confidential information from the Government.

[84] Interview with Hellyer (fn. 14).

[85] Hellyer's version of events differs in detail from that of Judy LaMarsh in *Memoirs of a Bird in a Gilded Cage* (Toronto/Montreal: McClelland and Stewart Limited 1968), 19-30. LaMarsh suggests that Hellyer's speech may have been given in collaboration with Pearson who later disavowed his association with it. Hellyer, on the contrary, says he acted independently. The Hellyer version is accepted here because it appears to be more precise and is compatible with other evidence. LaMarsh's narrative is loose and imprecise, and she is not always factually correct. For example, she writes that the Norstad press conference, which took place on January 3, happened *after* Pearson's Scarborough speech, which was delivered on January 12.

[86] Interviews with historian John Munro, August 27, 1974, and the Honourable Walter Gordon. There is no mention of collaboration on this issue in Gordon's biography by Denis Smith, *Gentle Patriot: A Political Biography of Walter Gordon* (Edmonton: Hurtig Publishers 1973).

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Instead, he deferred to Pearson, for he was more interested in other problems—particularly unemployment—which would be an issue in the forthcoming election campaign.

After having made his decision, Pearson did receive advice from Pickersgill and from his staff, particularly Richard O'Hagan, on the political details surrounding the publicity, and the implications for affecting popular votes. His contact with Malone provided the test for the decision in having an advocate react to the arguments against it.

It is surprising that there is no evidence of any involvement by Paul Martin, who was presently to become foreign minister in the Pearson Government. In general, Pearson relied on Martin as a professional politician,[87] but he did not give Martin a copy of Gellner's memorandum, and did not seek his views on Pickersgill's political argument. In view of the fact that Howard Green, the Minister of External Affairs, was central to the substantive controversy, one might expect that the man who would eventually replace Green would be consulted by Pearson on the substantive decision. One can only speculate why the two men did not work together on this issue. Possibly, Pearson made a rigid division between defense and foreign policy and felt that Martin ought not have any interest in defense policy.[88] Possibly, Martin did not have any interest in nuclear weapons. Possibly, Martin was simply not available at the time of the decision. In any case, the evidence is not available to determine the answer to this question.

Personality, Values, and Political Style

It is beyond the scope of this article to develop a comprehensive analysis of the personalities, values, and political styles of Messrs. Diefenbaker and Pearson. I can dwell only on those aspects of the two men which appear to be pertinent to the decision. I will describe the questions used to elicit responses about these factors,[89] and lay out a tentative set of categories of political style.

[87] Interview with Munro (fn. 86).

[88] This is the least likely explanation. In his Scarborough speech, Mr. Pearson said, "Defence policy must be part of our foreign policy. . . ."

[89] The questions used are based heavily on the work of James David Barber. See especially *The Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the White House* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall 1972); also see the lengthy review of this work by Alexander L. George, "Assessing Presidential Character," *World Politics*, XXVI (January 1974). A briefer version which explicitly poses the questions without providing answers is Barber, "Ford as the President: Some Hard Questions," *New York Times*, June 22, 1974.

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The technique of interviewing members of the elite does not lend itself to systematic gathering of data that can be quantified. One reason is that the number of responses is too small for statistical analysis. Moreover, the interviewer does not approach his task with a rigid framework, for the greatest value of the interviews is that respondents provide knowledge and insights that neither the interviewer nor the respondent knew or understood beforehand.[90] Different questions asked of different interviewees were tailored to elicit information that an individual respondent was thought to possess by virtue of his unique position and his relationships to others.

The following questions were put to a number of people who were acquainted with the men who have served as prime ministers of Canada. The specific form of the questions varied with the context of the interview; the phrasing here is general, and is meant to convey the sense of what was asked. The first question was, "What did he think was important, and what did he try to accomplish in Canada and in foreign policy?" This question was usually followed by inquiries about particular interests and goals, and "What were his accomplishments? What were the disappointments?"

Another set of questions involved relations with others. "Whom did he trust? Whom did he distrust? Did he inspire others?" Specific relationships were explored.

There were questions on political style: "Is he the sort of person who has firm ideas, who attempts to get others to accede, or does he tend to follow a consensus? What is his approach to crisis? How did he understand the political process?"

In exploring this last question, a set of categories of political style were generally laid out for the interviewee to respond to. Some individuals regard the political process as an exchange of favors and friendship; some hold to a firm belief in certain procedures; that belief values whatever outcomes these procedures arrive at. Others view the political process as commanding general deference in order to give the leader maximum freedom of action; and still others prefer to build discrete coalitions on specific issues.

Without pretending to a deep psychological approach, I also asked whether the subject enjoyed politics.[91] Finally, in some interviews I explored an open-ended question: "What was he like as a person?" Speeches and written materials were also used.

[90] See Lewis A. Dexter, *Elite and Specialized Interviewing* (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press 1970).

[91] This question is a crucial one in Barber (fn. 89).

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PRIME MINISTER DIEFENBAKER

Mr. Diefenbaker as Prime Minister was an ambitious idealist who revered the political process as the instrument for achieving his ideals. Those who have known him or studied him place his humanitarianism and his concern for the common man at the center of his political values.[92] In the following passage from an interview, he described his self-image as a man who, through politics, could implement his vision:

> From my earliest days I wanted to become one of the leaders of my country. I wanted to bring about what I had in mind as far back as my collegiate days, one Canada, one Nation. I wanted to end discrimination within the country. I wanted to do something for the poor and the afflicted. I saw the difficulties of the farmer. I knew what it was to be a common labourer, for I was that for one whole summer. I knew what it was to have lived in a home in which . . . every dollar had to be carefully hoarded.[93]

Mr. Diefenbaker was very sensitive to the fact that his name was neither English nor French, and his aspirations for Canada sought to make room for a broader conception of multiethnicity than the idea of the "founding races" allowed.[94] At the same time, he was unable to find an effective way to include the "French fact" in this radical departure from Canadian tradition. "He was very interested in western Canada";[95] his policies often favored the prairies.

Diefenbaker was deeply patriotic. In the context of his other values, this included a deep attachment to the British crown and other symbols of the link with Britain. Patriotism in most countries includes an inevitable "anti" feeling, and in Canada that feeling is to a large extent directed toward the United States. Thus, an element of distrust of the United States also constituted part of Mr. Diefenbaker's makeup. This distrust was particularly fed by the aggressive style of the Kennedy Administration.

His values, like those of most chief executives, lay primarily in the realm of domestic life, but he did have clear views about Canada's relations with other countries. "External Affairs must be the responsibility of the Prime Minister. He is directly responsible for the security of the state."[96] However, except when he held the External Affairs portfolio, Diefenbaker "was not interested in the broad sweep of foreign

[92] Newman (fn. 2), 179, and interview with Green (fn. 6).
[93] Interview of Diefenbaker for *The Tenth Decade* (CBC Television Production Cameron Graham, Producer, 1971) by Bernard Ostrey and Cameron Graham, Roll #51, July 15, 1971, p. 2.
[94] Newman (fn. 2), 187-89.
[95] Interview with Green (fn. 6).
[96] Interview with the Rt. Hon. John G. Diefenbaker, August 7, 1974.

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policy. Human rights was a strong interest."[97] "He was anxious to have Canada have a good name."[98]

Diefenbaker's conception of leadership in the political process was that of a public actor who debates in the House of Commons and orates before mass audiences, but it did not extend to organizing his government and party. "Mr. Diefenbaker was the Government. It was a one-man show."[99] "Diefenbaker was a very political person. He always watched public opinion closely. But he was not an organizer. He was more the man who could go on the hustings."[100] His reverence for Parliament is well known, and his continued service in the House attests to his deep belief in that institution.

Although he had a command of parliamentary rules and tactics and was very knowledgeable about its history, Diefenbaker failed to master the House of Commons. He was less successful at surviving in a minority government situation than either Pearson or Trudeau.[101]

In broader and close-up relations with other people, Diefenbaker showed a basic respect for them. His norms for dealing with opponents are illustrated in the following quotation.

> Those that in public life endeavor to destroy their opponents do not live long, in the thinking of Canadians, or in any democratic country. Now I don't believe in using a feather-duster in debate. I believe that strong men have strong opinions and express them strongly, but I have always believed in one principle—that my political opponents are just as sincere as I am. I disagree with their stands that they may take, but I endeavor never to wound, never to say the glib thing that leaves a memory in the individual who has been the recipient of a deep hurt.[102]

Others have corroborated Mr. Diefenbaker's testimony that he encouraged discussion in Cabinet. "I offered no view until all had spoken, excepting for an observation now and then by way of a question for clarification. And then at the end to bring together the jarring elements. I followed the course of suggesting an alternative that would secure the support of all. And no Minister at any time was denied the fullest right to give his views."[103]

[97] Confidential interview, July 16, 1974. [98] Interview with Green (fn. 6).
[99] Confidential interview, January 30, 1975.
[100] Interview with Green (fn. 6).
[101] Diefenbaker's Government in 1963 was defeated in a Commons vote. This was only the second time in Canadian history that this had happened; see Newman (fn. 2), 374. In contrast, Pearson led a minority government for five years, and this was followed by a majority victory under Mr. Trudeau's leadership in the 1968 election. Trudeau led a minority government for two years and was returned with a majority in 1974.
[102] Interview for *The Tenth Decade* (fn. 93), Roll #65, July 17, 1971, p. 2.
[103] *Ibid.*, Roll #50, July 15, 1971, p. 5.

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Despite this basic respect, Mr. Diefenbaker did not give his trust to very many people. One interviewee stated, "The important thing to remember about Diefenbaker is the importance of personal relations and loyalty and in your context, his suspicion of the Department of External Affairs."[104] Diefenbaker's distrust extended beyond the Department of External Affairs to the military bureaucracy. This is revealed in his statement that "he [Minister of National Defence Harkness] became a puppet of the military officials, the top level of military officials."[105] The circle of those he did trust included Gordon Churchill, J. Waldo Monteith, and Howard C. Green, all members of his Cabinet. He had a close personal relationship with Senator William Brunt. Among officials, he trusted Robert Bryce, the Secretary of the Cabinet, and Basil Robinson, the Department of External Affairs' liaison with the Prime Minister's Office. "He handled defence matters gingerly and cautiously," and, in comparison with his employment of other Cabinet committees, "Diefenbaker was much more cautious in using Cabinet committees on foreign policy and defence."[106]

Mr. Diefenbaker's political style included elements from each of the four categories indicated. There seems to have been a strand of considering the political process as including the exchange of friendship. Added to that, however, is his reverence for parliamentary institutions and processes. Although he did not command general deference, he did attempt to retain personal control of his administration. In his approach to Cabinet meetings, there is an element of building discrete coalitions on specific issues. Although a clearly dominant style in terms of the categories does not emerge from the evidence, belief in procedures may have been more emphasized than the other elements.

Other elements of political style included the fact that Mr. Diefenbaker's suspicion and distrust of others did not allow him to employ them as partners in the governing enterprise. At the same time, his basic respect for other people prevented him from coercing them to do his bidding, to command deference from them, or to destroy them. As the following statement attests, Mr. Diefenbaker was aware of his power as Prime Minister: "Overhanging every decision that's made is that power of dissolution. That's one tremendous power. And the second is that in the control he exercises over the matters that may come before Cabinet is traditional."[107] This formal conception of power, however, does not extend to the management of men in informal ways.

[104] Confidential interview, July 29, 1974. [105] Interview with Diefenbaker (fn. 96).
[106] Confidential interview, July 29, 1974.
[107] Interview for *The Tenth Decade* (fn. 93), Roll #50, July 15, 1971, p. 4.

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Fundamentally, then, Mr. Diefenbaker's political style—that is, his understanding of the political process—was grounded in a belief in two things: himself, and parliamentary institutions and procedures. It was only upon these two instruments that he could rely.[108] When they failed him, he had nowhere to turn.

LEADER OF THE OPPOSITION PEARSON

Lester B. Pearson left a civil service career to enter politics in 1948 as Secretary of State for External Affairs. Unlike Diefenbaker, Pearson is not associated with a central value. "His ideals were shaped by his experiences during the 1930's and the First War. A third influence was his father's views. These were conventional views out of the church, on good and evil. His was a simple, but strict family."[109] Pearson's career was mostly involved with foreign affairs; by the time he became Leader of the Opposition, his most notable achievement had been the creation of the United Nations Emergency Force, for which he had been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.

Pearson had been involved in the formation of NATO and had a distinct commitment to working cooperatively with allies. He also had a strong commitment to an independent Canada—as sharply independent from Britain as the United States—but he did not posture in that direction.

As Leader of the Opposition, Mr. Pearson was ambitious to have the Liberals take over the Government. In pursuit of that goal, his ambition was deeply identified with his party, and he relied implicitly on the professional politicians of his party for advice.[110] By contrast to Diefenbaker, his personal ambition was inseparable from that of his advisers.

Mr. Pearson relied on his advisers particularly in dealing with the House of Commons and the electorate. "He certainly had no love for the House of Commons. He felt very uncomfortable there. He didn't understand the process of parliamentary government. He did not have a feeling for it. He didn't see Parliament as being central to the process of good government, except perhaps in opposition."[111] At the same time that he relied on others, he also managed and used them. "His relations with others . . . were fairly easy and fairly superficial. He did not have long talks with people. He was a man of action. He was not academically inclined: not interested in abstract questions."[112]

[108] There may be a slight exaggeration in this characterization, although I think it is basically correct. Newman (fn. 2), chap. 24, in a narrative of the events involved in the attempt to depose Diefenbaker, provides some evidence that conflicts with my characterization.

[109] Confidential interview, August 8, 1974.

[110] Interview with Munro (fn. 86).

[111] *Ibid.*

[112] Confidential interview, August 8, 1974.

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Mr. Pearson's "personality was based on self-confidence. He had a kind of athletic personality." He behaved like a "second baseman." He "anticipated" what was going to happen, "and he knew what to do."[113] Mr. Pearson's self-confidence and action by instinct generated tremendous affection from his colleagues. As one of them stated in commenting on his nuclear weapons decision, "We all had so much affection for Pearson, we would probably stand on our heads, if he asked, at that time."[114]

Nevertheless, several people who have worked with Mr. Pearson have felt let down by him.[115] By using other people in the context of affection but retaining control through the instinctive actions that were appropriate to the positions he held, he created some frustration. But he also commanded deference.

Though neither an orator nor a great parliamentarian, Pearson operated within the context of democratic institutions. Without reverence for them and skill in using them, he placed more reliance upon other resources for accomplishing things. One important ingredient in his understanding of the political process was that one can accomplish things in a crisis that would be impossible at other times.[116] Diefenbaker's crisis in January 1963 therefore provided Pearson with an opening for action.

In addition, Mr. Pearson's understanding of the political process included an aspect of building discrete coalitions on specific issues.[117] The outstanding element, based on the evidence of the nuclear weapons decision as well as some additional indications, is that he commanded deference through his style of operation.[118]

Pearson's personal values were revealed in a letter responding to a thoughtful critic. The letter outlines, in three major paragraphs, the rea-

[113] *Ibid.*

[114] Confidential interview, January 30, 1975.

[115] Perhaps the unkindest version is in LaMarsh (fn. 85). A kinder account was given by Hellyer in an interview (fn. 14), where he stated that Pearson "would agree now. Then he would read a book with a glass of Scotch, and disagree tomorrow. This was a form of intellectual honesty."

[116] "Things can be done under the incentive of terror and fear that cannot be done when the fear disappears." Pearson (fn. 1), Vol. 2, 1948–1957, p. 272. Norman Smith has written about Pearson, "Crises stimulated him. He used crises to move public and politicians to do things they would otherwise not face up to." In "Pearson, people, and press," *International Journal*, XXIX (Winter 1973–74), 22.

[117] Confidential interview, January 31, 1975.

[118] This is a behavioral rather than a belief category, for Pearson probably did not understand his approach to politics in this way. *Ibid.* For an analysis of his beliefs, see Donald Arthur Lawrence, "The Operational Code of Lester B. Pearson," paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Toronto, June 3-6, 1974.

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sons why "the party and myself feel that Canada must accept nuclear weapons. . . ."[119] A major excerpt of the first paragraph follows.

> (a) first and foremost, we have given our undertaking that we would accept such arms, and the policy of the western alliance relative to the defence of North America has been based on the assumption that we would honour this commitment. I am sure that you will agree that there is the same moral obligation for a proud nation such as Canada to honour its undertakings as there is for an honourable man in private life. . . . Personally, if I have the honour to become the head of the government after April 8, I would propose, with my colleagues, to conduct the affairs of the country in accordance with the same standards of honourable behavior and respect for commitments and undertakings which I have always tried to adhere to as an individual. My colleagues share this view.

Pearson's motivation as stated here is a sense of honor that he applies to himself whether acting in a personal or public capacity. There is no guile, and neither is there a divorce between public and private morality.

The second reason given in the letter displays Pearson's concern with alliance cohesion and with the problem of nuclear proliferation:

> (b) Canada's acceptance of nuclear weapons for defensive purposes has been part of a consistent attempt to have the nations of the western alliance share in a single nuclear deterrent rather than develop individual deterrents of their own. In the past year or so there has been a tendency, noticeably in one quarter, for nations to break away from this common purpose, and there is a danger this tendency may grow. If we, too, were to opt out of the common program, even if it were to avoid having any nuclear weapons at all rather than to develop such weapons of our own, we would be encouraging by precept and example a trend which is frought [sic] with serious danger for the free world. I do not feel that this would be a wise policy.

Mr. Pearson's third reason testifies to his continuing concern with maintaining Canada's influence internationally, which, as he consistently held throughout his career, required credible participation in the Atlantic alliance. In addition, this paragraph shows his sense of obligation to Canada's allies.

> (c) It is suggested in some quarters . . . that Canada should make little or no contribution to the military defence of the western alliance,

[119] Letter, Pearson to H. R. McArthur, February 22, 1963. Pearson papers, Leader of the Opposition files, Vol. 94, File 806.2, Nuclear Policy, Part 2. The letter was prepared by David Stanley, a Toronto businessman who assisted Pearson during the 1963 election campaign.

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> but should rely on U.S. protection while devoting its efforts . . . to promote the cause of disarmament and of aid to underdeveloped nations. To begin with, I do not believe that as one of the strongest wealthiest and most stable of the western nations we can honestly refrain from playing our full part in the common defence. . . . And if we do refrain from making our full contribution to this defence, I believe that our voice and our influence in the cause of world peace would be negligible.

This letter reveals Mr. Pearson's thinking on the substantive issues at the personal level, divorced from the context of events and partisan considerations. Given the fact that Pearson made up his own mind—having been freed to do so by the deference of his colleagues—the letter demonstrates the way he thought about the problem as he understood it. It also provides evidence that, in making the decision on nuclear weapons, he acted in consistence with his broader values.

In(ter)dependent Variables: Explaining the Decision

The independent variables influencing Mr. Pearson's decision have been isolated, first, by drawing a distinction between decision making and other foreign policy acts. On this basis, public intervention by the U.S., though pertinent to the process of mobilization of resources, did not have any relevance for the dependent variable. Thus, General Norstad's press conference, upon which a great deal of attention has been focused in previous studies of this decision, is not regarded here as an independent variable at all.

Some of the variables that have been isolated are systemic and situational. The first of these is the series of undertakings by the Canadian Government which, in turn, generated time pressures through bureaucratic routines, created expectations (especially in the military bureaucracy), and assigned an advocacy role to Mr. Harkness, an important member of the political elite.

The second situational variable is the behavior of individuals within the United States Government. General Norstad's views had an impact upon Mr. Hellyer during his November 1962 visit to Europe.

Third, the events of the Cuban missile crisis affected the Diefenbaker Cabinet, Canadian public opinion, the Canadian military bureaucracy, and Mr. Pearson, both directly and indirectly.

Together, these three situational and systemic variables had a powerful impact on Mr. Pearson. But they were processed through the Cana-

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dian political system and his own political style. Moreover, if these variables alone had been controlling, they should have moved Mr. Diefenbaker and his Cabinet to the same decision. The fact that they did not indicates that further explanation is needed. That further analysis leads to an assessment of the impact of variables of the political process and political style.

Several variables aside from those associated with political elite interaction have been noted. The first was the frustration of the military bureaucracy. This group exerted pressure on the Minister, Mr. Harkness, although his advocacy can be accounted for without that pressure. Lobbying the Department of External Affairs was another activity of the military bureaucracy, but those efforts were unsuccessful. Ultimately, the most effective outlet for the military's frustration was talking with Mr. Hellyer. Another variable was the political elite's perception of public opinion, as expressed by Mitchell Sharp and Walter Gordon. A further variable in this category is the electoral process. The 1962 election results provided an opportunity for the anti-Diefenbaker movement, although other factors, such as the nuclear weapons controversy itself, also helped to prepare the way for the Cabinet split that eventually took place. Although operative, these variables do not weigh so heavily in the decision as those that fall within the category of elite interaction.

The first set of variables in the category of elite interaction consists of those that entail relations within the Government. This set was shaped to some extent by fate (the deaths of two members of the Cabinet) and Mr. Diefenbaker's recruitment policy, as well as by the electoral process. Two splits in the Cabinet have been identified as crucial in explaining the elite interaction, but the evidence does not allow the assignment of priority to either the split over nuclear weapons between Mr. Green and Mr. Harkness and their followers, or to the political one between Mr. Hees and Mr. Diefenbaker and their followers. The compounding of cleavages may be considered to be the crucial variable, for Mr. Diefenbaker might have been able to manage either one alone. The compound cleavages not only presented Mr. Diefenbaker with a political problem that his resources did not enable him to solve, but also provided the scope for Mr. Pearson to act.

The structural relations between Government and Opposition in which each is motivated to seek and retain office constituted a strong—though not crucial—variable that led Mr. Pearson to make his decision. In the context of structural tension between Government and Opposi-

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tion, Mr. Pearson and his colleagues perceived not only an absence of leadership (decisiveness), but also less-than-honorable behavior by the Government; it led Mr. Pearson to see a political opportunity consistent with the implementation of some fundamental personal values.

The most important variables within the Opposition were those associated with Mr. Hellyer's behavior. Having become convinced of the case in favor of nuclear weapons, he campaigned vigorously and in several ways to influence his party's leader. He reported directly to Pearson orally and in writing. He reported to Pearson's most influential advisers and to the Liberal caucus. He made a public speech and he mobilized Mr. Gellner. Simultaneously, other elite members of the Opposition conceded deference to Mr. Pearson. Mr. Hellyer's activity may be considered to be an important variable. Although their action was not crucial, Messrs. Pickersgill and O'Hagan, and, possibly, Brig. Malone were influential in shaping the public expression of the decision.

The final category of variables is that of values, personality, and political style. In Mr. Diefenbaker's case, his reverence for parliamentary institutions and processes and his reliance upon himself alone did not provide him with sufficient resources to solve his political problem. At the same time, his basic respect for others and his fear of defeat in the House of Commons acted as restraints, preventing him perhaps from taking more effective action to crush his opponents.

Mr. Pearson's political style allowed him to take the decision upon himself; he made it in conformity with his basic ethical and political values rather than with his previous public pronouncements.

Officially, the decision to acquire nuclear weapons was made after the Liberals came to office, with Mr. Pearson as Prime Minister. The fact that the basic decision had been made by Mr. Pearson on January 1, 1963, while he was Leader of the Opposition, tends to disconfirm the hypothesis that decisions in the Canadian parliamentary system are made in Cabinet.

On the other hand, the case confirms the hypothesis that the values and political style of the Prime Minister (and in this case the potential Prime Minister) are powerful variables in decision making. However, these variables operate within the context of political elite interaction.

Given a situation, then, that is structured by the interactions between one government and another, a process is set in motion. Although a variety of variables are at work, including fairly powerful events, the most potent variables for predicting behavior are the values and political styles of leaders interacting in a political process.

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Conclusions

One cannot, of course, derive any generalizations from a single case study, but one can ask whether the case study offers evidence that tends to confirm or falsify hypotheses. In the present case, a conceptual and comparative framework was designed to assist in this task.

The case is one involving a situation between two allies, one dominant and the other deferential. The condition of interaction was integrative. Although propositions might apply more broadly, it would go beyond the scope of the evidence to assert that the case materials are applicable to other kinds of situations.

Situational and systemic effects were powerful in this case, but their influence was filtered through a domestic political process. The case, then, tends to disconfirm the proposition that foreign and defense policy are totally separate from inter- and intra-party political conflict. Although I think that the bureaucratic politics model fails to make certain important distinctions that are crucial to understanding the role of political leadership, there is further evidence here to show the utility of Allison's and Halperin's approach. The present example demonstrates that a model which includes a political process in foreign and defense policy making is applicable to a country other than the United States. The latter has provided the materials for most of the empirical work that has been done thus far.[120]

This case was unusual in that the operative decision was made not by the Prime Minister and his Cabinet, but by the Leader of the Opposition. On a superficial level, it appears to disconfirm the proposition that decisions in a parliamentary system are made through private bargaining at the Cabinet and official levels.[121] At a deeper level of analysis it may reveal that Cabinet unity is not just a formal arrangement for governing, but that the system requires the condition of political unity to operate effectively. In the absence of that unity, a crisis of governance is created that the Opposition can exploit.

Such unity relies principally on the Prime Minister. To cope with cleavages that may arise, especially under conditions of minority government—which are not unusual in Canada—the Prime Minister needs

[120] For studies using this approach applied to other countries, see Chihiro Hosoya, "Characteristics of the Foreign Policy Decision-Making System in Japan," *World Politics*, XXVI (April 1974); Nils Ørvik and associates, *Departmental Decision-Making: A Research Report* (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget 1972); the latter deals with Norway.

[121] See Richard Neustadt, "White House and Whitehall," in Thomas A. Hockin, *Apex of Power: The Prime Minister and Political Leadership in Canada* (Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice-Hall of Canada, Ltd. 1971), abridged from *The Public Interest*, II (1966).

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a large repertory of resources. The formal governance procedures of the parliamentary system alone are not enough, for the system does not serve the Prime Minister alone. It provides a set of tools for him, but also places on him a set of constraints. Above all, he needs his colleagues and, thus, the skills to manage them. The belief system and political style of the Prime Minister set boundaries for what he can do, and his style may not be appropriate to all political circumstances.

What is suggested by a comparison of Mr. Diefenbaker and Mr. Pearson is that a political style which commands deference makes the values of the leader act as more powerful variables than they would in other political styles.

In seeking to understand any country's foreign- and defense-policy decision making, the main contribution of this case study may be in pointing to the interaction of variables. The most potent variables identified were systemic, elite politics and the personal characteristics of leaders. None of these stood in isolation to operate in an independent and straightforward manner upon the dependent variable. Each interacted with the other. To explain foreign- and defense-policy making through such a complex process may be more difficult than through simple variation, but this approach has the advantage of combining attention to historical detail with concern for political analysis.

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EXTERNAL CO-OPTATION OF A LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRY'S POLICY MAKING: The Case of Ghana, 1969–1972

By RONALD T. LIBBY*

Introduction

BETWEEN 1969 and 1972, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and creditor countries structured the context in which their client, Ghana—a less developed country (LDC)—formulated its economic policy. The intergovernmental organizations (IGO's) and creditor countries failed to take into account the client country's domestic political situation. When the LDC became heavily dependent upon the IGO's and creditors for financial assistance to enable the government to survive a disastrous shortfall in foreign exchange earnings, it was forced to accept extreme, and politically dangerous, measures in order to secure assistance. The policies that were adopted were catastrophic for the LDC, and destroyed what remained of the democratic government's public support. This dramatic change in public climate made the government fatally vulnerable to a military coup d'état.

During the period under discussion, Dr. Kofi Busia's democratic government found itself locked into a network of intergovernmental economic relations. Within that network, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) effected a linkage of policy formation and transmission. The IGO's connected creditor and donor countries by means of an informal coalition of Ghanaian officials and foreign advisers who were residents of Ghana.

For purposes of lobbying their policies within decision-making circles inside the government, the international organizations created a base of operations consisting of Ghanaian officials and foreign advisers who informally coordinated their work with them. The IGO's, on their part, forged policy consensus among creditors and donors. Armed with financial support for their policies, the international organizations and the internal coalition proved decisive in gaining

* I wish to express my appreciation for support from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace during the early stages of research on this article.

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Ghana's acceptance of them. The policies turned out to be disastrous, however, for the Busia government, undermining its already precarious public support. In the wake of public disaffection, a military coup d'état was successfully carried out, putting an end to Ghana's short-lived experiment in democracy.

The Base of Operations of the IGO's

The co-optation of Ghana's economic policy making started in 1967 with the placement of a team of Harvard Development Advisory Service (DAS) economists in the planning and economic policy-making units of the government.[1] E. N. Omaboe, the chairman of the influential Economic Committee of the National Liberation Council (NLC), and Dr. Gustoph Papanek, the director of DAS, negotiated for the team, whose primary purpose was to form the nexus of a central planning unit in Ghana.[2] Its chief task was development planning and project identification—prerequisites to receiving IBRD lending and development aid from Western countries. Formally, the DAS team occupied positions in the reconstituted Ministry of Economic Planning. There was a planning unit for every development ministry —for agriculture, transportation, housing, health, industry, trade, and social sectors. Before a ministry could formalize a request for project funding, it had to have the approval of the relevant sector in the planning secretariat. DAS members acted as sector "overseers" because they were among the very few in the ministry who had the expertise to prepare projects to the Bank's satisfaction. Harvard specialists worked directly with the Bank in assessing project feasibility, obtaining data on the economy, and drafting Ghana's development plans.

The DAS and the IBRD were directly linked in Ghana's policy-making process. The DAS provided the technical data and internal documentation which the Bank needed to make presentations to Ghana's donors and creditors for development assistance and debt concessions. The nature of the DAS-IBRD relationship becomes clear in

[1] In August 1966, the Bank's planning expert, Albert Waterston, wrote a report entitled "A Practical Program of Planning for Ghana." The World Bank itself was not prepared to make the necessary consultants available; however, they suggested that Ghana could obtain the necessary technical expertise from the DAS.

[2] Interview with E. N. Omaboe; Accra, June 27, 1974. The Harvard Development Advisory Service has since been absorbed into a successor institution, the Harvard Institute for International Development, under the directorship of Lester Gordon. DAS teams have been financed by the IBRD, the United Nations Development Program, and the Ford Foundation. The IBRD has had close working relationships with the DAS in Colombia, Liberia, Pakistan, Argentina, and more recently in Tanzania and Indonesia—all of them major clients of the Bank.

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interviews with officials who were involved. One official of the World Bank explained the close relationship between the DAS and IBRD as follows: "If the Harvard people had been Bank people, they could not have done differently. They were like the Bank. They could observe things in much the same objective way as the Bank. They looked at things from the same vantage point as the Bank."[3]

The Bank and the DAS never disagreed. The DAS provided an invaluable service to the Bank in dealing with the government. Members of the team were usually the first people the Bank missions saw when visiting Ghana. The IBRD could learn more about what was going on inside the government by consulting the DAS than by meeting with Ghanaians. "They [the DAS] were a repository of information. They were close to J. H. [Mensah] and Jones [Ofori-Atta], so they were in the best position to provide data and say where data could be gotten and were in a perfect position to brief them on development policies and internal politics, for example on what J. H. and Busia were thinking, and they let the Bank know. In one half-hour with Harvard they could get the key information."[4] There is evidence to suggest that the DAS did not have this relationship with other external agencies. One Harvard team member stated, "I never saw anyone from an aid mission socializing with a sector staff member. It was always across the table with the external aid divisions. . . ."[5]

The Internal Coalition

Inside Ghana's government, the loosely knit group of DAS technical advisers and top-level Ghanaian officials who coordinated their policy-making efforts worked together on committees and in small informal groups. They were united by a common set of policy assumptions and by their informal ties with the IBRD and the IMF. The group was comprised of approximately twelve officials—six of them foreigners residing in Ghana. The nominal leader of the group was J. H. Frimpong-Ansah; other important Ghanaians were A. E. K. Ashiabor, Dr. Amon-Nikoi, Dr. A. O. Adu, S. K. Botchway, and Dr. Jones Ofori-Atta. Most of them had either worked in the IBRD/IMF be-

[3] Interview with Peter Reitter, the IBRD's Resident Representative in Ghana; Accra, July 23, 1974. Research produced by DAS economists in the Ministry of Economic Planning was described by the Minister in charge, J. H. Mensah, as being "geared to the assumptions held by the IBRD." Interview with J. H. Mensah; Accra, July 26, 1974.

[4] Reitter (fn. 3).

[5] Interview with Roger Selley, a former member of the DAS team; Legon, January 11, 1974.

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fore going into government service or joined the IGO's later.[6] Tony Killick, Joseph Stern, Michael Roemer, and Sieb Miedema of the DAS coordinated their work directly with Amon-Nikoi and Ashiabor. Two other members of the group were John Odling-Smee and Babu Niculescu who, operating from the Prime Minister's office, were instrumental in coordinating the coalition's efforts to influence him.

Frimpong-Ansah was the Governor of the Bank of Ghana during this period. In effect, he acted as the alternate Minister of Finance. Dr. Amon-Nikoi was the Principal Secretary of Finance; Dr. A. O. Adu was an Executive Director of the Bank of Ghana; and Dr. Ofori-Atta was the Deputy Minister for Planning. Odling-Smee wrote simplified briefing papers for Dr. Busia, which were frequently based on the more technical papers that had been drafted by the group. Niculescu, an old and trusted friend of the Prime Minister, served to personally persuade Busia of the correctness of the policy recommendations generated by the group. One member of the group described Niculescu's role in the coalition:

> Niculescu did personal errands for Busia. He talked to people in the British Treasury. He was here during the IMF visits and had direct access to Busia. He was in the castle and put an alternative to Busia against J. H.—he had Busia's ear. Whenever J. H. urged a point on Busia, Niculescu would be there to get in his points against it. He impressed on Busia that if certain things were done [i.e., the correct policies were followed], then resources would be forthcoming.[7]

Despite personality differences, the members of the group were united in their opposition to the government's economic policies which until August 1971 had been the exclusive preserve of the Minister of Finance, J. H. Mensah. They consciously orchestrated their efforts with the IGO's to influence the Prime Minister. Initially, they sought to ally themselves with the IBRD, and later with the IMF, in an effort to defeat Mensah's economic policy. Jones Ofori-Atta explained this informal alliance with the Bank:

> All donors looked at the Bank's reports as "the" data. Those who wanted to persuade J. H. to adopt a policy, posed the policy in Bank terms. We had to form an alliance with the Bank to get Busia's approval.

[6] Dr. Adu was a former Fellow of the World Bank's Economic Development Institute; Ashiabor had left government service in November 1971 to join the staff of the World Bank; Dr. Amon-Nikoi was an Executive Director of the IMF before becoming Principal Secretary for Finance; Frimpong-Ansah was elected vice-president of the IMF's Group of Twenty shortly after the 1972 coup.

[7] Interview with Dr. Amon-Nikoi, Governor of the Bank of Ghana; Accra, June 24, 1974.

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> Busia took his cue from the IBRD/IMF dislike of J. H. It became evident to Busia as early as March 1971 that something would have to be done about J. H. . . . I requested an IBRD Resident Representative to get more firm commitments from them and to get projects through more quickly and get support in the fight against J. H.; McNamara liked the idea.[8]

The official reported that, with the support of the World Bank, they "broke J. H.'s back." At meetings which were chaired by the Prime Minister, Mensah could not casually explain away or blithely justify his policies; he had to give systematic evidence with data to compete with the opposing evidence which was being produced by the coalition.

Contest for Control of Policy

From approximately August 1971 until December 1971, an intense contest for control of Ghana's economic policy took place between the coalition of the DAS and the Bank of Ghana, backed by the IGO's on one side and the Minister of Finance, J. H. Mensah, on the other. The lines of demarcation between the two sides surfaced in late January 1971 on the occasion of the Prime Minister's announcement of a major Cabinet reshuffle. There were ten major Cabinet changes; three ministers were removed. The most significant change was that of the division of the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning into two ministries. The Prime Minister himself took control of the planning portfolio, leaving Mensah with only the Ministry of Finance, thus reducing Mensah's virtual monopoly over economic policy. It was a public humiliation of Mensah and an effort to undercut his control. Busia took this extreme action at the urging of Ghana's donor and creditor countries and the IGO's. An official who was working in the Office of the Prime Minister at the time explained the circumstances leading to Busia's action: "J. H. was not briefing the Cabinet on the economic situation. He also went to creditor country meetings and the meetings broke down. Nothing happened. Aid flow stopped. A debt settlement had to come before aid would come. He would not brief the P. M. People who came to see him were not received well. There would not be aid without a debt settlement and a plan. The Bank and Fund and embassies complained about this."[9]

What was at stake in the Prime Minister's decision to reduce Mensah's authority was ability of the creditor countries and IGO's to in-

[8] Interview with Dr. Ofori-Atta; Legon, June 10, 1974.

[9] Interview with S. E. Arthur, former Deputy Secretary to the Busia Cabinet; Accra, July 2, 1974.

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fluence Ghana's economic policy. The removal of the Ministry of Economic Planning from Mensah's control was a prelude to the emergence of the informal alliance between the internal coalition, the IGO's, and the creditor countries. A high-level administrator for the U.S. Agency for International Development who participated in Ghana's 1970 aid meetings described the nature of this alliance as follows: "Creditors used Bank/Fund documents as the framework of correct policies for Ghana. They were the principal economic consultants and arbiters in the process. The Ghanaians had the Harvard group, and the creditors used the Bank and Fund as go-betweens with the Ghana Government."[10] The IGO's coordinated all action by imposing the requirement of a development program and policies as a *sine qua non* for aid from donor countries. The Bank, for example, would not recommend an aid program for Ghana until the government had produced a plan and a set of policies that were acceptable to it. Mensah had resisted this pressure by arguing that the development ministries were not themselves able to design a sufficient number of sound development projects, and that a development program comprised only of projects would not be adequate for Ghana's needs. He had also taken the position that unless the ministries knew the size of the aid commitments, they could not formulate a suitable development program.

The pressure to produce a plan and to adopt policies which were acceptable to the IBRD prompted the Prime Minister to remove the Ministry of Economic Planning from Mensah's control. By restructuring Ghana's economic policy-making apparatus, Busia created a direct policy-formulating link with the IGO's and creditors.

In February of 1971, shortly after taking personal control of the planning ministry, Busia created a special Cabinet-level Standing Development Committee (SDC) as the government's principal decision-making body for economic policy. The committee was chaired by the Prime Minister himself, and included Mensah and Frimpong-Ansah. These two men were the principal antagonists and, in the beginning, tended to dominate the meetings. The Economic Advisory Committee and the Economic Review Committee were under the SDC in terms of policy-making authority; their members were more technically oriented. The function of the latter two committees was to advise the Cabinet on short-term economic events. The heart of their work was the transmission of economic reports on the state of the economy to the SDC. These reports were produced under the supervision of Killick,

[10] Interview with Robert North, U.S. AID Director for Ghana; Accra, July 11, 1974.

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a member of the DAS team, and were instrumental in undermining Mensah's authority in Busia's eyes.[11]

Alliance Mobilization

In December of 1970, the IGO's and Ghana's creditors had begun to challenge Mensah's economic policy at a meeting of Ghana's Consultative Group of aid-giving donor countries, chaired by the World Bank. Just prior to the meeting, IBRD officials had discussed their differences with the Ghana delegation in a briefing paper entitled "Points for Discussion with Delegation of Ghana." The Bank had pressed for measures to arrest the alarming depletion of foreign exchange due to massive importation. Its officials argued that the measures introduced in Mensah's 1970–71 budget were not enough,[12] and maintained that either devaluation or higher import surcharges were required to contain importation within the bounds of Ghana's foreign-exchange reserves. They also insisted that payment of debts due to private foreign businesses was essential to restore the creditors' confidence in Ghana's policies. In this connection, they urged that Ghana eliminate the practice of importing on a basis of 180-day payments, and revert to "on-sight" payment for all imports. The Bank and the Fund also expressed their opposition to the Bank of Ghana's giving credit to the Ghana Supply Commission, which they saw as a device for increasing governmental financing of imports.

As leader of Ghana's delegation, Mensah refused to agree to the policy recommendations. He maintained that higher import taxes were not required to contain the current level of imports, and ruled out the possibility of devaluation because of its political unpopularity and because he regarded it as a self-defeating policy. However, he agreed to consider higher surcharges in the future if imports did not decline within the next few months. The IGO's and creditor countries remained unconvinced, however, of the efficacy of Mensah's policies. They refused to make significant aid contributions and debt concessions to Ghana at the 1970 meetings.

[11] Killick's group produced periodic documents monitoring economic trends and recommending policies. These reports were presented in April, May, June, and July of 1971.

[12] The 1970–71 budget introduced a graduated surcharge tax on the importation of certain commodities. It ranged from zero on pharmaceuticals, tinned fish, corned beef, and baby food, to 125 percent on clothing. A special development levy was placed on rice and sugar imports. However, the imports that had experienced the most dramatic increase—food items—were otherwise largely unaffected by the budget measures.

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On the basis of a recommendation by the World Bank, the Ghanaians made a special appeal to their creditors for debt relief. They proposed that the "aid-giving countries consider debt relief a legitimate form of aid and permit the use of new loans to refinance debt payments in order to reduce the need for full-scale debt relief negotiations."[13] At the debt meeting in London in July 1970, which was again chaired by the World Bank, the Ghanaians argued that their country's medium-term debts should be refinanced by creditors with 40-year loans, plus a grace period of 10 years, and at an interest rate of 2 percent. Britain was the major source of opposition to this appeal.[14] The British held approximately 25 percent of Ghana's medium-term or suppliers' credits (contracted during the Nkrumah regime). Their reaction was to reject the proposal out of hand. Before they would consider refinancing the debt, 100 percent of the repayment due under the 1966 and 1968 agreements would have to be remitted. Mensah proposed that Britain provide a low-interest refinancing loan of £3.5 million to repay Ghana's medium-term debts to the United Kingdom, due between July 1, 1970, and June 30, 1972. The loan was designed to compensate for the interest Ghana had been paying to the British under the terms of the 1966 and 1968 debt agreements. This interest became the source of a deadlock between Ghana and its principal creditor.

Britain's intransigence on the debt question was predicated largely on Whitehall's concern about setting a precedent for other Commonwealth countries with similar problems. Official thinking on this question was explained by a British diplomat. "Money costs money. Interest-free loans are not appreciated and do little good. The principle that debts must be repaid is a recognized one in international law. . . . Certain contracts may not be in the interests of recipient countries but the recipient country representatives are also responsible. . . ." The official went on to observe: "In 1966, 1968, and 1970 we provided new money in the form of program loans and refinancing to give them more foreign exchange to fulfill their debt obligations. The principle that the debts must be repaid was the one we were operating on. . . . J. H. was under great strain. He tried an impossible thing: he tried to get

[13] Lester B. Pearson and others, *Partners in Development* (New York: Praeger 1969), 157-58.

[14] The French were even more adamant than the British about having their debts repaid on schedule, but debts to the French were miniscule compared with those to the British. The Germans, on the other hand, who were owed a sizeable amount (second only to the British), were willing to consider the appeal, but deferred to the British as the major creditor.

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his country out of debt. He tried to settle problems which had accumulated over the years and he understood the difficulties."[15] A second major concern was that the cancellation of Ghana's debts would adversely affect a whole complex of British businesses which would have to be compensated. The U.K. was also worried about its relations with other OECD countries who had interests in Ghana; the British did not feel they could give concessions that other creditor countries were unwilling to give without straining relations with them.[16]

The deadlock was not resolved until Prime Minister Busia acted independently of his Minister of Finance, and gave indications that his government was prepared to accept the policy recommendations which the World Bank and the creditors had been making.

IGO Policy Coordination

The shift in Ghana's economic policies came about when the Prime Minister—unaccompanied by Mensah—personally visited Britain to discuss the impasse between the two countries. Between April 15 and May 2, 1971, Dr. Busia consulted with Prime Minister Heath and with officials of the Ministry of Overseas Development. After acceding to the British demand that Ghana pay its outstanding debts with interest according to the agreement of 1966 and 1968, the Prime Minister triumphantly announced that "the way was now clear for resumption of bilateral negotiations with Britain on Ghana's external debts." A debt-refinancing loan for £3.5 million at 2 percent interest per year, payable in 25 years with a 7-year grace period, was signed in mid-July 1971. Mensah registered his strong protest, however; he was particularly disturbed at the moratorium interest that Ghana was agreeing to pay. He estimated that this amounted to $87.2 million and increased Ghana's outstanding debt to Britain by 36 percent.

Busia's success in resolving the impasse on the Nkrumah or medium-term debt repayment between Ghana and Britain encouraged him to undertake a second mission to the United Kingdom to settle Ghana's growing short-term debt problem. Again unaccompanied by Mensah,

[15] Confidential interview with a British diplomat; Accra, July 19, 1974.

[16] There had been two abortive efforts at negotiating an agreement with the British. One was held in Accra and the other in Britain. Bilateral talks were held in Accra between British and Ghanaian representatives on November 23–25, 1970, without resolution. The following month, another effort was made in London, beginning December 18. This meeting was between Mensah and Terence Higgins, British Minister of State at the Finance Ministry. It coincided with the World Bank Consultative Group meeting for Ghana, held in Paris.

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he met with Prime Minister Heath at the latter's official country residence, Chequers.[17] In requesting Britain to help Ghana solve its debt difficulties, Busia made three specific appeals to Heath. He asked for a $360 million long-term loan on soft terms of repayment to repay Ghana's accumulating debts and to build Ghana's reserves by $100 million. (At this time, Ghana's short-term debts totalled $260 million and consisted of about $200 million in outstanding 180-day import credits and $60 million in foreign profits and dividend bills.) Second, he requested that Britain call another international debt conference of creditors to consider making further medium-term debt concessions to Ghana.[18] His third request was that the United Kingdom, Ghana's largest trading partner, continue guaranteeing export credit for imports to Ghana.

Busia came away from the meeting with the hope that Britain would bail Ghana out of its debt problems. However, the only concrete concessions the British actually made were to write off the balance of an old Nkrumah debt for an outrageously embellished, undelivered frigate (dubbed the "gin palace" for its many sumptuous bars), and an agreement to continue guaranteeing export credits for goods to Ghana at least through the Christmas holiday.[19]

Two weeks after Busia returned from London, he asked Frimpong-Ansah, the Governor of the Bank of Ghana, to undertake further discussions with British and American officials with a view to negotiate the terms of the assistance Ghana needed to resolve its debt problem. In this role, the Governor was acting as Busia's personal emissary, operating independently of the Minister of Finance.

Frimpong-Ansah, accompanied by Alex Ashiabor, the Director of Planning and coordinator of DAS officials in the Development Planning Secretariat, undertook this assignment in a five-day trip in mid-October, first to London and then to Washington. The purpose of his mission was to confirm Heath's offer of assistance to Busia, and also

[17] The trip was arranged by Niculescu, who also prepared briefing papers for Busia. Mensah had originally been scheduled to accompany Busia's party; however, a day before the departure, he was informed that the Prime Minister had decided to make the trip without him.

[18] According to the terms of the last debt conference held in 1970, the agreement was expected to be binding until at least 1972—the earliest another conference could be called. The British were the key in any decision to convene another debt conference. It took nine months, for example, before the British would agree to call the last conference, held in 1970.

[19] One reason for the timing of Busia's trip was that Ghana's export debts had grown to the point where the British export-guaranteeing agency (ECGD) was threatening to cut off Ghana's credit just when the Christmas holiday was approaching. A shortage of imported goods at that time would have been the most obvious indication to the Ghanaian public of the failure of Busia's economic policies.

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to help formulate a strategy for the latter's scheduled trip to London and Washington in November. At a meeting with officials of the Treasury and the Bank of England, the Ghanaians were informed that Britain was indeed prepared to help Ghana out of its difficulties. By way of confirmation, they were shown a copy of a letter which Prime Minister Heath was preparing to send to Busia. The letter contained the following major points outlining the British position:

1) Ghana was to prepare an agreed program with the IMF for the restoration of basic preconditions for stable growth of the economy, with particular concern for avoiding inflation.

2) Ghana was to try to draw as much as possible from the Fund.

3) After a program had been agreed upon with the IMF, and the Fund had extended financial assistance, Britain would organize other creditor countries to provide debt relief and aid so that Ghana could continue its development efforts at a high growth rate (i.e., 4.5 percent or higher).

The British made the agreement with the IMF a precondition for their assistance because they felt that they could not keep the Ghanaians under control without the cooperation of the IGO's and other creditors.[20] Agreement with the IGO's therefore became a *sine qua non* for aid and for a resolution of Ghana's debt problem.

The Ghanaians next went to Washington, where they held discussions with officials of the World Bank and the IMF on October 20-21, 1971. They discussed preliminary arrangements for the adoption of a comprehensive program of assistance by the Fund. The officials of the World Bank took the position that since Ghana needed emergency assistance, it would have to rely primarily upon the Fund. However, they indicated that an early agreement with the Fund on a comprehensive program would make it easier for the IBRD to support program lending to Ghana, and that that in itself would be a sign to donors to give more aid to Ghana. In a report submitted to the Prime Minister, Frimpong-Ansah explicitly stated that, "given an agreement on a comprehensive programme for Ghana, the Bank's Executive Board would find it easier to support programme lending to Ghana. This itself would be a signal to other countries to give more aid to Ghana. Prof. Chenery in particular thought that an early agreement with the Fund would be a good beginning."[21] Bank officials also stressed the fact that

[20] Interview with A. Ashiabor, Assistant Commissioner for Finance; Accra, August 6, 1974.

[21] J. H. Frimpong-Ansah, "Report to the Rt. Honourable The Prime Minister: Ghana's Short Term Debts—Report on Discussions in Washington and London," October 28, 1971, p. 12.

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if Ghana adopted a comprehensive program acceptable to creditors, it would be a *quid pro quo* for the settlement of Ghana's debt problem.

Mr. M. Toure, the leader of the IMF team, expressed the Fund's position by indicating that Ghana would have to agree to a comprehensive program with them in order to get assistance from the Fund and creditor countries. Specifically, the IMF would be prepared to offer Ghana a standby in the sum of approximately $43.5 million, and would assist in formulating a comprehensive program that would satisfy both the Fund and the creditors. Fund officials indicated their willingness to help Ghana work out a program that could be ready for approval by the IMF Executive Directors in late November 1971. They offered to provide this assistance during the Fund's consultation mission according to Article XIV, scheduled to be held in Ghana during the first week of November.

Challenge to the Coordinating Role of the IGO's

In opposition to the strategy that Busia appeared to be taking in dealing with the debt problem, Mensah made efforts to obtain short-term credit from Ghana's creditors outside of the IGO context. Opposed to having Ghana's debt problem treated as a long-term comprehensive one, Mensah considered the difficulties as short-term ones which required temporary measures to enable the country to "get over the hump" in the bad cocoa market. He favored a piecemeal strategy of getting assistance and debt concessions from donors and creditors to survive the crisis in the cocoa market and to continue Ghana's ambitious development efforts.[22] Mensah proposed to approach principal creditors for assistance individually, and to apply for a drawing from the IMF. He therefore refused to accept a comprehensive program designed to simultaneously resolve Ghana's short-term and medium-term debts (i.e., the 180-day import credits and the Nkrumah 1- to 12-year debts). He believed that by including the short-term with the medium-term debts, Ghana would prejudice its case for medium-term debt concessions. Considering Ghana's economic problem to be primarily a cyclical one which required a short-term solution, Mensah did not want to rely primarily upon the IMF; he particularly wanted to avoid having a comprehensive program forced on Ghana as a condition for assistance.

Mensah made an effort to formulate his short-term strategy at the

[22] In order to continue Ghana's ambitious development efforts, Mensah favored increasing the development budget to $199.9 million for 1971–72.

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IBRD/IMF annual meeting in Washington, in September 1971, where he consulted with British, American, and IBRD/IMF officials. He appealed to them for assistance in giving Ghana temporary accommodation. By focusing on resolving the short-term debt problem, he hoped to enable Ghana to clear up current arrears and carry on with its development efforts at a high annual growth rate of between 5 and 6 percent. When he resisted suggestions that Ghana should accept a package of policies which would include devaluation or higher import surcharges and significant reductions in the development budget, the result was an impasse which made assistance conditional upon the acceptance of major policy changes.

Mensah's next major effort to formulate a strategy independent of IGO coordination came during the first two weeks of November 1971, when he accompanied the Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs to Washington and London in a last-ditch effort to get short-term concessions and assistance. They met in Washington with officials of the IBRD, IMF, and the Agency for International Development. At those meetings, the Ghanaians were informed that a standby from the Fund would be conditional upon the outcome of the IMF consultation mission that was currently in progress in Ghana. American AID officials expressed their government's sympathy, but indicated that the U.K. was the key factor as the principal creditor country. If Britain were prepared to make a concession outside the context of the IMF, then the United States might also be prepared to help. However, at Busia's meetings with Sir Alec Douglas-Home and Lord Lothian, and with Prime Minister Heath, on November 12, 1971, it was made clear that British assistance was conditioned upon a comprehensive program agreed to by the IMF. Busia returned to Accra on November 19 in a deeply discouraged frame of mind. After this trip, he was reconciled to accepting the IMF approach in order to get the needed assistance.[23] Mensah, however, continued to oppose this strategy; he tried to mobilize the Cabinet as late as December to discredit the Prime Minister for this line of action.

The sequence of events quickened as Ghana's trade position deteriorated further. On November 22, only three days after Busia re-

[23] Shortly after these meetings, Busia sent letters to both President Nixon and Prime Minister Heath, indicating Ghana's willingness to accept the Fund approach in settling the debt problem, and asking confirmation of their willingness to assist in an international settlement of Ghana's short-term and medium-term debt problems at forthcoming conferences in early 1972. The letters also asked for confirmation of their governments' willingness to provide increased long-term concessionary aid at subsequent aid meetings chaired by the IBRD.

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turned to Ghana, the team of the IMF Article XIV mission paid him a personal visit. The team was led by Rattan Bhatia, the IMF's former Resident Representative for Ghana.[24]

In a briefing paper entitled "Meeting with the Prime Minister; Main Points" and in two subsequent meetings, the team stressed the fact that fundamental policy changes were required to avert a major crisis. Bhatia strongly criticized Mensah's budget for 1971–72 and his economic management of Ghana. On November 24, following a series of meetings, the consultation team presented Busia with a paper entitled "Policy Measures to Deal with the Present Economic Situation," which contained the outline of the Letter of Intent for an IMF standby. The Cabinet considered this measure on December 22, 1971. Frimpong-Ansah, who participated in the meetings and introduced information to support the IMF team's position, strengthened its argument. For example, he warned the Prime Minister that British export insurance would be discontinued unless import arrears were cleared up. He also mentioned the need to borrow in order to repay the IMF for a previous, outstanding loan before any further loans could be made, and he showed Busia urgent cables from the Ghana Commercial Bank in London (a government-owned bank), warning that they would have to close unless foreign exchange were somehow made available. The Prime Minister was also persuaded that once Ghana had reached a settlement with the IMF, creditors and donors would be prepared to make debt and aid concessions to Ghana.

Consequently, Busia directed Niculescu to produce a paper which would formulate Ghana's policy options, to be considered by the Standing Development Committee within 48 hours. Niculescu organized an *ad hoc* committee comprised of Stern and Killick (the two DAS members), and Odling-Smee of the Prime Minister's office. Their report, submitted for consideration by the SDC on November 30, argued for devaluation, cuts in the recurrent and capital expenditures, increased taxes, restrictive credit policies, and reductions in subsidies to parastatal bodies. The main point of the paper was that strong measures were called for to correct a basic trade disequilibrium and to convince the IMF, IBRD, and creditors that Ghana was serious about dealing with its debt problem and therefore deserved further assistance.

During the discussion at the SDC meeting, Mensah was the only one

[24] The fact that Bhatia headed the IMF mission to Ghana was a personal slight to Mensah, who had not renewed Bhatia's contract as IMF Resident Representative. Bhatia had therefore been asked to leave Ghana in 1968.

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to oppose the recommendations. He based his opposition largely on political grounds. Mensah argued that a major devaluation was unwise and politically dangerous; it had failed in 1967. He raised the ominous question of whether the administration had enough "political capital" in the middle of its term to risk a major policy change which would have traumatic consequences for the Ghanaian public. He also argued that the measures currently in force (i.e., the 1971–72 budget) were sufficient to put the situation under control. The increase in importation was attributed to "pent-up" demand which had been released by the liberalization of imports. After an initial increase, he expected the import surcharges introduced in the recent budget to "bite" and the flow of imports to slow. The statistics on imports for September 1971, the latest available in November, seemed to support Mensah's case. The figures for that month showed a decline of about 15 percent from the previous month.

Mensah's admonitions against the danger of a comprehensive settlement with the IMF were ignored, however, and Busia asked Frimpong-Ansah to quantify the consequences of the policy measures discussed in the recommendations. Frimpong-Ansah thereupon organized another *ad hoc* committee under the nominal chairmanship of Dr. A. O. Adu, the Deputy Governor of the Bank of Ghana. It was comprised of seven civil servants, plus five foreign resident advisers who did most of the work: the four DAS officials—Stern, Killick, Roemer, Miedema —as well as Odling-Smee. The committee's first report to the Governor on December 14 had recommended an exchange rate adjustment of not less than ₵1.50 = $1.00, or an approximate cedi devaluation of 49 percent. It also suggested that additional deflationary measures were required to secure an IMF standby agreement and to get assistance from creditors and donors. Moreover, it proposed cuts in the recurrent and development budgets.

Frimpong-Ansah agreed that further deflationary measures were required in addition to the proposed devaluation. However, he argued that budget cuts were politically unacceptable. Cutting recurrent expenditures meant laying off government employees, which would be unpopular; reductions in the development budget were strongly opposed by Mensah who still had enough support in the Cabinet to block such a measure. Frimpong-Ansah further agreed with the committee's suggestion that "sweeteners" were required to soften the impact of the devaluation. However, this could not be accomplished by cutting the budget. In his opinion, the only way government could gain the agree-

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ment of the IMF without making unpopular budget cuts was to increase the margin of the devaluation.[25] The Governor informed the committee, therefore, that the government was prepared to increase the devaluation up to a further 50 percent beyond its initial recommendation.

Two days later, the committee produced a revised report. It recommended a devaluation to ₵1.75 = $1.00, combined with further deflationary measures. The development budget was to be cut by $41.1 million, and "sweeteners" were to be added to soften the impact of the devaluation on the public. The price of cocoa to producers would be raised by 25 percent and the minimum wage for workers was to be raised by 14 percent. Import surcharges, the unpopular development levy, taxes on invisibles, and export bonuses also were to be eliminated.

The new report explained that the devaluation would result in an 11 percent rise in the cost of living and would increase the cost of politically sensitive consumer imports such as milk, tinned fish, corned beef, sugar, and rice by the amount of the devaluation. It also contained an impressionistic table suggesting how the policy package would affect different income groups. Cocoa farmers, exporters, import substitutors, and the government budget would benefit, while the urban middle class (which included the army) and traders would suffer a loss in real income.

The Prime Minister called a meeting of the SDC for December 17 to work out a program for presentation to the IMF team which had just returned from Washington. Divergent views again emerged, with Mensah arguing against major policy changes. He stated that a major reduction in imports would preclude an annual growth rate of 4.5 percent on which present development plans were based. He suggested that imports be reduced by between $29.4 and $39.2 million instead of $98 million as recommended to the Prime Minister. At this stage, Dr. Busia had aligned himself with the position of the IGO/coalition, and openly argued against Mensah—his own Minister of Finance. He disputed the assertion that the devaluation would undermine Ghana's development efforts and (incorrectly) argued that it would not prevent Ghana from attaining an annual growth rate of 4.5 percent. He invoked the names of Prime Minister Heath and President Nixon, and the IMF to confirm his argument. By way of concluding the meeting,

[25] Members of the DAS team concluded, however, that it was unnecessary, and that the results were too unpredictable to have a devaluation as high as 50 percent in terms of dollars. They decided to resist such an extreme devaluation and to push for ancillary deflationary measures along with a lower rate of devaluation.

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Dr. Busia instructed Frimpong-Ansah and Mensah (in deference to the latter's office) to meet with the committee which had produced the policy recommendations, in order to work out the details of an IMF program that could be agreed upon at the next meeting of the SDC, on December 20. This instruction was ignored: Frimpong-Ansah and the committee did not meet with Mensah.

On December 20, Frimpong-Ansah essentially recommended the same program as at the previous meeting: a devaluation to ₵1.75 = $1.00, the abolition of import surcharges, taxes on invisible transactions and the export bonus, a 25 percent increase in the price of cocoa to producers, and an increase in the minimum wage to ₵.85 per day. In the discussion that followed, Busia rejected Mensah's argument that the devaluation was too risky by saying that the situation was politically dangerous regardless of the action chosen. He contended that Mensah's proposals would not convince the IMF and creditors to help Ghana through its debt crisis. Mensah did not pursue the argument; instead, he shifted attention to the difficulties of accepting the IMF's proposed program. The Fund's Letter of Intent, a draft of which had been circulated the evening prior to the SDC meeting, called for a 44 percent devaluation in terms of dollars or about 75 percent in terms of cedis. It suggested reductions in the budget, credit ceilings in the banking system (a limit of $137.2 million), and an agreement not to increase recurrent expenditures beyond 5 percent during the period of the standby. The government would also be required to reduce its short-term arrears by $25 million before the end of 1972, and would have to eliminate its entire 180-day (short-term) trade deficit. Finally, Ghana would have to agree not to incur external debts of medium-term duration (i.e., suppliers' credits) in excess of $10 million during the period of the standby.

Mensah questioned the advisability of accepting the condition of the 180-day import arrears clearance, on grounds that it would weaken Ghana's appeal for future debt concessions. He opposed the limitations on credit in the banking system because they would create problems for cocoa purchasers. And he questioned whether the IMF would accept "sweeteners" such as wage increases and increases in the price of cocoa to producers, which were designed to cushion the impact of the devaluation on the public, but were inflationary.

The Prime Minister's reply to Mensah was that the only uncertainty he—Busia—had was in deciding which sweeteners to include in the policy package. The meeting ended with an agreement to time the de-

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valuation to coincide with the scheduled announcement of the U.S. dollar devaluation, as a "smoke screen."[26]

The Prime Minister called an emergency meeting of the Cabinet to ensure political support for a policy on which he had already decided. The meeting, which was held on December 22, 1971, caught most ministers by surprise; many were unable even to understand what was at issue. At the meeting, the Prime Minister repudiated Mensah's challenge to his leadership by reading aloud the full text of a letter addressed to Mensah. It was a reply to an earlier letter from Mensah to Busia, which had been widely circulated and was designed to mobilize Cabinet support for Mensah in opposition to Busia's policies. Busia's letter implied that Mensah had misled him about the state of the economy, and that his proposals were inadequate and would not gain the support of the IMF and the creditors. Mensah equivocated by saying that, although he opposed the devaluation, he recognized that it might be the only way in which Ghana could secure assistance. Busia then asked Mensah to present to the Cabinet the details of the policy package which had been previously worked out by the SDC. The Finance Minister surprised everyone present by recommending a higher devaluation than Frimpong-Ansah and the IMF had. He expressed his opposition to devaluation, but said that if it was necessary, it should be at the higher end of the scale rather than the lower end. He gave three reasons.[27]

1) The 43 percent devaluation that the technical committee had recommended would require additional deflationary measures, such as a budget cut of $44.1 million. A higher exchange rate adjustment of ₵1.818 = $1.00 would require budget cuts of only $24.5 million, still enabling Ghana to achieve a high annual growth rate.

2) A higher rate of devaluation would make sure that it did not have to be repeated.

3) At the higher rate of devaluation, greater budget revenues were

[26] This strategy had initially been proposed by Stern and Killick in a paper prepared for an SDC meeting entitled "Draft Memorandum on the International Monetary Situation," August 18, 1971. The paper argued that while the U.S. devaluation might not have a significant impact on Ghana, it might provide an opportunity to devalue without appearing to make an independent policy decision.

[27] Mensah did not oppose devaluation on doctrinaire grounds. He had, in fact, supported a major devaluation during October 1971 when the decision was made to peg the cedi to the U.S. dollar, in anticipation of the U.S. devaluation of 7.9 percent which eventually occurred on December 24 of that year. Pegging to the U.S. dollar, plus the fact that the currencies of Ghana's major trading partners would thereby appreciate by an average of between 8 and 10 percent, would represent an effective cedi devaluation of around 15 percent.

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likely, giving the government greater flexibility in a possible reduction of other taxes when preparing the next budget in July 1972.

Mensah argued that there should be no cuts in the development budget. However, he recommended further deflationary measures, such as retaining import surcharges along with the export bonus, and adding a new import predeposit scheme—all of which were designed to reduce importation. He supported the increase in the price of cocoa to producers and proposed a 1 percent cut in recurrent expenditures.

On the morning the devaluation was announced, Mensah informed the Cabinet in a final report that the devaluation would be to ₵1.818 = $1.00, and that budget expenditures would be cut by $24.5 million. Contrary to Mensah's proposals, however, the import surcharges and export bonuses were dropped, and the Cabinet insisted that the minimum wage be raised to ₵1.00. Mensah also informed the Cabinet that the Letter of Intent had not been signed, and that the IMF team had been asked to leave the country while the new policies were announced.[28] Mensah had, in fact, arranged for the IMF team to be out of the country in order to postpone an agreement and thus increase Ghana's future bargaining power with the Fund. He hoped in particular to avoid the Fund's rigid conditions regarding cuts in the budget and credit ceilings in the banking system.

The Prime Minister made the announcement on December 27, in the form of a press release that suggested that the cause of the cedi devaluation was the devaluation of the U.S. dollar on December 24. The cedi devaluation of 82 percent represented a 48 percent increase in terms of gold. It resulted in an average increase in import prices of 92 percent, and was estimated to have caused a 14 percent increase in the cost of living as a direct result of higher import prices.

The effect of the devaluation on the price of imported consumer goods was immediate. Within days of the announcement, imported consumer goods almost doubled in price or disappeared entirely from the shelves of retail shops. On December 31, the airlines suspended ticket sales pending new air fares—which doubled in price. Traders in Accra started selling essential commodities at prices greatly in excess of the controlled prices. The *Ghanaian Times* announced that, according to a survey conducted by the official Ghana News Agency on De-

[28] The Fund mission did not like being told to come back to finalize the standby agreement. However, they were told that the Ghanaians would have to sort things out for themselves before a standby could be arranged. The mission returned early in January 1972 to negotiate the final terms of the standby. Efforts to finalize the agreement were still in progress when the coup occurred.

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cember 30, a packet of St. Louis Sugar which formerly sold at the controlled price of 27 New Pesewas now sold for 40 NP; a tin of Peak milk sold at 15 NP instead of 11 NP. On January 6, 1972, a can of beef sold for 70 NP instead of 55 NP, and a packet of locally manufactured cigarettes sold for 65 NP instead of 45 NP. It was also rumored that most essential goods at the big department stores were being cleared by traders with the intention of hoarding them; there were widespread reports of the absence of certain import commodities altogether from stores.

The public reaction to the devaluation was sharp and hostile. It created the climate in which a military coup d'état could be carried out. On January 13, two days after Dr. Busia's sudden departure for Britain for medical treatment, a successful military coup took place, led by Colonel I. K. Acheampong. The new government publicly admitted having planned the coup as early as June 1970; it seized the opportunity presented by the public dissatisfaction with Busia's economic policies. The new government used the disaffection with the devaluation in particular to win support for itself by reversing the devaluation. On February 7, the currency was revalued upward by 21.4 percent (in terms of gold), to C1.00 = $0.78, which neutralized about two-thirds of the effects of the devaluation.

An Alternative Political Strategy

In order to judge whether or not Ghana's economic policy making was indeed co-opted by the IGO's and creditors, it is necessary to consider whether Ghana had an alternative to the devaluation policy package. The National Redemption Council (NRC), successor to the Busia government, listed the debts it had inherited as follows:[29]

Long-Term Debts	$230 million
Medium-Term Debts	$370 million
Short-Term Debts	$286 million
(unmatured 180-day credits	$139 million)
(arrears on service payments	$80 million)
(arrears on import payments	$67 million)

The NRC repudiated certain debts and unilaterally announced the terms on which the balance of the medium-term debts would be repaid. The new government also took the highly unusual step of uni-

[29] *West Africa*, November 13, 1972, pp. 1528-29; *Ghanaian Times*, April 26, 1974; *Africa Report*, April 1972, p. 22.

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laterally revaluing its currency at a time when the country was bankrupt. After only one month in office, the NRC repudiated $90 million in medium-term debts owed to British companies. The rest of the debts were to be paid only if the firms could prove the honesty of their claims. Repayment was to be over a 50-year period with no increase in interest. This would have effectively transformed all of the Nkrumah debts from medium-term to long-term debts. Although these terms were not accepted by creditors, Ghana did receive one of the best terms of repayment ever given by Western creditor countries to any debtor country. They ultimately agreed on a repayment period of 28 years, with a grace period of 10 years and an interest rate of 2½ percent per annum.[30] These generous terms did not affect the NRC's debt repudiation, nor were any conditions attached to the agreement.

The NRC's tough position vis-à-vis creditors also did not result in the severance of export credits. The debt repudiation did, however, make it more costly to import goods, and required importation on "hard" credit. It also made it difficult for Ghana to borrow from international financial companies. However, upon the recovery of the cocoa market, Ghana was able to make payments on its short-term commercial overseas debts, and its import credit was restored. The spot price for Ghanaian cocoa rose from a disastrous £260 per ton in early 1972 to an unprecedented high of £900 per ton in July 1973. As a result, there was a surplus in balance of payments of 143.4 million cedis in 1972, and about 150 million cedis in 1973.

The NRC's independent strategy toward its creditors and the IGO's proved very advantageous and was politically popular. It netted the NRC highly favorable terms of debt repayment and did not invite the retaliation by the creditors which Busia had feared. Creditors accepted the debt repudiation as a *fait accompli* and appeared to be mollified by the NRC's resumption of short-term commercial debt repayment. The resumption of these payments also served as a signal to creditor countries to resume aid contributions to Ghana. The NRC has underscored its independence from Western creditors by re-establishing its trade and aid relationship with Soviet bloc countries. It has refused to allow the World Bank and IMF to coordinate its aid and debt relationship with creditors, and has thereby avoided falling into the trap of IGO/creditor co-optation.[31]

[30] Previously, the best terms Ghana had received from creditors was a repayment period of 7 to 8½ years, with a moratorium interest of between 5½ and 6½ percent; it applied to only a portion of the outstanding debt.

[31] However, Ghana's long-term structural economic and political problems have not been resolved. Dependence on imported consumer goods, an excess of imports over

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Conclusion

Given the context in which economic policy was formulated, Dr. Busia appeared to have no other option but to accept the massive devaluation policy. This policy was considered necessary to demonstrate to the IMF and the creditors that Ghana was determined to "live within its means" and that it therefore deserved further assistance. Herein lies the fundamental error of the course Busia chose. Once the Busia government had accepted the auspices of the IGO's in coordinating Ghana's foreign aid and debt conferences, the government was forced to deal with the coordinated influence of donors and creditors thereafter. The IGO's set the policy framework within which creditor countries dealt with Ghana; they co-opted Ghana's policy-formation process by coordinating external contacts with the government. When external assistance became crucial for the government's survival due to a serious decline in the world price of cocoa beans in mid-1971, Ghana became heavily dependent upon the IGO's and creditors. The devaluation package which the IMF, IBRD, Britain and other creditors presented as a precondition for their help was primarily designed to persuade creditor and donor governments that Ghana was deserving of further assistance. Dr. Busia was placed in a dilemma of taking extreme policy measures which would have a traumatic impact upon the Ghanaian public or risking the severance of export credit and aid—which would also undermine public confidence in his government. Neither course was a viable option because neither took the precarious position of the government into account.

J. H. Mensah's opposition to the Prime Minister was largely based on Mensah's resistance to the co-optation of Ghana's economic policy by the IGO's. As a politician he recognized that a massive devaluation would be politically too risky. He therefore fought for moderate, medium-term measures of adjusting to the cocoa market over the 1972–1976 period by gradually reducing the level of imports by 7½ to 10 percent. He tried to secure external assistance outside the IGO/creditor context to support his policies. However, Mensah's efforts were doomed to failure precisely because the IGO's had co-opted Ghana's economic policy making, forcing the government to negotiate a comprehensive economic program involving major policy changes through the auspices of the IMF.

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exports, fluctuating prices of cocoa on world markets, lack of foreign investment, high population growth, and high urban unemployment continue to plague Ghanaian politics.

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The policies which Busia ultimately adopted were viable in the context in which they were formulated—intergovernmental relations. However, in Ghana's domestic political context, they were suicidal. No government can continue for long if it formulates policy primarily to satisfy external constituents. This condition applies particularly to popularly elected third-world governments such as Ghana's, whose democratic institutions are poorly developed.

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SOVIET NAVAL DOCTRINE AND SOVIET POLITICS, 1953–1975

By GEORGE E. HUDSON*

THIS study of Soviet naval doctrine is concerned with doctrinal development in the post-Stalin years, when Soviet thinking about naval policy was greatly influenced by the nuclear revolution that began to have an impact between 1953 and 1957. In the Khrushchev years (1957–1964), the conventional forces of the fleet were declared "obsolete"; and in the current period (1964–1975), the doctrines of the "balanced fleet" and "denial of the seas" have become accepted as principles of Soviet naval policy. Soviet naval doctrine[1] continues to change: since 1973, there has been some evidence that the current Soviet leadership may wish to limit fleet development and use.

Two major analytical points can be made about the development of Soviet naval doctrine: (1) It has changed due partly to the interaction of domestic political forces,[2] especially the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), the Soviet Army, and Soviet Navy; partly because of economic conditions within the Soviet Union; and partly because of Soviet reactions to U.S. foreign policy. (2) Modern Soviet naval doctrine reflects a distinct view of naval utilization, differing in important respects from current Western thinking.[3]

Hints of Change from Stalin's Time: 1953–1957

Stalin's death in March 1953 threw the Soviet political and military leadership into chaos. As if in search of stability, most military thinkers

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[1] Naval doctrine is defined as propositions dealing with a navy on the nature of a future war, the effect of the nuclear revolution, the preconditions and conditions for victory in a future war, and the organizational structure of the armed forces.

[2] Also referred to as "interest groups." Two kinds of interest groups have been identified in the Soviet system, those that are associated with institutions, or "institutional" groups, and those that cut across institutions, or "tendencies of articulation." I have found that both are represented in this study of naval doctrine. For a methodological discussion on interest groups, see H. Gordon Skilling and Franklyn Griffiths, eds., *Interest Groups in Soviet Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1971), chaps. I, II, X, and XI.

[3] This point counters an assertion made previously about the Western nature of Soviet naval doctrine. See Hudson, "Soviet Naval Doctrine, 1953–1972," in Michael MccGwire, ed., *Soviet Naval Developments: Capability and Context* (New York: Praeger 1973), 288.

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at first propounded doctrinal concepts similar to those developed during Stalin's regime, with emphasis on a large but defensive fleet, barely hinting at the modernizing tendencies implicit in the development of nuclear weaponry and missile technology. It was a time of immense political change in the Soviet Union, marked by the rise of Khrushchev. It was also a time of transition in naval doctrine.

Differing doctrinal views in the party, army, and navy help to illustrate the tensions present during this period of change, and demonstrate the directions in which doctrine was moving.[4] The CPSU, more than either the army or the navy, advocated diminished reliance on the conventional forces of the Soviet Navy and a greater role for nuclear weapons generally. Party policy on troop cuts in 1955 and 1956, and the withdrawal of naval forces from Porkkala-Ud and Port Arthur in the same years, seem to indicate the party's preference for restructuring the armed forces.

Party leaders and theoreticians contended that any future war would most likely be nuclear. Georgii Malenkov, head of the state apparatus, announced in 1954 that war would lead to "fresh carnage, which, with modern methods of warfare, means the ruin of world civilization,"[5] a view adopted by Khrushchev and his supporters at the time of the Twentieth Party Congress (1956). War at sea between the two superpowers was considered unlikely, as implied by the aforementioned troop cuts and reduction of naval base facilities.

The foundation of the party's view was a belief in the deterrent power of nuclear weapons, which made war "not fatalistically inevitable." The probability of war could be reduced and, just as important, so could conventional military expenditures: the party lowered troop levels by 640,000 men in 1955, announced a further cut of 1,200,000 men in 1957, diminished the military budget by 10 billion rubles between 1955 and 1956,[6] and demobilized 375 naval vessels.[7]

Admiral Gorshkov later implied that the party at that time had

[4] The identification of differing doctrinal views calls into question Raymond Garthoff's contention that there was an "*absence* of conflict over military strategic thinking or concepts" during this period. See Raymond L. Garthoff, *Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age* (New York: Praeger 1958), 37; emphasis in original.

[5] "Speech by Comrade G. M. Malenkov," *Pravda*, March 13, 1954, as translated in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, VI (April 28, 1954), 8.

[6] Admiral N. Basistyi, "Na strazhe morskikh rubezhei" [On Guard of the Sea Boundaries], *Izvestiia*, July 29, 1956, p. 3; Marshal G. K. Zhukov, "Rech' tovarishcha G. K. Zhukova" [The Speech of Comrade G. K. Zhukov], *Krasnaia zvezda*, February 21, 1956, p. 3.

[7] Admiral S. G. Gorshkov, "Na strazhe morskikh rubezhei Sovetskoi derzhavy," [On Guard of the Soviet State's Sea Boundaries], *Pravda*, July 29, 1956, p. 3. Some of these vessels were believed to be obsolete; see Robert W. Herrick, *Soviet Naval Strategy* (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute 1968), 80.

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almost planned to abandon the conventional surface fleet.[8] While the future of the main branch of the navy—the surface fleet—was indeed placed in doubt, the party was beginning to consider submarines as the staple force of the navy. The intention at this stage, then, was not to eliminate the navy completely as a branch of the armed forces.[9] The duties of a revolutionized and "submarinized" navy would, however, place the fleet in an inferior position relative to the other armed forces. References to the navy as the "faithful helper" or "active helper" of the Soviet Army during World War II reinforced party arguments that the navy should continue this secondary role in the future.[10]

At the outset of the post-Stalin period, most army writers held that future wars would be conducted by all branches of the armed forces in all theaters of activity, and that the conventional forces operating in these theaters would be even more important than during World War II.[11] But during this transition period, the army's view on the probable type of war to be waged changed increasingly from the mixed type, involving conventional and nuclear weapons, to a more nuclear perspective. Yet, army officers still believed that only a sustained effort of all armed forces working together with the entire nation could achieve victory.[12]

As nuclear weapons received more and more acclaim, tension developed within army ranks between traditionalist (pro-conventional) and modernist (pro-nuclear) advocates. The prevalence of what Colonel G. Fedorov, a prolific writer on military doctrine, called "old views"—that is, traditional doctrine—retarded doctrinal change in the army and influenced the army's view of the new methods in the navy.[13] After the *Nautilus* had its first sea cruise in January 1955, the visible evidence of the utility of American and Soviet nuclear developments slowly began to undermine the traditionalist position. It was asserted that the navy could adjust to the new demands of the nuclear age by combining nuclear and conventional weapons, and could thereby remain "decisive" in the future.[14]

[8] Gorshkov, "Razvitie Sovetskogo voennomorskogo iskusstva" [The Development of the Soviet Naval Art], *Morskoi sbornik*, No. 2 (February 1967), 19.

[9] Herrick (fn. 7), 75-76.

[10] "Den' Voenno-Morskogo Flota" [Soviet Navy Day], *Pravda*, July 29, 1956, p. 1.

[11] "Nastoichivo ukrepliat' mogushchestvo Sovetskikh Vooruzhennykh Sil" [Persistently Fortify the Might of the Soviet Armed Forces], *Krasnaia zvezda*, November 12, 1954, p. 1.

[12] Colonel G. Fedorov, "O soderzhanii sovetskoi voennoi ideologii" [On the Content of Soviet Military Ideology], *Krasnaia zvezda*, March 22, 1957, p. 2.

[13] Fedorov, "O soderzhanii sovetskoi voennoi ideologii" [On the Content of Soviet Military Ideology], *Krasnaia zvezda*, March 22, 1964, pp. 2-4.

[14] Colonel I. Korotkov, "Rol' praktiki v razvitii sovetskoi voennoi nauke" [The Role

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The army, however, envisioned the fleet as conducting merely defensive operations during a war while the ground forces would hold the main responsibilities for offensive operations. Some spokesmen, such as Marshal A. M. Vasilevskii, not only emphasized naval defensive operations, but even postulated that the navy would need substantial help in its primary theater of activities, the sea coast, whereas the army would not require much assistance in its own sphere.[15] Statements of this type muted efforts for cooperation with the navy by advancing the army's superior vision of itself.

If the party in this period is to be considered "modernist," and the army an admixture of modernism and traditionalism, or "mixed," then the navy may also be conceived of as "mixed," but leaning even more toward traditionalism than the army. For, in an obvious, self-serving fashion, most naval writers argued that an important portion of any type of war would involve conventional operations at sea. In their view, victory could be achieved only by all branches of the armed forces acting together.[16] Although nuclear weapons might be used in future conflicts, the writers envisioned a long war, since the participation of conventional forces was considered a requisite for victory. Nuclear weapons did not change the fundamental nature of war, they merely added a new dimension, making it slightly more complex.

On Armed Forces Day, 1956, Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, the new naval Commander in Chief, issued a summary comment relating to the navy's opinion:

> A future war, if it is unleashed by the imperialists, . . . will contrast considerably with past wars as regards the massive use of air power, various types of rockets, and various means of massive destruction, such as atomic, thermonuclear, chemical and bacteriological weapons. However, this does not diminish the significance of the army, the fleet, and the air force. Moreover, without mighty land troops, a first-class air force, and a modern navy, without their efficient and reliable interaction, it is impossible successfully to conduct contemporary war.[17]

Although he admitted that nuclear and other modern weapons were important considerations in Soviet naval doctrine, he nevertheless

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of Practice in the Development of Soviet Military Science], *Krasnaia zvezda*, August 29, 1956, p. 2.

[15] Vasilevskii, "Vooruzhennye sily Sovetskogo gosudarstva" [The Armed Forces of the Soviet Government], *Izvestiia*, February 23, 1956, p. 4.

[16] See Admiral N. G. Kuznetsov, "Vernyi strazh morskikh rubezhei" [Faithful Guardian of the Sea Boundaries], *Pravda*, July 25, 1954, p. 3.

[17] Gorshkov, "Na strazhe bezopastnosti sotsialisticheskogo otechestva" [On Guard for the Security of the Socialist Fatherland], *Sovetskii flot*, February 23, 1956, p. 4. This and all following translations from Russian are by the author.

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added the significant qualification that conventional forces would also be important. Old and new doctrines could coexist. But coexistence did not necessarily signify equality, as naval theoreticians continued to underline the importance of conventional weapons in war, perhaps even purposefully overemphasizing their value to meet the onrush of the advocates of nuclear weapons.

In addition, the navy contended that doctrine was based on "the harmonious development of all types and kinds of troops."[18] This view denoted the equality of the navy with the army in the organizational and operational hierarchy of the armed forces, rather than the predominance of one (especially the army) over the other. Certainly, in accord with the doctrine of cooperation, most naval officers conceded their partial dependence on the army during wartime, but affirmed that the navy should be viewed as a primary part of the armed forces, not as a secondary arm.[19]

The contending positions of the party, the army, and the navy were not, of course, developed in a vacuum. Current domestic and international political factors had a great impact on doctrinal trends, advancing the fortunes of some but retarding others.

Domestic and International Factors, 1953–1957

Power and policy struggles within the Soviet Union and pressures from the international realm became significant inputs into the doctrinal disputes. Three factors reinforced the tendency toward a nuclear-powered fleet, and began to chip away at the traditionalist arguments advanced by the army and navy. As Khrushchev began to consolidate his power, as the international environment began to change, and as military technology developed, party and military interests collided. From the impact came the incremental change in naval doctrine that would be more fully developed between 1957 and 1964.

The overriding political event between 1953 and 1957 was Khrushchev's ascent to the leadership of the Soviet Union. His advance proceeded in two stages: the "hard-line" stage which produced conflict with Malenkov, and the "soft" stage during which he defeated his political opponents. The difference between the first period, 1953–1954, and the second, 1955–1957, was roughly parallel to Khrushchev's emphasis

[18] *Ibid.*, 4.

[19] Gorshkov, "Vydaiushcheesia sobytie pervoi Russkoi revoliutsii" [The Outstanding Event of the First Russian Revolution], *Krasnaia zvezda*, June 26, 1955, p. 2.

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on either heavy industrial development or consumer goods in Soviet economic planning. The conventional Soviet armed forces establishment had a vested interest in furthering industrial development for the construction of its massive weapons. Without emphasis on heavy industry, it reasoned, large surface vessels could not be built and a conventional navy could not be maintained.[20] This argument obviously placed the armed forces in direct conflict first with Malenkov and then with Khrushchev, who saw economic advantages in de-emphasizing heavy industry and constructing relatively inexpensive nuclear weapons.

Doctrinal alliance between the army and navy was also forged by party policies on troop cuts, reduced military budgets, and the opinion that the military's professional expertise was being placed in question by outsiders who had minimal battle experience. Admiral Gorshkov somehow arranged to keep alive his construction program for *Sverdlov* cruisers during this period, despite party policies. Gorshkov's activity on this and other naval matters demonstrated that he was not a "party man," as Robert Herrick maintains he was, nor part of Khrushchev's loyal "Stalingrad group," as Roman Kolkowicz contends.[21] On the contrary, Gorshkov seemed to reinforce professional norms and standards in the navy in opposition to the party's changing doctrinal views.

Another, perhaps more potent force operating against political controls in the navy—and thus against the inculcation of party views of foreign and domestic policy—was the administration of Minister of Defense Georgii Zhukov, a supporter of the conventional armed forces. Under Zhukov's administration, party influence in the navy and other services was at a minimum and the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy (MPA) was kept under control of the Ministry of Defense; after Zhukov's ouster, the MPA became independent of the Ministry. Zhukov also attempted to dilute the authority of the second level of party organization in the navy, the political departments of the fleet.[22] To Khrushchev, this type of activity probably constituted a good reason for expelling Zhukov from the Presidium in 1957.

Aside from economic policy and professionalism, a third, related

[20] "Tiazhelaia promyshlennost'—osnova oboronosposobnosti Sovetskogo gosudarstva" [Heavy Industry—The Basis for the Defensive Capacity of the Soviet Government], *Krasnaia zvezda*, February 15, 1955, p. 1.

[21] Herrick (fn. 7), 70; Kolkowicz, *The Soviet Military and the Communist Party* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1967), 355.

[22] Kolkowicz (fn. 21), 84-86.

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cause of conflict between the armed forces and the party concerned matters of foreign policy. The most important foreign policy thrust of the Soviet Union between 1953 and 1957 was the attempt to create and take advantage of a more relaxed international atmosphere than had been present during the Stalinist postwar years. "Peaceful coexistence" was founded on Khrushchev's fear that a nuclear war would cause the end of civilization. The Soviet leader conceived of all wars in nuclear terms and also conceptualized the avoidance of war in these terms: nuclear deterrence would prevent nuclear war. If the Soviet Union possessed a nuclear deterrent, then the United States would not dare to launch an attack on the Soviet Union, and might wish to pursue friendlier relations. Obviously, such a policy left little room for conventional arms. Nuclear deterrence, disarmament, and détente went hand in hand.

In the face of the assumptions and conclusions of coexistence, which implied a small Soviet Navy, naval officers battled with the party over whether wars were "fatalistically inevitable" and whether they would be so destructive that they could and must be avoided at nearly all costs. They argued that the latter view would leave the Soviet Union unprepared for war, placing the Soviet Navy in a disadvantageous posture vis-à-vis the United States. The U.S. was not to be trusted, and nuclear deterrence was not enough to stop it.[23]

Opposition to Khrushchev severely moderated the speed of doctrinal change. Yet, rifts in opposing factions and interest groups slowly signalled that naval doctrine was about to undergo a change in the direction that Khrushchev desired. First, Khrushchev's opponents (the "anti-party group") became largely neutralized, permitting a single, pro-Khrushchev view within the party. Then two other tendencies began to emerge: army-navy hostility, and a split within the Soviet Navy itself, weakened the advocates of conventional forces.

The army's predominant position in every ministry of defense since 1917 had created an atmosphere of army superiority with regard to the other services which was difficult to overcome. During the immediate post-Stalin years, the naval Commander in Chief took his orders from a "Marshal," an officer with an army title, as Minister of Defense of the U.S.S.R. Admiral Gorshkov did not even hold the highest rank in the navy—Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union—while there were 20 active army officers who outranked him.[24] In com-

[23] "Nesokrushimaia sila lageria demokratii i sotsializma" [The Indestructible Strength of the Camp of Democracy and Socialism], *Sovetskii flot*, January 31, 1956, p. 1.

[24] Garthoff (fn. 4), 55-56. In the Army, there were several ranks higher than that

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menting on the 1953–1957 period, Admiral Gorshkov seemed particularly angered that the navy was considered primarily as a defensive unit with its major role "as *only* the helper of the land forces."[25]

Some opposition to the prevailing naval view actually came from within the navy's ranks. Naval modernists, such as Admiral V. Fokin, noted that the Soviets should "rework military and naval art" to meet the demands of the nuclear age, and foresaw "a qualitatively completely different fleet than in the past war." As for the value of past experience, one of the mainstays of the traditionalist approach, Fokin felt it must be viewed "critically in the light of new conditions."[26] The new conditions to which Fokin and others referred were the increased speed of new weapons and the possibility of surprise attack, ideas developed primarily by Marshal Pavel Rotmistrov in 1955.[27] The dissidents reasoned that a large surface fleet could not operate quickly enough in a future war and that their speed and mobility somehow had to be increased to meet new demands. Admiral L. Vladimirskii, an advocate of the modernist approach, drew what seemed to be the obvious conclusions: the navy should construct a small, but modern and quickly maneuverable fleet armed with powerful nuclear and conventional weapons.[28]

These modernist views, expressed mainly in 1956 and 1957, helped to forecast the trend naval doctrine would assume from 1957 to 1964. A small group of dissidents assisted in providing the transition from a traditionally oriented view to one that leaned toward nuclearization of the fleet, thus serving to ensure that modernist ideas would be included permanently in Soviet naval doctrine even after Khrushchev was removed from office. They may not have known at that time that Khrushchev would seize on their ideas and amplify them to the extent of attempting to expunge from military doctrine virtually any important role for the Soviet Navy. Eventually, therefore, even the naval modernists turned against the ebullient Khrushchev.

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of Admiral before the highest Army rank, Marshal of the Soviet Union. Promotion in the Navy skipped these intermediate ranks and went from Admiral to Admiral of the Fleet, which corresponded to Marshal of the Soviet Union.

[25] Gorshkov (fn. 8), 15-16; emphasis added.

[26] Fokin, "Na strazhe morskikh rubezhei Sovetskogo gosudarstva" [On Guard of the Soviet Government's Sea Boundaries], *Krasnaia zvezda*, July 29, 1956, p. 3.

[27] Rotmistrov, "Za tvorcheskuiu razrabotku voprosov sovetskoi voennoi nauki" [For a Creative Development of Questions of Soviet Military Science], *Krasnaia zvezda*, March 24, 1955, p. 2.

[28] Vladimirskii, "Reaktivnoe oruzhie i vedenie boevykh deistvii na more" [Rocket Weapons and the Conduct of Battle Activity on the Sea], *Sovetskii flot*, September 21, 1956, p. 2.

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The "Limited Navy" Doctrine, 1957–1964

As nuclear weapons became an established part of the Soviet arsenal, the navy's role in future military plans began to decrease. Starting with the ouster of Marshal Zhukov and continuing through the period when Khrushchev's influence was predominant, Soviet naval doctrine was characterized by the notions that nuclear submarines should form the main, and perhaps sole, arm of Soviet naval power, and that other branches of the fleet were outmoded as weapons of war. Because these other branches, which included surface vessels and the naval air force, had previously been considered fundamental sections of the navy, the period may be called the era of the "limited navy" doctrine. This view was altered, however, by 1964, when Soviet opinion turned from the "limited navy" doctrine toward one which would allow more flexible strategies to develop. The latter view, which the Soviets entitled the "balanced navy" doctrine, included the refurbishing of the conventional arms of the fleet (surface ships, air force, marines) and the enhancement of the navy's status in relation to the other branches of the armed forces. The post-Khrushchev leadership understood that a nuclear stand-off with the United States had to be supplemented by conventional weapons if the U.S.S.R. were to pursue a successful course in international and domestic politics.

From the perspective of the three institutions under study, we may observe several trends in doctrinal thinking. Party officials, whose doctrinal view was conditioned by Khrushchev, were decisively influenced by the nuclear revolution. Nuclear war would be the end product of any military conflict and would be all-consuming and all-destructive. Local wars would inevitably grow into global, nuclear ones and would bifurcate the world; there would be no room for neutrals.[29]

In a disarmament speech before the Supreme Soviet in January 1960, Khrushchev proclaimed that conventional weapons in the navy and other branches of the armed forces were "outmoded" for modern war and he implied that they would be phased out.[30] At the same session of the Supreme Soviet, it was officially announced that a new branch of the armed forces, the strategic rocket forces, had been created. Party leaders seemed to be making a dual thrust. On the one hand,

[29] Colonel V. Glazov, "O reaktsionnoi sushchnosti teorii lokal'nykh voin" [On the Reactionary Nature of the Theory of Local Wars], *Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil*, No. 10 (May 1961), 59-66.

[30] Khrushchev, "Razoruzhenie—put' k uprocheniu mira i obespecheniiu druzhby mezhdu narodom" [Disarmament—The Path Towards the Strengthening of Peace and Safeguarding of Friendship Between Peoples], *Pravda*, January 15, 1960, p. 3.

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they were underlining Soviet nuclear delivery capacity by allowing it to develop through the creation of a separate specialized branch of the armed forces. On the other hand, they were deprecating the conventional naval role and, therefore, most of the existing naval weaponry. One service was built up at the expense of another. The nuclear-powered submarine fleet was to become the main weapon for victory at sea, "the fundamental basis for the might of the naval forces," providing the same offensive capacity and deterrent strength as its land-based cousin, the ICBM.[31]

For most of the Khrushchev years, the Soviet Army agreed with Khrushchev's assessment of the impact of the nuclear revolution on the Soviet Navy: the navy would become a much more limited service due to the advent of atomic weapons and missiles. As R. Ia. Malinovskii, the Minister of Defense, put it: "[the navy] in the modern stage has become basically a submarine fleet."[32]

Yet there were a growing number of Army officers who allowed that nuclear "one-weaponry" was a mistake. Among them were Marshal Rotmistrov, Commander in Chief of the Armored Troops, Marshal Grechko, who became Minister of Defense in 1967, and Marshal Rokossovskii, who at the time was a Deputy Minister of Defense.[33] They did not explicitly support a more conventional navy as such, but couched their comments either in general demands for more conventional forces or for ground forces in particular. In doing so, they helped to create an atmosphere conducive to the development of conventional forces, perhaps aiding an informal conventional forces "movement" or interest group which cut across the various branches of the armed forces and which eventually furthered the "balanced navy" concept.

As might be expected, the Soviet Navy had its own ideas about the effect of the nuclear revolution. Against the prevailing opinion, naval officers argued that war at sea between conventional forces was possible and necessitated a fleet balanced between nuclear and conventional

[31] "Rech' tovarishcha N. S. Khrushcheva" [Speech of Comrade N. S. Khrushchev], *Pravda*, July 9, 1964, p. 2.

[32] Malinovskii, "45 let na strazhe sotsialisticheskoi Rodiny" [45 Years on Guard of the Socialist Homeland], *Pravda*, February 23, 1963, p. 2.

[33] Rotmistrov, "Vliianie tankov na tempy nastupatel'nykh operatsii" [The Influence of Tanks on the Tempo of Offensive Operations], *Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal*, No. 1 (January 1961), 17, on the role of tanks in warfare; Grechko, "Voennaia istoriia i sovremennost'" [Military History and the Present], *Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal*, No. 2 (February 1961), 9, on the importance of historical experience in current doctrinal formulation; and Rokossovskii, "Vernyi strazh mira" [Faithful Guardian of Peace], *Voennyi vestnik*, No. 2 (February 1960), 10, on the importance of "all forces" in planning future battle operations.

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weapons. The term "balance" was not used until 1967,[34] but one of its essential meanings, that the navy should be equipped to use nuclear *and* non-nuclear weapons, was developed before Khrushchev's fall. To a remarkable extent, the navy seemed to be unified around the ideas of enhanced naval prestige and balance within the fleet, placing it in obvious conflict with the stance of much of the army and seemingly the entire party. This conflict was intimately related to many important international and domestic political developments between 1957 and 1964.

The Political Scene and Naval Doctrine, 1957–1964

Soviet foreign policy during the Khrushchev era was characterized by striving toward bipolarity while maintaining peaceful relations with the West—the policy known as "peaceful coexistence." Khrushchev first announced this idea at the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956, subsequently elaborating on it at the following two Party Congresses in 1959 and 1961. Since both the United States and the Soviet Union possessed nuclear weapons and since each realized the irrationality of nuclear conflict, he noted, a military stalemate would occur and relations between them would be free from military threat, though fraught with elements of ideological and economic competition.[35]

With the nuclear rocket as the ultimate deterrent, conventional weapons became superfluous. This argument not only made sound, logical sense to party policy makers, but also economic sense. The party leaders seemed to think that the growth and maintenance of a strong nuclear force, combined with a reduction in conventional weapons, would save billions of rubles. The newly demobilized soldiers and sailors would then be free to work on farms and in factories, thus increasing the material wealth of the country.[36]

The Soviet Navy, however, disagreed with Khrushchev's interpretation of international relations, arguing that the United States did not share Khrushchev's view of nuclear deterrence. It was necessary, naval writers contended, to make sure the U.S.S.R. did not become lulled into thinking that the mere possession of nuclear weapons meant there was no threat from the United States. "Soviet sailors wholeheartedly support the peace-loving propositions of the Soviet leadership," noted

[34] Gorshkov (fn. 8), 20.

[35] The best summary of Khrushchev's thinking on peaceful coexistence is contained in his "On Peaceful Coexistence," *Foreign Affairs*, XXXVIII (October 1959), 1-18.

[36] "Armiia, okhraniaiushchaia trud stroitelei kommunizma" [The Army, Protecting the Labor of the Builders of Communism], *Pravda*, February 23, 1960, p. 1.

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a *Soviet Fleet* editorial, "but they remember that we still do not have even the smallest basis for complacency . . . the 'cold war' still lives, military blocs and bases directed against the Soviet Union still exist."[37]

Evidence is also available that naval spokesmen did not agree with three domestic corollaries of coexistence: (1) that the U.S.S.R. would save money by disarming; (2) that heavy industry should be stressed less than it had previously been; and (3) that disarmament would automatically yield a usable labor force. Support for a strong navy obviously implied naval opposition to disarmament and a desire for more money to be spent for naval forces, not less. Lengthy articles on U.S. conventional sea forces were possibly intended to sway opinion in the party and army toward these types of weapons and may have helped to create an arms-race psychology among naval officers.[38] In addition, the navy contended that heavy industry ought to be stressed more than light industry, a stance taken by most supporters of conventional arms.[39] Furthermore, the naval press reported that demobilized sailors had problems finding jobs immediately, in spite of the optimistic visions of party leaders. V. G. Bakaev, the minister in charge of the merchant marines, pointed out that sailors could not just automatically be received into the merchant marines, but had to go to school first to receive proper training.[40]

Of more immediate consequence to the navy were the force reduction announcements at the Supreme Soviet meeting of January 1960, which were perceived to threaten the very existence of the navy. Gorshkov made it known just a month later, on Armed Forces Day, that nuclear weapons should not be the sole Soviet force:

> The basic type of armed force, possessing a very great fire power, are the rocket forces. But it does not follow from this that the need for other forces has diminished. Victory in contemporary war can be accomplished only through the use of all means of armed battle. The geographic conditions of our nation, washed by many seas and oceans, dictate particularly that the navy will henceforth occupy an important place in the system of the Soviet Armed Forces.[41]

[37] "V interesakh naroda" [In the Interests of the People], *Sovetskii flot*, September 30, 1959, p. 1. *Sovetskii flot* is the former official daily newspaper of the Soviet Navy. It was combined with *Krasnaia zvezda*, the Army-oriented official daily newspaper of the Soviet Ministry of Defense, late in 1960.

[38] In 1960, articles of this type increased markedly in frequency in *Sovetskii flot*.

[39] "Zabota o blage trudiashchikhsia" [Care of the Workers' Welfare], *Sovetskii flot*, May 11, 1958, p. 1.

[40] Bakaev, "Kazhdyi mozhet vybrat' trud po dushe" [Everyone May Choose Work to His Liking], *Sovetskii flot*, February 11, 1960, p. 1.

[41] Gorshkov, "Nadezhnyi strazh bezopastnosti Rodiny" [The Reliable Guardian of the Security of the Homeland], *Sovetskii flot*, February 23, 1960, pp. 1-2.

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The debates over the implications of peaceful coexistence to Soviet naval doctrine achieved greater moment as it became clear that the United States was not effectively deterred by nuclear weapons. Both the U-2 incident and the Cuban missile crisis provided ample evidence for that point as well as for a further, related fault in Khrushchev's thinking: that "either nuclear war or no war" was an extremely limited manner in which to approach military confrontations with another powerful nation.

The shooting down of a U.S. spy aircraft over the Soviet Union in May 1960 placed Premier Khrushchev in a vulnerable political position. He was forced to reprimand the United States while at the same time contending that peaceful coexistence and nuclear deterrence would work as the governing factors in Soviet-American relations. At first, the navy used the event to underline the critical importance of preparedness against enemy attack. Naval leaders seemed to be attempting to slow the pace of disarmament to ensure that Khrushchev's "submarinization" or disbandment of the navy did not occur.[42] Officers asked rhetorically whether the "provocation" of Soviet air space by a hostile power could not also be matched by "provocations" at sea. Gorshkov stressed the need to protect Soviet territorial waters with surface vessels as well as submarines: "We are *keeping on duty* vessels of shore defense, patrol boats which carry rockets, the submarine fleet, also armed with rockets, and torpedo boats and trawlers."[43] But in spite of the U-2 incident, Khrushchev still believed that peaceful coexistence was the proper course, and that it implied a limited navy.[44]

It took an incident much more relevant to the naval forces, the Cuban missile crisis, to increase the clamor for a strong Soviet fleet. The general lesson the Soviet Navy learned from the Cuban crisis seemed to be that Khrushchev's nuclear diplomacy was bankrupt in the face of a strong nuclear power. It was necessary to possess a deterrent or a fighting force that could operate in nuclear and subnuclear contexts at sea. In other words, a fleet was required that could heighten the level of battle gradually, perhaps holding it to a conflict without nuclear weapons. This argument seemed the essence of an article on

[42] See "Derzhat' vysokuiu boevuiu gotovnost'" [Maintain a High Battle Readiness], *Sovetskii flot*, May 14, 1960, p. 1.

[43] Gorshkov, "Nadezhnyi strazh morskikh rubezhei SSSR" [Reliable Guardian of the U.S.S.R.'s Sea Boundaries], *Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil*, No. 13 (July 1961), 27; emphasis added.

[44] Even at the height of his embarrassment over this issue, Khrushchev called for "general and complete disarmament." See the series of announcements in *Sovetskii flot*, June 4, 1960, p. 1.

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the missile crisis by Admiral Gorshkov in July 1963. Since he mentioned surface vessels and future battles at sea as well as atomic warfare, it seems probable that he was envisioning a situation where Soviet vessels could respond to an enemy threat in a way which might not involve a nuclear exchange.[45] He may even have contemplated the reverse of the Cuban crisis, a case in which the Soviet fleet would prevent U.S. missile emplacement at some place on the globe. The Commander in Chief seemed to desire surface ships to provide a subnuclear deterrent to U.S. aggression so that Soviet officials would not have to make the horrible choice of either waging nuclear war or backing down, as happened in Cuba. Gorshkov was to assume that position more clearly after Khrushchev's fall.

Army spokesmen also began to reject the all-or-nothing doctrine, although they used it to build support for their own conventional forces and often dismissed the importance of the navy. Army-navy disputes over the future role and composition of the fleet were best exemplified by the reaction to the publication of *Military Strategy* in 1963, edited by Marshal V. D. Sokolovskii, the first important Soviet work on military doctrine since A. Svechin's *Strategy* appeared in 1926. In general, the book argued that nuclear weapons were the primary battle force in war, and that ground troops were the only important conventional force.[46]

Understandably, naval reception of the Sokolovskii book was hostile. It was attacked most severely by Admiral V. A. Alafuzov, who condemned the book for its heavy bias in favor of the strategic rocket forces and ground troops:

> The deepest theoretical judgments of the author (pp. 337-341) form a basis for concluding that a contemporary large war can be won only with the rocket and land forces and with the cooperation of long-range aviation. Moreover, on page 341 the unconditional assertion is permitted that all missions for the final destruction of the enemy (after the first and decisive nuclear rocket strike) can be fulfilled only by the land forces.
>
> It is completely obvious that a war with a "naval opponent," that is, with an enemy whose territory can be occupied only by surmounting a water (naval) barrier, cannot be managed without the navy.

[45] Gorshkov, "Voenno-Morskoi Flot nashei Rodiny" [Our Homeland's Navy], *Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil*, No. 13 (July 1963), 20.

[46] Sokolovskii, *Soviet Military Strategy*, trans. by Herbert Dinerstein, Leon Gouré, and Thomas Wolfe (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall 1963); see pp. 227-30 for the discussion of ground troops.

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> It seems to us that victory in contemporary war can be accomplished with all branches of the armed forces, the role of each of which at various stages of war will be different.[47]

Ironically, given the interservice rivalry evidenced above, *Military Strategy* may have aided the navy's advance, as it supported a movement against the extreme Khrushchevian view that missiles were the only important weapon in war.[48] By 1964, there seemed a definite swing away from the sole reliance on nuclear weapons and toward dependence on more conventional means of regulating international conflicts. This trend was intensified when Brezhnev and Kosygin became the new Soviet leaders in October 1964, and promoted the doctrines of the balanced fleet and denial of the seas.

A Balanced Fleet, 1964–1973

The term "balanced" in reference to the Soviet fleet seems to have been first used publicly by Sergei Gorshkov in 1967. In a footnote to an article in *Naval Digest*, the monthly theoretical journal of the Soviet Navy, Gorshkov stated: "By a well-balanced fleet we mean a fleet which, both in composition and armament, is able to complete the missions assigned to it in rocket-nuclear war and in wars without nuclear weapons, and also to guarantee state interests on the sea in peacetime."[49] He was thus defining the balanced fleet in terms of the missions that it could accomplish in war and peace. He contended it could fight nuclear as well as non-nuclear battles, and play a political part during peacetime. This variety of tasks would demand a navy flexible enough "in composition and armament" to respond to a number of maritime situations.

Thus, the concept of balance is based on four points: (1) a fleet should be balanced to perform nuclear or non-nuclear battle missions; (2) it should be balanced to conduct peacetime or wartime activities; (3) it should be balanced in terms of the types of vessels in service; and (4) the fleet's prestige and time spent on important battle and peacetime activities should, if possible, match other branches of the Soviet armed forces, reflecting a balance of forces within the military. A clarification should be added here, however: the Soviet term "balanced fleet" (*sbalansirovannyi flot*) is not identical to the term in the West-

[47] Alafuzov, "K vykhodu v svet truda *Voennaia strategiia*" [On the Appearance of the Work *Military Strategy*], *Morskoi sbornik*, No. 1 (January 1963), 88.

[48] Thomas Wolfe, *Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1964), 36.

[49] Gorshkov (fn. 8), 20.

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ern sense. The latter seems to mean the representation of *all* types of vessels in the fleet, including large attack aircraft carriers, whereas the Soviet meaning does not demand this sort of completeness.[50] The attack carrier apparently remains absent from the construction plans of the Soviet fleet.

Central to the adoption of the doctrine of a balanced navy was a change of attitude toward the Soviet Navy, since 1964, by virtually all important party leaders. Soviet officials began to view war at sea as a possible future scenario, even though they did not currently have the capability to conduct a sea war with the United States.[51] They seemed to conceive of the sea effort as an important *part* in any overall war. Regardless of the realities of the situation, such statements helped to create an atmosphere that fostered the prestige of a high-seas fleet.

Coincident with the party's new position on sea wars was a reversion to a standard pre-1953 formula that no weapon should be considered as the ultimate weapon in war, and that a successful military machine must have a flexible mix of weapons. In current terms, it meant emphasizing a balance between nuclear and conventional military arms, and negating Khrushchev's sole reliance on nuclear deterrent forces. Rocket-rattling and brinksmanship would become too risky, and could never be "absolute" deterrents. A fleet that could rely on non-nuclear and nuclear capabilities to fight and to deter aggression was definitely included in party doctrine.[52]

Surprisingly, the Soviet Army provided additional support for the balanced navy doctrine. Army spokesmen would usually acknowledge that "all forces," even conventional naval weapons, were important in contemporary warfare. Marshal Grechko upheld the navy to the extent of saying that "War demonstrates also that in battle even with a *continental enemy*, an important role belongs to the navy."[53] This attitude

[50] Reflective of this view in U.S. naval thinking is the contention that aircraft carriers and other types of surface vessels will continue to be critical for victory in war. See Admiral Thomas H. Moorer's testimony in U.S., Senate, Armed Services Committee, *Authorization for Military Procurement, Research and Development, Fiscal Year 1971, and Reserve Strength*, Part 2, 91st Cong., 2d sess. (1970), 1308.

[51] See Steve F. Kime's discussion of the various "levels" of possible Soviet military action, "The Nuclear Age and the Navies of the Superpowers," unpub., presented at the Seminar on Soviet Naval Developments, Halifax (October 1973). Party views on wars at sea were expressed in many places. See, for example, "Voenno-Morskoi Flot SSSR" [The U.S.S.R.'s Navy], *Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil*, No. 13 (July 1968), 32.

[52] See the pointed discussion in Lieutenant Colonel A. Volkov and Lieutenant Colonel N. Zapara, "Nauchno-tekhnicheskaia revoliutsiia i voennoe delo" [The Scientific-Technological Revolution and Military Affairs], *Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil*, No. 2 (January 1971), 12.

[53] Grechko, "Flot nashei Rodiny" [Our Homeland's Fleet], *Morskoi sbornik*, No. 7 (July 1971), 5; emphasis added.

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was a marked change from past army points of view and can be traced partly to the new doctrinal atmosphere created by Brezhnev and Kosygin. Partly also, however, it was due to the independent contribution of Marshal Grechko himself, who seemed initially more hospitable to a strengthened navy than his predecessor as Minister of Defense, Marshal Malinovskii, had been. Whereas Malinovskii even during the Brezhnev years had supported Khrushchev's doctrines of nuclear deterrence and reduction of conventional weapons, Grechko had taken a general position favoring conventional weapons as early as 1961.[54]

Reference to the army's changed outlook is not, however, meant to imply that interservice rivalry had somehow disappeared. Quite the contrary: army officers consistently wrote that naval forces were secondary to land troops in war.[55] The navy still seems relegated to a slot subordinate to the army in the command of the Ministry of Defense. The three top posts—Minister of Defense, First Deputy Minister of Defense, and Chief of Staff—are occupied by army officers.[56]

Particularly since the ouster of Khrushchev, Admiral Gorshkov and many other naval officers have lobbied actively for a strengthened, balanced fleet. The evidence collected from statements about the utility of the balanced fleet support Peter Vigor's "speculation" (to use his own term), that it was the "fighting" naval officers, as distinct from the "political" naval officers, who seemed to argue most strongly for a modern, balanced fleet.[57] The differences in emphasis emanating from the multifaceted meaning of the term "balance" did not seem to cause irreconcilable conflict or to impede the acceptance of balance in Gorshkov's four-pronged sense during the period under examination. But by 1975 the differences did seem portentous for further doctrinal development.

[54] Malinovskii, "Velikaia pobeda" [A Great Victory], *Pravda*, May 9, 1966, p. 2; Grechko (fn. 33), 9.

[55] Sokolovskii's third edition of *Military Strategy* (1968) still mentioned the Navy last whenever it listed the armed forces together.

[56] For an organization chart of the current Soviet Ministry of Defense, see Colonel William F. Scott, USAF (Ret.), "Soviet Aerospace Forces and Doctrine," *Air Force Magazine*, Vol. 58 (March 1975), 41. Dimitri F. Ustinov, a civilian appointed Minister of Defense in April 1976, received the title of general, an army rank, shortly after his appointment.

[57] Peter Vigor, "The Soviet Understanding of the Concept of 'Command of the Sea' (*Gospodstvo na more*)," unpub., presented at the Seminar on Soviet Naval Developments, Halifax (October 1973), 26. A revised version is published in Michael McGwire, Ken Booth, and John McDonnell, eds., *Soviet Naval Policy: Objectives and Constraints* (New York: Praeger 1975), 601-22. To add to Vigor's comments: the "political" naval officers often publish in the party-oriented *Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil*, the semimonthly theoretical and political journal of the Main Political Administration of the Army and Navy.

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Victory in a future sea war is partly predicated on the Soviet version of command of the seas, referred to here as "denial of the seas." Unlike the concept "balanced fleet," "denial of the seas" has been used only by Western writers, but it seems aptly descriptive of an important aspect of Soviet naval doctrine. It is defined by one scholar as "the capacity to *deny* absolute control of the ocean to an opponent."[58] It does not denote "command of the seas" as understood in the West; it does signify that one does not allow one's opponent to obtain "command" in areas of one's own interest. Soviet battle scenarios have envisioned control merely of the operational area, usually close to the Soviet littoral.[59] In contrast, "command of the seas" in the Western sense holds that a navy should control a large portion of the high seas—not merely the waters close to one's shores—to the extent that no large enemy operation of any sort can take place on the high seas. It also posits that one's own naval forces should be able to move about on the high seas without significant enemy hindrance.[60]

"Denial" may be conceived as recognition by the Soviet Union that its capabilities could not reach the extent of "commanding" an area against a Western offensive. The objective of denial would be to challenge and deter existing sea powers, so that the oceans would not become American (or British or French) "lakes" from which virtually any offensive military operation could issue. Taken in this context, the huge and impressive Soviet naval exercise, operation "Okean" (April-May 1970), seemed to be an attempt to show the West that the Soviet fleet was strong enough to at least deny naval command to the West.

Denial of the seas means, to Gorshkov and his naval comrades especially, that the Soviet Navy be composed of more than just the submarine fleet. A variety of vessels, a "balanced fleet," is necessary to implement denial. In certain military situations surface vessels, for instance, can often pose a limited threat when submarines cannot. James Cable has discussed this problem in *Gunboat Diplomacy*:

> The "unknown submarine" is the weapon of a government with nothing to lose, and sinking ships an act of such violence that its consequences can seldom be expected to remain limited. Yet, if submarines do not actually sink ships, their mere menace is likely to prove ineffective. A

[58] John Erickson, *Soviet Military Power* (London: Royal United Institute for Defence Studies 1971), 55; emphasis in original.

[59] For an argument taken from the history of Soviet doctrine, but with evident contemporary relevance, see Gorshkov's "Voenno-morskie floty v voinakh i v mirnoe vremia" [Navies in War and Peace], *Morskoi sbornik*, No. 8 (August 1972), 21.

[60] For a detailed discussion of "command of the seas," see Bernard Brodie, *A Guide to Naval Strategy* (newly rev. ed., New York: Praeger 1965), chap. IV.

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> submarine cannot communicate a threat without making its presence known. Indeed, unless the victim is a fairly sophisticated and consequently dangerous warship, the submarine will actually have to surface, when it ceases to be a superior ship, and becomes acutely vulnerable to almost any warship. . . . Perhaps the greatest weakness of the modern submarine—for Soviet submarines do not mount guns—is that it has no equivalent to the graduated ladder of violence enjoyed by surface ships. If the initial summons is disregarded and the fire of small arms ignored, the submarine must sink its victim or submit to the calling of the bluff.

The submarine, Cable concludes, "is inherently ill-suited to the exercise of limited naval force."[61] Since the Soviet leadership wishes to avoid nuclear war, it requires military flexibility; the balanced fleet aids this flexibility by the possibility of denial.

The diplomatic aspect of denial is important as well. The balanced fleet can be expected to deny the political maneuvers of competing powers without raising conflict to the level of military action. Thus, a primary role of the Soviet fleet is to gain diplomatic advantage over rivals of the Soviet Union. This is why statements about "showing the flag" are of such interest to the student of Soviet naval doctrine. For an effective showing of the flag, mighty, visible vessels—mainly surface ships—must be available to enhance Soviet prestige and power in relation to other nations. Since 1967, Soviet vessels have been conspicuous, apparently in order to offset the American presence during third-world conflicts, particularly in the Arab-Israeli disputes.[62]

The International Context, 1964–1973

As noted earlier, one of the basic propositions underlying Khrushchev's concept of peaceful coexistence was that peaceful relations with the West could be accomplished only with the aid of a strong, nuclear deterrent. When Brezhnev and Kosygin assumed leadership, however, they changed this proposition from sole reliance on nuclear weapons to partial reliance. Although recognizing strategic arms as the primary military instrument on which Soviet foreign policy was based, the new

[61] Cable, *Gunboat Diplomacy: Political Applications of Limited Naval Force* (New York: Praeger 1971), 134, 135.

[62] Barry M. Blechman, *The Changing Soviet Navy* (Washington: Brookings Institution Press 1973), 22-23. For a first-rate discussion of definitional difficulties with "showing the flag" and other commonly used naval concepts, see Ken Booth, "Navies and Foreign Policy," unpub., presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, St. Louis, Mo. (March 1974), 12-14. A revised version of this paper is to be published in late 1976 by Crane Russak Publishers, as *Navies and Foreign Policy*.

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leadership acknowledged the important supportive role of conventional weapons in the conduct of foreign relations. The changes in general military doctrine and naval doctrine were partly outgrowths of this more flexible attitude. Small, localized wars (always caused by "imperialists") were no longer considered as necessarily leading to nuclear war between the two large powers, although that possibility still existed.[63] (Vietnam was an obvious case which did not escalate to nuclear war.) Furthermore, the possible use of conventional weapons in a non-nuclear military conflict became a well-established part of Soviet military doctrine. No longer were Soviet military choices dichotomized between nuclear war or capitulation, but there was a range of alternatives short of nuclear war, which would not necessarily involve total defeat or total victory, but were hoped to increase the influence of the U.S.S.R. in a dispute.

Coinciding with these developments in Soviet foreign policy and military doctrine were several significant international events that served to reinforce the acceptance of the balanced fleet and denial of the seas.[64] The Vietnam War demonstrated to the Soviets that a navy could be used effectively in armed conflicts with small powers, and could successfully hold the level of conflict to conventional weapons. It seemed to be the example of Vietnam, rather than any threat posed to the U.S.S.R. by American naval activities there, that aided the development of the balanced navy. Admiral S. E. Zakharov and others, in their textbook for advanced students in naval academies, discussed the use of aircraft carriers and cruisers in the conduct of the Vietnam War. The authors clearly felt that U.S. aircraft carriers and cruisers had been used efficiently and advantageously in the armed conflict. They cited, for instance, a *New York Times* account that "Aircraft carriers and their escort vessels spend 97% of their time at sea." They also discussed American use of the naval blockade in the war, the tremendous transportation effort to supply troops in Vietnam, and the role of naval vessels in marine landings. In sum, it was the Soviet view of the U.S. Navy in Vietnam that the fleet had been very important to that local conflict: "In the Vietnam war the fleet of the aggressors plays a great role. Ensuring the foundation of a significant grouping of land forces

[63] Major General V. Matsulenko, "Lokal'nye voiny imperializma" [Local Wars of Imperialism], *Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal*, No. 9 (September 1968), 38.

[64] International events and policy changes cannot have an immediate impact on the output of new or renovated naval vessels, due to the length of lead time involved in naval construction. See Michael MccGwire, "The Turning Points in Soviet Naval Policy," in MccGwire (fn. 3), 180.

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in South Vietnam, it nourishes and supports it with fire. The fleet of the interventionists takes active participation in the escalation of the robber's war against the Vietnamese people and in the sea blockade of the land theater of military activity."[65] Although the Soviet leadership probably did not wish to reproduce the Vietnam operation anywhere—and could not, without aircraft carriers—the general lesson that surface vessels could be used advantageously in a local conflict did not seem to be lost.

The most outstanding event that seemed to support developments in Soviet naval doctrine was the Six-Day War of 1967. During this conflict, the Israeli destroyer *Eilat* was sunk by a Soviet-built ship-to-ship Styx missile, fired from an *Osa-* or *Komar*-class patrol boat manned by Egyptian forces. The Egyptians had helped the Soviet Navy to combat-test a portion of its fleet, using for the first time since the end of World War II a surface vessel in a local war. Following the Six-Day War, the Soviets were able to establish naval base facilities in Egypt, which made the permanent stationing of vessels in the Mediterranean feasible. Since then, the number of Soviet ships in the Mediterranean has varied from slightly over 90 to about 20.

The Soviet build-up seemed aimed at developing a strong Mediterranean *eskadra*, or "squadron" (there is no separate Mediterranean "fleet"), to offset and deter U.S. naval activity in the area. Following the Six-Day War, Brezhnev declared that the strong U.S. presence in the Middle East and the Mediterranean represented a threat to the U.S.S.R.[66] Soon after, Gorshkov stated that the United States was attempting to use the Mediterranean as a "springboard" for an attack on the U.S.S.R., and that the Soviet Navy could help to meet the challenge represented by the U.S. Sixth Fleet.[67] A TASS news agency release of November 1968 explained the doctrinal rationale behind Soviet interest in the Mediterranean, expressing the view that the Mediterranean is a proper place for the Soviet fleet because the U.S.S.R. is a "Black Sea power."[68] To my knowledge, that was the first time since World War II that the Soviets pronounced such a doctrine. The justification for Soviet presence in the Mediterranean, in addition to its contiguity to the Black Sea, was to "promote stability and peace"—in other

[65] Zakharov and others, *Istoriia voenno-morskogo iskusstva: uchebnik dlia vysshikh voenno-morskikh uchilishch* [A History of the Naval Art: A Textbook for Advanced Naval Students] (Moscow: Voenizdat 1969); quotes from pp. 556, 559.

[66] "Rech' tovarishcha L. I. Brezhneva" [Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's Speech], *Pravda*, July 6, 1967, pp. 1-2.

[67] Gorshkov, "Nash moguchii okeanskii flot" [Our Mighty Ocean Fleet], *Pravda*, July 30, 1967, p. 2.

[68] "Zaiavlenie TASS" [TASS Statement], *Krasnaia zvezda*, November 24, 1968, p. 3.

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words, to meet and attempt to deter the United States and any other power that desired to challenge Soviet interests.[69]

The doctrines of the balanced fleet and of denial of the seas were thus incorporated into the tenets of Soviet military doctrine. For most naval officers, it had been a long and probably bitter struggle against the party, the army, and internal opponents; but by 1973 the balanced navy seemed a fact of life. Yet even then, the doctrine was changing.

Conclusions and Doctrinal Trends to 1975

It would be an error to conclude from the above that Soviet naval doctrine has simply mirrored Western concepts. It is true that the Soviets have used their fleet to exert political pressure on other nations, and have concluded that one of the navy's main purposes is to protect the Soviet merchant fleet, in the tradition of Western naval powers.[70] But Soviet naval doctrine is definitely *not* Western in two critical senses. First, we have seen that the Soviets have eschewed Western "command of the seas" and have substituted the more limited "denial of the seas." Although the Soviets have not had a recent opportunity to make use of denial in battle, it is clear that the diplomatic aspect of it has been utilized to deny political control. Second, the composition of the "balanced" Soviet fleet, with which denial can be exercised, it not meant to imitate the composition of Western fleets; it is meant to achieve balance with respect to the missions assigned to it by the Soviets, which are more limited than Western missions.[71] Hence, the fleet does not need to have the breadth of its Western counterparts. That fact partially explains why the Soviets do not have, or need, attack aircraft carriers or a large marine force ("naval infantry").[72] The helicopter carriers *Moskva* and *Leningrad* are primarily for antisubmarine warfare operations, as is the recently constructed carrier *Kiev*, which is equipped with short-range vertical take-off aircraft. In any case, similarity of weapons does not necessarily mean similarity of intent. The Soviets are committed to the new weapons, such as aircraft carriers, which

[69] See Commander I. Bobkov, "Russkie i sovetskie korabli v Sredizimnom more" [Russian and Soviet Vessels in the Mediterranean Sea], *Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal*, No. 9 (September 1970), 47.

[70] Gorshkov, "Na okeanskikh rubezhakh" [On the Ocean Boundaries], *Pravda*, July 28, 1968, p. 2.

[71] For a discussion of current missions, see Robert G. Weinland, "The Changing Mission Structure of the Soviet Navy," in McGwire (fn. 3), 292-305.

[72] The Soviet marine force numbers 17,000; the U.S. Marines, 197,000. International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance: 1975–1976* (London: I.I.S.S. 1975), 9, 6.

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they decided to build about ten years ago, for use in a possibly changed strategic situation.[73] They therefore ask themselves, "How can we use them?" The doctrinal context may provide a key.

The nature of the "threat" or "menace" of the Soviet fleet is put into perspective by examining naval doctrine. The Soviets do not portray their navy as the "fundamental basis" of Soviet might in the way many Western naval theorists envision their own navies. Unlike the West, they do not seem to intend to use their navy as a major arm of their foreign or military policy. The Soviets still rely primarily on land and missile forces for their offensive and defensive capabilities. This point seems to be underlined by current developments in Soviet naval doctrine.

In February 1972, Admiral Gorshkov began a series of articles in *Naval Digest*, entitled "Navies in War and Peace." By the conclusion of the series in February 1973, it was obvious that Gorshkov's intent was to champion the cause of the balanced Soviet Navy, as he had done many times before.[74] It is not my intent to detail the article here, as it has been analyzed elsewhere.[75] Yet, such a long series raises questions: Why now? What were Gorshkov's motives? From the perspective of 1976, one can only speculate. Two interpretations, however, seem to present themselves: (1) that the series represents a final "victory speech" for the principles Gorshkov has been pursuing for so long—balance and denial—and he wished to summarize his views before he is scheduled to retire in 1976; and (2) that it is an attempt to re-convince party policy makers of the necessity for a strong, balanced fleet, since Gorshkov perceives a retreat from his balanced-fleet concept toward a more limited conception of naval power.

In view of certain developments between 1973 and 1975, it seems that the second interpretation would be the more correct one. Since the adoption of the doctrines of balance and denial were in part reactions to the United States, a continued U.S.-Soviet confrontation, at least at the levels of the 1965–1972 period, would be a condition for the first interpretation. Since 1971, however, there have been major developments in the relations between the two powers which have helped to create a more tranquil atmosphere. Foremost among these develop-

[73] MccGwire uses a lead time of between eight and twelve years (fn. 64), 180.

[74] Gorshkov, "Voenno-Morskie floty v voinakh i v mirnoe vremia" [Navies in War and Peace], began to appear in *Morskoi sbornik*, No. 2 (February 1972); it was continued in Nos. 3-6 and 8-12, and was completed in No. 2 (February 1973).

[75] Robert W. Herrick, "The Gorshkov Interpretation of Russian Naval History," in MccGwire (fn. 3), 306-21; Robert G. Weinland, "Analysis of Admiral Gorshkov's 'Navies in War and Peace,'" in MccGwire, Booth, and McDonnell (fn. 57), 547-72.

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ments has been the end of the war in Vietnam. This has removed a major barrier blocking their rapprochement, and has allowed them partly to disregard their respective ideological banners, "anti-communism" and "anti-imperialism," when talking to each other.

From the Soviet perspective, peaceful relations have also been occasioned by objective internal economic considerations, such as the need for agricultural products, foreign technology, consumer goods, and the necessity to export products. The fact that the fleet is expensive to build militates against its further development, especially if the consumer area of the Soviet economy is to be emphasized. Of course, Soviet leaders are no more and no less prone to the rules of logic than are other national policy makers. Nevertheless, Brezhnev seems to have staked his political future on internal economic development within the context of peaceful Soviet-U.S. relations.

Another factor casting disfavor on a politically active Soviet fleet is that the use of the Soviet Navy as an instrument of diplomacy may have backfired. Instead of permanently enhancing Soviet military power and international prestige in relation to the United States (and thus making the United States more willing to agree with the Soviet Union on important matters), it has caused U.S. policy makers to react to the extent that they now wish to build a completely new generation of nuclear submarines (Trident), to construct an expensive aircraft carrier, and to establish a naval base on Diego Garcia, an island south of India. Thus, whatever the Soviets may have gained in military or diplomatic strength, they may soon lose. That is to say that they may have done *too well* in their naval diplomatic maneuvers. So far as general military diplomacy is concerned, the Soviets seem to be concentrating on maintaining parity with the United States in nuclear weapons—one of the apparent results of the SALT talks[76]—rather than on building a navy to "equal" that of the United States.

If this brief analysis of Brezhnev's current foreign policy is correct, then Gorshkov would now be in a position less favorable than that which he held prior to 1973. In view of Gorshkov's penchant for arguing his points forcefully with the Soviet political leadership, the explanation for the appearance of the Gorshkov series would be that the naval Commander in Chief needs to fight another uphill battle for a balanced navy. If he cannot do that successfully, we may point to 1973–1975 as the beginning of a new era in Soviet naval doctrine.

[76] Ken Booth, *The Military Instrument in Soviet Foreign Policy* (London: Royal United Services Institute 1974), 23.

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Review Articles

FROM COLD WAR TO OSTPOLITIK: Two Germanys in Search of Separate Identities

By WILHELM BLEEK

Henry Krisch, *German Politics under Soviet Occupation*. New York and London, Columbia University Press, 1974, 321 pp., $15.00.
Ernst Nolte, *Deutschland und der Kalte Krieg*. Munich and Zurich, Piper Verlag, 1974, 755 pp., DM 64.00.
Roger Tilford, ed., *The Ostpolitik and Political Change in Germany*. Westmead, Farnborough (England), Saxon House; and Lexington, Mass., Lexington Books, 1975, 111 pp., $14.00.

IN November 1972, the two German states agreed to develop normal relations with each other. This first step included a pledge to respect each other's independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity, as well as plans to exchange permanent missions and to promote cooperation in various fields. These moves toward normalization underline the extraordinary character of inter-German relations. At the same time, the Federal Republic of Germany (F.R.G.) and the German Democratic Republic (G.D.R.) specified certain fundamental questions, especially the "national question," upon which they could not agree.[1]

Two years later, when each of the German states celebrated the 25th anniversary of its founding, the indispensability and appropriateness of this specific reservation became even more obvious. Helmut Schmidt, Chancellor of the F.R.G., emphasized that all Germans, although living in two separate states, formed one nation: "Germans do not wish to give up their common bond in a German nation; even those who would, cannot."[2] On the other hand, the G.D.R. approved a far-reaching modification of its 1968 constitution, deleting all references to the "German nation" and "German unity."[3] The G.D.R. now considers itself a socialist nation-state on the road to communism, linked

[1] Preamble to the Basic Treaty (*Grundvertrag*). The English text may be found in *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, 1972, 25621-22, and in Frederick W. Hess, ed., *German Unity* (Kansas City, Mo.: Park College Bureau of Governmental Research 1974), 28-33.

[2] *Bericht zur Lage der Nation* (Report on the State of the Nation), in the Bundestag, January 30, 1975; see *Archiv der Gegenwart*, 1975, 19222.

[3] Preamble and Art. 8, sec. 2 of the constitutional amendments of October 7, 1974, *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, 1974, 26835-36.

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forever to other socialist states under the guidance of the Soviet Union, and having nothing in common with the capitalist F.R.G. Nevertheless, each of the German states continues to use the other to define and identify itself. In contrasting itself to the other German state, each evidences a frame of reference and legitimacy that continues to exist. Through reviews of several new publications on the domestic and foreign policies of East and West Germany, I will examine the dialectical process of two states of a divided nation in search of their separate identities.

The most impressive of these books, both in scope and in weight of argument, is Ernst Nolte's *Deutschland und der Kalte Krieg* (Germany and the Cold War). Nolte examines the origins of the cold war, the division of Germany, and the subsequent course of confrontation between the two states. He not only provides a detailed description of more than thirty years of recent history; he also theorizes about the nature of the cold war in general, and of the inter-German dispute in particular. This work is a major contribution to our understanding of the inner logic of the "German question."

Henry Krisch's *German Politics under Soviet Occupation* deals with a much shorter period of time and a narrower topic: the merger, between 1945 and 1946, of the Social Democratic Party with the Communist Party in East Germany, to form the Socialist Unity Party (*Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands*, or SED). This unification, carried out under the pressure of Soviet military occupation, played an important role in hardening the political cleavage between the two Germanys.

The third study reviewed here is a collection of essays written for a conference at the University of Surrey in March 1974, and edited by Roger Tilford. The papers focus on the Federal Republic's *Ostpolitik*, starting in 1969. The essays develop the idea that it has not been the main purpose of *Ostpolitik* to overcome the division of Germany; rather, its purpose is to overcome the fact that that division limits the domestic and foreign policies of both Germanys. The main interests of the contributors to this book lie in the question whether, by their fixation on each other and on their future reunification, the two Germanys are still bound together as they were during the days of the cold war.

Despite their different perspectives and approaches, all three books are primarily concerned with the identities of the two German states and their populations. How do the people and governments of the F.R.G. and the G.D.R. perceive themselves? To what extent is the identity of

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each based on its perception of the other German state? What is the impact of these conceptions on their current and future interrelationship?

These identities and perceptions are of course influenced by the changing environments and politics of the German states as well as by those of their respective allies. But I shall concentrate on the effects that inter-German relations have had on the domestic politics of the two states. In my opinion, the chief significance of the inter-German controversy over identity derives from its effect in stabilizing and legitimizing the two separate states and societies. I shall suggest possible fields and methods of research that may generate information relevant to testing this assertion. Part I of this essay will be an overview of the history of inter-German perceptions; part II an analysis of the main functions of these perceptions; and part III will deal with some methodological problems in studying politics in a divided nation.

I

GERMANY IN THE COLD WAR (1945–1949)

Establishment in 1949 of two German states came about as the result of a four-year process of disintegration of the victorious alliance of World War II. Both states began their divided existence with a determination to reunite. The basic law of the F.R.G. called upon the entire German people "to achieve in free self-determination the unity and freedom of Germany"; the constitution of the G.D.R. labeled Germany an "indivisible democratic republic."[4]

In *Deutschland und der Kalte Krieg*, Ernst Nolte presents an inventive and exciting new treatment of this topic. He combines two lines of research and reflection which were previously only loosely connected: questions of the origins of the cold war and of the identity of divided Germany. The cold war was a conflict between two ideological camps with bases grounded in European political and intellectual history. Germany, the first victim of this war, was also one of its creators, having given birth to Marxism and nurtured Fascism. In Nolte's eyes, Germany functioned like a huge magnetic field around two poles of antagonistic ideologies, attracting and dividing not only the former allies of World War II, but also German elites.

Nolte is more concerned with ideological development than with

[4] Preamble to the Basic Law (*Grundgesetz*) of the F.R.G.; Art. 1 of the G.D.R.'s constitution of 1949.

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political maneuvering. The details of confrontation and coalition building among occupying powers and the elites of the occupied country have been clearly outlined by Hans-Peter Schwarz.[5] But Schwarz concentrates on only one side of the bipolar process, the "Western orientation." He treats the Eastern pole of development, Soviet policy—and, more importantly, all German politicians who pleaded for an "Eastern orientation"—as secondary. Henry Krisch's *German Politics under Soviet Occupation* aims to fill this gap by focusing primarily on efforts of the Social Democratic leadership in East Germany and particularly in Berlin (the *Zentralausschuss*) to mediate among the occupying powers and the two working-class parties in order to preserve the unity of the German working class and the German nation as a whole. But the realities of cold-war confrontations forced these and other supporters of a "bridge-solution" into one or the other polarized mold. The example of the founding of the Socialist Unity Party clearly demonstrates that unity was the goal, but partition the outcome.[6] Formation of the SED split the all-German Social-Democratic movement and widened the gap between Western- and Soviet-occupied zones. The Germans and their allied protectors never demonstrated their disunity more clearly than by their talk and action on "unity."

POLARIZATION OF THE TWO GERMANYS (1949–1960)

Although the F.R.G. and the G.D.R. initially regarded their territorial entities to be merely provisional, they considered their contrasting political and ideological systems as non-negotiable. The Federal Republic became a member not only of the military and economic but also of the ideological community of "Western democracies," and considered itself to be the only free German state. The German Democratic Republic stressed democracy, and proclaimed itself to be the only true executor of the Potsdam principles for an antifascist and democratic order in postwar Germany. Each state considered the other a colony of imperialism—American or Soviet.

Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and his Christian Democrats hoped that by demonstrating Western (economic and military) strength and

[5] Schwarz, *Vom Reich zur Bundesrepublik* [From Reich to Federal Republic] (Berlin-Neuwied: Luchterhand 1966). See the review article by Klaus Epstein "The German Problem: 1945–1950," *World Politics*, XX (January 1968), 279-300, which presents a brilliant summary of Schwarz's findings.

[6] In this respect, the material of Krisch's study contradicts his generalization about an all-German intention behind the Soviet promotion of the merger (p. 210 and throughout). In general, Krisch's conclusions on Soviet aims and strategies in postwar Europe (pp. 200 ff.) seem vague and speculative.

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East German weakness, they could help persuade the Soviet Union to rid itself of its troublesome "occupation zone." Behind the official West German reunification program of "all-German free elections" stood the expectation of a collapse of the East German system, of reunification by annexation.

At the outset, the East German leadership under Walter Ulbricht may have had parallel expectations based on an ideological faith in the inevitable demise of capitalism. Economic development in both German states, however, soon disillusioned believers in an all-German socialist nation. In the first years of the G.D.R.'s existence, German communists had feared that East Germany might be used as a bargaining chip in Soviet politics. However, after the Soviets failed to stop West German rearmament in 1953–1955, the establishment of an autonomous G.D.R. won unchallenged Soviet priority. Although the communists had conducted the more aggressive propaganda campaign for a single Germany, this militancy represented primarily an effort to compensate for the lag in establishing the economic and political stability of their state. In fact, their policy in all-German matters was reactive and defensive.

In the second half of the 1950's, the Soviets dismissed any idea of influencing West Germany with offers of reunification, and concentrated on establishing the G.D.R. as the socialist stronghold in Germany. Both sides gave a high priority to internal and international recognition of the G.D.R.: the East sought to achieve it, the West to prevent it. The Soviet Union and East Germany promoted the two-states theory. West Germany and its allies proclaimed the nonexistence of the G.R.D., labeling it an illegitimate and oppressive "phenomenon." Migration from East to West Germany was called a "referendum by foot." But West Germany's assumptions about Anglo-American support for reunification and about Soviet security interests turned out to be illusions at the very moment when the Western system seemed to be about to succeed.

THE UNCHANGEABLE STATUS QUO (1961–1968)

Berlin represents a pivot in the history of bipolar confrontation and inter-German relations. For years it was the center of the cold war in Germany. For the East German regime, Berlin was the weakest point of its existence. But the wall, at first a manifestation of weakness, became the starting point of stabilization. No longer having to fear a drain on its highly skilled population, the regime could replace repression with persuasion, negative sanctions with positive rewards, ideological dog-

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matism with economic pragmatism. Soon the G.D.R.'s political and social system began a slow but continuous progress.

Quite the opposite was the case in the Federal Republic. It experienced a manifold crisis of identity and suffered from setbacks in its economic and political development. The wall and its accompanying diplomacy demonstrated the limitations of the Western alliance and pushed the hope for reunification into a vague future. This identity crisis of the 1960's found its expression in neonationalist movements, difficulties regarding the succession to Konrad Adenauer, and the emergence of a radical leftist extraparliamentary opposition. In addition, the economic problems of the middle sixties seemed to endanger the one solid base of democracy in West Germany, its so-called "economic miracle."

Changes in the mood of international politics deepened West German feelings of insecurity. The crises of Berlin and Cuba had forced the two world powers to recognize the dangers of unlimited and uncontrolled confrontations. Both the United States and the Soviet Union began to define their mutual spheres of interests and to promote détente. In this "latent phase of the cold war" (Nolte, 575), West Germany's desire for reunification became increasingly displeasing—not only to the communist states, but also to the West. The F.R.G. tried to show its good intentions by offering treaties renouncing force, but it would not agree to recognize the G.D.R. Nevertheless, more and more countries were recognizing the G.D.R.; the Federal Republic reacted by breaking off diplomatic relations with these states. This policy became increasingly isolated, passive, and fatalistic.

OSTPOLITIK (1969 TO PRESENT)

The deadlock was drastically changed by Chancellor Willy Brandt's *Ostpolitik*. Under his leadership, the F.R.G. recognized the G.D.R. and the Oder-Neisse border, established diplomatic relations with all communist states, and, along with the G.D.R., joined the United Nations. Evaluation of this shift to an activist policy and its outcome has been quite varied. Some call it a surrender to Soviet pressure, others a new start for West German politics.

The main accomplishment of Brandt's policy lies in its acceptance of the inevitable. The F.R.G. acquiesced in worldwide recognition of the G.D.R.; in turn, it won contractual assurances concerning West Berlin's links with the Federal Republic and (limited) opportunities for communication and travel between the two German states. Even more important, the Federal Republic won new leeway for interna-

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tional action. It freed itself from its special conflict with the Soviet Union,[7] from the possibility of blackmail by third countries (threatening to recognize the G.D.R.), and even from its former dependence on the West for support of unification.

It is not clear what effect the recovery of initiative and room for choice had on West Germany's relation to the Western alliance. Roger Morgan presents a reasonable and balanced essay on the effects of *Ostpolitik* on the international position of the F.R.G. (Tilford, 95-108). In his opinion, by recognizing the G.D.R. and arriving at a compromise with the East, the Federal Republic won increased influence and gained self-confidence as a loyal member of the Western alliance.

This appraisal might also hold true for East Germany's position in the Eastern alliance. On a superficial level, the G.D.R. seems to rely more than ever on the Soviet Union—if one takes daily proclamations of socialist brotherhood between the two states as signs of dependence. In fact, however, the G.D.R. has a greater influence on the policy formulation of communist parties and other communist states than before, and does not shrink from asserting its own interests.

Mutual recognition may have given the two Germanys more freedom of action and broader responsibility in international relations. Whether or not they have freed themselves from their fixation on each other and their insecurity remains a question that can be dealt with only after analyzing the nature and functions of inter-German relations and perceptions.

II

IDENTITY AND COUNTER-IDENTITY

Since 1949, both Germanys have differentiated themselves from one another in all their actions and declarations. Above all, they have disagreed over the concept of a German nation. The result has not been indifference and isolation, but a continuous affirmation of a common frame of identity and legitimacy. For years, anticommunism was an important element of consensus and stability within the F.R.G. Lack of a similar, broadly accepted enemy was one of the reasons for the G.D.R.'s instability.

The old compulsion for mutual reference, however, is obviously diminishing. The mere fact of separate existence for more than 25

[7] That thesis is the main argument of Richard Loewenthal's diplomatic history of the Eastern relations of the Federal Republic: "Vom kalten Krieg zur Ostpolitik," in R. Loewenthal and H. P. Schwarz, eds., *Die zweite Republik* (Stuttgart: Seewald 1974), 604-99.

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years has promoted the emergence of autonomous and positive identifications. With *Ostpolitik*, the two German states not only recognized each other, but also accepted themselves and strengthened their internal order. The foregoing is the main finding of the essays in the volume edited by Tilford. Nevertheless, it seems questionable whether West Germans now accept the Federal Republic as their "nation"—as concluded by W. E. Paterson (Tilford, 41) and others. Ernst Nolte and other German observers are not as positive on this point.

Nolte considers the Federal Republic's renunciation of its old policy of reunification as its chance to come to grips with its autonomous legitimacy and historical reality (pp. 600-601 and throughout). On the other hand, he points to the F.R.G.'s weakness in dealing with enemies of its political and social order to demonstrate that recognition of the G.D.R. may be "not the simultaneous self-recognition of the Federal Republic, but its self-surrender" (p. 589). This reservation is understandable only when we perceive the F.R.G. and the G.D.R. in their relationship to each other, not simply as two distinct and self-contained states, but as overlapping entities.

A COLD CIVIL WAR IN GERMANY?

The inter-German confrontation was both an inter-state and an intra-state dispute. The two states were based on antagonistic political movements with a long tradition in all parts of Germany. Nolte regards the confrontation between the F.R.G. and the G.D.R. primarily as a fight among parties of all-German origins and sympathizers. In a long chapter (pp. 371-462), he discusses sympathizers of one state who reside in the other, and the strategies and organizations designed to destabilize the counter-regime and undermine its legitimacy. One might call this intra-German conflict a cold civil war. "Cold" because it was part of the larger ideological confrontation; "civil" in the sense that characteristics of rebellion and violence, although usually latent, were always present.[8]

Not only had the F.R.G. and the G.D.R. refused to recognize each other's statehood; each had for some time considered the other government as a rebellious usurper, totally dependent on foreign military force. In order to stabilize its own system, the G.D.R. abolished this policy earlier than the F.R.G. But both governments had, at least implicitly, encouraged the population of the other to overthrow its regime. Each state counted on sympathizers in the other's territory.

[8] The hypotheses and methods of the study of internal war might be applied to the confrontation within divided nations. Cf. Harry Eckstein, ed., *Internal War: Problems and Approaches* (New York-London: Free Press 1964).

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In discussing these intra-German conflicts, Nolte's explanatory framework becomes debatable and demonstrates that he is locked into cold-war ideology. He applies his interpretation of the cold war in Germany as an all-German party conflict only to inter-state relations. Nolte neglects to analyze how each government manipulated suspicions of sympathy with the enemy's aims and ideas as weapons against its own domestic critics—even those loyal to the state.[9] But one must consider just such relations, how each government provoked confrontation with its opponent in order to provide justification for curbing domestic critics. In the name of German unity and democracy, the hostile systems "tended to pervert all opposition into opposition to the other system and to deprive domestic conflicts of political expression" (Tilford, 12). This process may have been applied more brutally in the G.D.R. than in the F.R.G., but its contours existed in both states.[10] Inter-German conflicts induced a climate of fear, suspicion, repression, and opportunism which will take a long time to subside.

LEGAL WARFARE BETWEEN THE TWO GERMANYS

Normalization of relations between the two German states is difficult because both froze their antagonistic positions into law. The G.D.R. has altered its constitutional provisions twice—in 1968 and again in 1974; but the F.R.G. still retains, although in much amended form, the constitution of 1949. The general statement in the preamble of the West German *Grundgesetz*, "to achieve in free self-determination the unity and freedom of Germany," has been interpreted by courts and constitutional lawyers to create strict and legally binding rules for the policy of the Government of the Federal Republic. In its most recent decision on the constitutionality of the basic treaty between East and West Germany, for example, the Federal Constitutional Court bound all West German officials to act on the assumption that the F.R.G. is identical with the German Reich of 1937, though temporarily reduced in its territory.[11]

[9] See, for example, Nolte's treatment of the critics of West German rearmament (pp. 296-319).

[10] A good example of the confrontation's domestic impact in the F.R.G. is the history of the SPD (*Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands*) in the 1950's. Although they had been among the anti-Communist founders of the F.R.G., West Germany's Social Democrats were suspected of being a weak spot—if not possibly traitors—in the conflict with "Moscow" and "Pankow." (In order to avoid having to speak of the government in East Berlin, West Germans called the East German Government "Pankow," after the district where many of the party elite lived.) That suspicion was one of the reasons the SPD abandoned its independent program for German reunification and a socialist economy in 1959–1960. Nolte does not mention this episode at all.

[11] The English text of this decision of July 31, 1973, is reprinted in Hess (fn. 1), 34-60.

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The gap between these legal principles and political reality is wide, as Tilford points out in his discussion of the "legalistic approach to politics" (pp. 14-21). Throughout Adenauer's chancellorship, formulation of reunification policy was a task for lawyers like Foreign Minister von Brentano, Secretary of State Hallstein, and Ambassador Grewe. With the help of judges and academic legal experts, lawyers thus had a virtual monopoly of interpreting the "German question."

In East Germany, legal interpretations of the situation of both Germanys were functions of changing politics. West Germany, on the contrary, tended to consider policies toward the other side as a mere function of law. Steadfastness in legal principles pushed aside analyses of political realities and possibilities. Emphasis on transhistorical principles led to ignoring the difficulties—and possibilities—of political decisions. Legalistic constructions of the German question show how easily such an approach overlooks the way in which law is changed in specific political and social situations.

Legalistic screening of political reality would have been less harmful if it had involved only academic discussions or diplomatic relationships between two states. But in both German states the legal battle had broad implications for domestic politics. Both regimes used the law to separate the states and to eliminate internal foes. Constitutional provisions[12] and a rigid penal code enabled the F.R.G. and the G.D.R. to purge *collaborateurs* of the other state, actual or suspected, as well as enemies of their own system. In the 1950's both Germanys had their own brands of McCarthyism.

Such practices have since moderated. But it is imprudent to forget them, as both states seem to—at least in their own history.[13] Instead, we should regard this judicial enforcement of the antagonistic German policies as an example of the sterility that often results from rigid application of legal principles to shifting political problems. Clothing political repression in the mantle of judicial forms may limit the extent of the repression; on the other hand, such apparel often lends legitimacy. As long as the confrontation between the F.R.G. and the G.D.R. continues, both states will be tempted to confuse radical but loyal

[12] Art. 6 of the G.D.R.'s constitution of 1949, permitting prosecution of boycott agitation (*Boykotthetze*) against democratic institutions, organizations, and politicians (of the G.D.R.); Art. 21, sec. 2 of the basic law of the F.R.G., banning anti-constitutional parties.

[13] Ernst Nolte's history mentions neither the use of the penal code nor the banning of the West German Communist Party in 1956. This decision of the F.R.G.'s constitutional court (*Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts*, V, 85-393) provides an interesting example of a perception of Marxism-Leninism as a counter-ideology to Western democracy.

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critiques with high treason.[14] In this respect, a more thorough analysis of the function of law in inter-German relations might help in the process of normalization.

III

IDEOLOGY AND PHENOMENOLOGY

Like the cold war in general, the inter-German confrontation may be interpreted in several ways. It may be understood primarily as a conflict of competing states or elites over power, or as an ideological battle between two universalist ideas (Nolte, 39). The choice one makes is decisive for the selection of the method of research; the method, in turn, determines the outcome of the inquiry.

The connection between method and findings becomes apparent in Nolte's study. He places the cold war in the category of conflicts between states motivated totally or partially by ideology (p. 45). In that respect, Nolte's book is the sequel to his previous work on fascism, which dealt with the preceding epoch, but applied the same approach.[15] This time the topic is not a single ideology with several expressions, but a confrontation between two opposing ideologies: an open, pluralistic society in the West and a closed, nonpluralistic state in the East.[16]

Nolte's ambition is not merely to write a chronology of the cold war as an ideological battle, but "to contribute to theory," as he frequently states in his introductory chapter (pp. 31-61). His efforts result in a number of surprising and enlightening commentaries and in interesting concepts, such as "the latent phase of cold war," and "the potency of conversion" from one ideological camp to the other. But as a whole, his book provides only an impressionistic description of conflicts between "left" and "right." His systematic analysis, formulating and testing hypotheses on causal or functional relations, is simply not strong enough to succeed as the theoretical attempt he proposes.

This shortcoming is due mainly to Nolte's methodological approach which he terms "phenomenology." The method concentrates on the ideas and self-understanding of the acting persons and groups. It allows

[14] See Otto Kirchheimer, *Political Justice* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1961), for a discussion of the legal-political warfare between East and West Germany, and its implications for penal law.

[15] Nolte, *Three Faces of Fascism: Action Française, Italian Fascism, National Socialism* (London: Weidenfeld 1965); German original, *Der Faschismus in seiner Epoche* (Munich: Piper 1963). See Klaus Epstein's review article, "A New Study of Fascism," *World Politics*, XVI (January 1964), 302-21.

[16] Nolte rejects with firmness all dualistic models of a confrontation between "freedom-capitalism" and "socialism." To him, the latter is also part of the Western system and its tradition.

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Nolte to produce a rich account of the intellectual origins and development of the cold war, but it fails to fulfill his claims to reveal the "real structure of society," or to explain the "anatomy of society" (pp. 293, 329). Nolte's detailed presentation of the rearmament debate in the Federal Republic, for example (pp. 296-329), brings interesting insights into the mood of the time, but ends in the exaggerated conclusion that deep-rooted emotions and evaluations of "true interest," rather than the interests themselves, played the central role (p. 329).

Nolte's analysis suffers from his strong antipathy toward economic and sociological interpretation. Avoiding the materialistic explanatory scheme of vulgar Marxism, he falls into the opposite trap. In Nolte's view, in the beginning were the ideas: all else follows. The cold war and the division of Germany are thus inevitable results of a confrontation of ideologies deeply rooted in European history. This concentration on the *substance* of ideology totally neglects the *function* of ideologies. Such an approach takes expressed ideas only as an exact reflection of opinion and does not ask for hidden meanings. Phenomenology thus cuts short the analysis of ideology. Above all, it neglects the function of ideology in stabilizing and legitimizing political authority. I do not mean to imply that the importance of ideology lies only in its function. Both aspects are useful and necessary approaches to the study of ideology. But the ideological confrontation between the two German states is not only a dispute between a liberal-capitalist and a people's democratic-socialist system (substance); it is also the instrument that two states used to homogenize and legitimize their own system and to destabilize that of the opponent (function).

LEGITIMACY AND POLITICAL CULTURE

The inter-German dispute is above all a contest between two polarized elites, to win popular support for their antagonistic programs and legitimacy for the two states born of this confrontation. Most Western analysts and observers agree that elites governing West Germany have enjoyed decisive advantages over East German elites. Supposedly, the founding of the F.R.G. had the consent of its population from the beginning, whereas communist rule in the G.D.R. was considered a revolution imposed by military occupation. Even today, the G.D.R. is said to rest more on satisfaction with economic success than on political agreement.[17] This overall picture of a strong legitimacy in

[17] This is the basis for Peter Christian Ludz's thesis of "the G.D.R.'s lack of legitimacy." See his *Two Germanys in One World* (Paris: Atlantic Institute for International Affairs 1973), 23-25.

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West Germany and a weak, if not nonexistent, legitimacy in East Germany dominates the three books under review.

Although not wholly incorrect, such a general statement easily leads to simplistic polarization instead of a range of shading. Thinking in terms of a free versus a totalitarian regime, or a liberal versus a socialist system, disregards the very different situations that confronted the two regimes in 1949. The founders of the F.R.G. could link their state to the tradition of the Weimar Republic; their strong anti-Communist bias even enabled them to integrate former Nazis. On the other hand, the creation of a people's democracy and a socialist society in the East conflicted with much of German tradition.[18]

Because of West Germany's economic starting position and its outside support, it could use economic prosperity as proof of political legitimacy much earlier than East Germany was able to. Moreover, the SED in the early 1950's did much to worsen the weak position of the G.D.R. in the competition over legitimacy. Ulbricht and his companions at that time stressed both Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy and national unity; they achieved intimidation with the first, and affirmation of all-German unity with the second. When, in the late 1950's, they recognized the crucial significance of economic success, the SED leaders made exaggerated promises whose failure further weakened support. Only since the 1960's has the G.D.R. been able to conduct a cautious and smooth policy of stabilizing and legitimizing its system.

Evaluations and comparisons of the legitimacy of both German states and their policies would require much more empirical research,[19] and in addition, a critical reconsideration of applied concepts and models. Such models would have to take into account not only content, but also causes and conditions of legitimizing consent. In my opinion, the "political culture" approach offers one such model, combining the study of ideas and ideologies with the evaluation of stability and legitimacy of political systems.[20] Applied to an inquiry into a divided nation such as Germany, it can be used to examine how the two regimes compete with one another, each laying claim to the national heritage and trying to mold it in its own way. Through an investigation into attitudes and opinions of the political elites and publics of both states,

[18] The SED regime tried to compensate by stressing, in its propaganda and cultural policy, the "national heritage" of humanistic and progressive traditions.

[19] Such research is especially needed for the G.D.R., which, in comparison with the F.R.G., has been neglected by Western analysts. The reason may be its inaccessibility, but also the analysts' tendency to focus on the ally. An adequate though outdated sketch of the situation of the G.D.R. is given by David Childs (Tilford, 59-75).

[20] Cf. Robert C. Tucker, "Communist Revolutions, National Cultures, and the Divided Nations," *Studies in Comparative Communism*, VII (Autumn 1974), 235-45.

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one may analyze not only the intentions but also the results of the Eastern and Western policies concerning the German nation.[21]

NATION AND NATION BUILDING

The inter-German dispute over identity and legitimacy culminates in the question of the "German nation." For two decades, both governments have accused each other of betraying the national interest and have endorsed themselves as the only true representative of German unity. Only recently has the East German regime given up this "all-German" definition and begun to stress the emergence of a socialist nation-state in the G.D.R. In identifying class structure as the main determinant of a nation, East Germany now differentiates between the socialist nation in the G.D.R. and the capitalist nation in the F.R.G. The West German Government, on the other hand, maintains that the people in both German states are still bound together by their shared culture and tradition, overlapping kinship, and, most important, a common will to overcome the division.

Both regimes are eager to support their positions with scholarly research. They point to a catalogue of differently weighted characteristics, such as ethnic homogeneity, economic and social conditions, statehood and legitimacy, which seem to support the arguments of their particular side.[22] But such academic efforts merely serve to continue the political controversy on another level. The term "nation," as it is frequently used both in political propaganda and social-science research on inter-German relations, remains a confusing and controversial concept.

Work on "nation building," the most promising approach, has demonstrated the same shortcoming. In defining nations as bodies of communication and actions, some studies have considered "national consciousness" to be the decisive characteristic. Can one define what constitutes the "German nation" through an empirical evaluation of public opinion and attitudes in both states? Certainly Peter Christian Ludz and Gebhard Schweigler think so—just to mention two disciples of Karl W. Deutsch who have applied the latter's methods to the German case.[23] But their empirical work led them to opposite results:

[21] The one professed attempt to apply the "political culture" approach to East and West Germany's foreign policies and interrelations is Peter Merkl, *German Foreign Policies, West and East* (Santa Barbara, Cal.: American Bibliographical Center–Clio Press 1974). Unfortunately Merkl's attempt is not successful.

[22] Cf. the list of descriptive criteria in Bundesministerium für Gesamtdeutsche Fragen, ed., *Materialien zum Bericht zur Lage der Nation 1974* [Material for the Report on the State of the Nation] (Bonn 1974), 71-80.

[23] Ludz (fn. 17), and *Materialien zum Bericht zur Lage der Nation 1974* (fn. 22), written by a team under Ludz's leadership. Schweigler's Ph.D. dissertation, "National

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in Ludz's opinion, the legitimizing consent of both German populations for dividing the one nation into two is still missing. Schweigler, on the other hand, finds that the people in both states focus on autonomous social and economic identities and have become alienated from each other.

The difficulties encountered in empirical research on "nation building" are obvious. They derive mostly from failure to make a distinction between national identity on the one hand, and the support, by various groups, of socioeconomic conditions on the other. Concepts such as "nation," "state," and "nation-state" are too frequently used interchangeably in a confusing fashion. An even more serious problem is the static application by most scholars of the dynamic concept of "nation building." The mere question, "one or two nations in Germany?" is misleading. It focuses attention on whether one approves or disapproves of the antagonistic propositions of the two states. But policy and factual results are two different matters.[24] What has happened in Germany in the last thirty years has been neither the sudden replacement of the old nation by two new ones (or one traditional and one new, as the G.D.R. asserts), nor the self-evident continuation of one nation (as the F.R.G. alleges). On the contrary, it has been a process of breaking apart a nation-state which existed from 1871 to 1945. Two states have been established; the government of one seeks to establish a separate national identity, while the government of the other tries to preserve the all-German national identity (the roots of which extend back far beyond the founding of the nation-state in 1871). It would seem that, by the very fact of their existence as separate entities with differing economic and social orders for more than a quarter-century, both states have become autonomous, with separate focal points of identity.[25]

In the first decade after the founding of the two German states, the process was not one of building two nations, but of separating what was formerly one nation.[26] The elites and populations of both Germanys had to discover that they no longer formed the community of action and

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Consciousness in Divided Germany" (Harvard University 1972) has been published in German under the title *Nationalbewusstsein in der BRD und der DDR* (Düsseldorf: Bertelsmann Universitätsverlag 1973).

[24] For an example of how the political reality may be considered equivalent to policy statements, see John M. Starrels, "Nationalism in the German Democratic Republic," *Canadian Review of Studies of Nationalism*, II (Fall 1974), 23-37.

[25] In addition to the material presented by Ludz (fn. 17) and Schweigler (fn. 23), see the findings of the most recent public-opinion polls on West German identity in *Materialien zum Bericht zur Lage der Nation 1974* (fn. 22), 88-129.

[26] Cf. Walker Connor, "Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying?" *World Politics*, XXIV (April 1972), 319-55; however, Connor concentrates on the impact of ethnicity.

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communications to which they were accustomed. Ideological battles over the "German question" were an important part in this process of separation through experience. These battles demonstrated that the more both sides insisted on German unity, the more unlikely and impossible reunification became. The process of experience and learning was painful, emotional, and drawn out. But in recent years its prime focus seems to have shifted from negative demarcation to positive identification with one's own entity. The disintegration of what still exists of the one nation and the building of two new nations are thus overlapping and ongoing processes; one can guess at the final results, but one cannot predict them. Postwar Germany presents a model full of interesting questions and material for the study of the dissolution and formation of political entities in developed industrial societies.[27] In this respect, the "German question" is still a challenge for the historical and social sciences.

[27] The secession of Austria from the German Empire, and its development into a nation with its own values, provides a historical precedent—though West German politicians and political scientists tend to disregard it for obvious reasons. Cf. the interesting but impressionistic study by William T. Bluhm, *Building an Austrian Nation: The Political Integration of a Western State* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press 1973).

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COMPARATIVE AND ELITE POLITICS

By JOHN M. STARRELS

Thomas Arthur Baylis, *The Technical Intelligentsia and the East German Elite*. Berkeley/Los Angeles/London, University of California Press, 1974, 314 pp., $12.50.

Peter Christian Ludz, *The Changing Party Elite in East Germany*. Cambridge, Mass. and London, MIT Press, 1972, 506 pp., $17.00.

UNTIL the mid-1960's, American studies on German politics tended to ignore developments within the German Democratic Republic (G.D.R.). In large degree, this neglect could be traced back to the fact that few American scholars knew enough about the G.D.R. to justify extended analytical treatment.[1] The absence of an American commitment to the study of the G.D.R. was reflected in two areas of the discipline. Students of communist politics in Eastern Europe tended to exclude East Germany under the intellectually tenuous proposition that the G.D.R. was a "special case." Without saying so explicitly, this group appeared to support the creation of a new stratum of scholars that would somehow de-mystify the subject of East German politics, thereby making it a legitimate field of inquiry for other specialists. Students of Western European affairs, on the other hand, tended to keep East Germany at arm's length chiefly because they considered the Federal Republic to be their area of critical attention.[2] Starting with Arthur M. Hanhardt's *The German Democratic Republic* (Johns Hopkins Press, 1968) and extending through the recent publication of *Politics in the German Democratic Republic* (Praeger, 1975) by John Starrels and Anita Mallinckrodt, American scholars have finally begun to move away from their previously one-sided emphasis in the field of German affairs.

The publication in the United States of two works dealing with aspects of elite recruitment in the G.D.R. represents a most important phase in the evolution of research on East German politics going on in this country. *The Changing Party Elite in East Germany*, a long-delayed translation of *Parteielite im Wandel* (Cologne and Opladen, 1968), examines the evolution of political recruitment by the G.D.R.'s

[1] For a recent article dealing with the status of American research on the G.D.R., I strongly recommend Melvin Croan, "Zur Lage der DDR-Forschung in den USA," *Deutschland Archiv*, No. 2 (February 1976), 164-76.

[2] An important exception to this rule is seen in the comparative treatments done on West and East German politics by Arnold J. Heidenheimer and Donald P. Kommers, *The Governments of Germany* (4th ed.; New York: Crowell 1975).

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ruling Communist Party, the *Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands* (SED), from the early 1950's to the mid-1960's. Some of Ludz's arguments have been challenged in *The Technical Intelligentsia and the East German Elite* by Thomas Baylis, whose account takes into consideration some of the earlier as well as some of the more recent developments in East German society. In this paper, I shall examine the main arguments of both writers. In so doing, I hope to shift the focus of analytical attention away from the area-study identity which the G.D.R. continues to occupy in most treatments, and toward a larger comparative focus.

Survival and Adaptation

Ludz's examination of SED recruiting policy flows in two interrelated directions. First, in the broad evolution of communist recruitment policy, he suggests that there is a gradual, yet increasingly marked, shift away from crude methods of mass control and toward a more refined, and more effective, mode of communication between the SED and the population in general. The apparatus of coercion has not been replaced by an alternative structure of control, but the gradual evolution of newer methods of persuasion has slowly made it unnecessary for the SED to rely exclusively upon naked force in its attempt to mobilize the population in the service of economic modernization and social integration. Second, in relation to emerging generations of occupationally mobile East Germans, Ludz argues that the SED has become increasingly wedded to a policy of competitive recruitment in which ambitious and capable groups are being brought into the apparatuses of state and economic planning. He devotes attention to the mobility profiles of a special stratum, the "institutionalized counter-elite." This group constitutes an alternative leadership cadre to the older stratum of communist leaders who rose to power in East Germany at the end of World War II. Thus, what Ludz began as an examination of "systemic" change within the G.D.R.'s social structure becomes an analysis of the reflection of currents of sociopolitical change in the relations between partially competitive political generations within the SED's executive apparatus in general, and the Central Committee in particular.

Ludz begins his examination by generating ten hypotheses, all of which lead back to one master proposition:

> These postulates can be summarized in a unifying hypothesis: Under conditions of political, social, and intellectual change, the originally totalitarian SED has tended to develop into an authoritarian party. Since

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> Stalin's death, such changes have been evident throughout Eastern Europe, though they developed more slowly in the GDR. Certain features of this new authoritarian rule clearly distinguish it from totalitarian rule: First, although authoritarian rule requires a comprehensive ideology similar to that of totalitarian systems, there is one important difference between the two ideologies. Authoritarian ideologies precede the founding of movements, are regarded as eternal "givens," and thus need not be continually redefined or sustained by permanent terror. Furthermore, authoritarian (versus totalitarian) rule is characterized by greater flexibility within the system of control and higher adaptability of its various organizational systems to scientific and technical progress. Whereas totalitarian rule requires a relatively rigid system of control, the authoritarian framework includes more flexible means to coordinate and coopt. A more highly differentiated control system is supplemented by new patterns of communication (pp. 4-5).

Ludz divides the study of elite behavior into three overlapping analytical sections dealing with *organizational*, *theoretical*, and *ideological* dynamics at work within East German society in general, and within the hierarchies of the SED and the state bureaucracy more specifically. Beginning with some observations on the relevance of applying theories of modern organizational behavior to the competition that ranges the old and new elite groupings against each other in the G.D.R., Ludz identifies two key groups within the East German political system. On the one hand, he asserts that the old-line SED bureaucracy is dominant over the Politburo and within the secretariats of the party's *Bezirk* (district) apparatus. On the other hand, the "strategic clique," as he calls it, is partially counterbalanced by a younger (under-50) group of SED functionaries, many of whom are members of the Central Committee and the state bureaucracy, especially within the bureaus of industry and construction.

From the perspective of contemporary Western elite theory, Ludz then attempts to refine his observations on broad-level organizational competition between elites into a description of how the two groups behave toward each other. As the G.D.R. has moved away from a rigidly hierarchic authority structure (Stalinist totalitarianism of the mid-1940's through the mid-1950's) and toward what Rensis Likert calls a "consultative authoritarian" system with its guarded emphasis on delegated social controls and incentives, a gradual evolution has taken place within various levels of the SED and the state apparatus. The traditional strategic clique (which reached political maturity before the triumph of communist power in East Germany) performs overall "line" functions, appropriate to its longstanding activity within the party's execu-

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tive apparatus. The "institutionalized counter-elite"—the younger stratum of technical functionaries who grew up within the environment of East German institutions—holds "staff" responsibilities in recognition of its members' training in the running of a modern state and economic bureaucracy. Although the two strata tend to distrust one another, in accordance with their different experiences in politics, a symbiotic relationship between the two groups has emerged. Ludz is careful to note that the older group remains dominant in the new partnership between received ideology and technical expertise: "(T)he endorsement of the critical role of expertise by the political decision-makers, possibly compounded by the dynamics of the social system, remains highly qualified. The strategic clique endeavors to exploit and integrate expertise to a certain degree, but inwardly strives to retain control. . . . The experts are to be consulted, but fended off from the actual control arena of power" (p. 50).

Organizational and elite dynamics at work within various sections of the SED's executive apparatus are influenced by the impact of ideological factors that determine how the two elite groups orient themselves in making public policy. Ludz examines this issue by dividing ideology into an "official" and an "operating" component.[3] The distinction between the two, while unavoidably simplified and overdrawn, ties in with Ludz's earlier observations on the change of the organizational system in the G.D.R. Thus, the theory of Marxism-Leninism, "including its concrete formulations in party statutes and programs," corresponds to the received vision and future direction of East German society as the strategic clique wants it to be (p. 60). The institutionalized counter-elite invariably possesses a different conception of the function of ideology within East German society, since this younger stratum of technicians and administrators must attempt to translate the vague, at times even contradictory, components of official Marxism-Leninism into viable policy alternatives. Occasional conflicts between the two elite groups are on the surface manifested in arguments about the organization of decision-making responsibilities within state industrial enterprises. Actually, they are reflective of deeper ideological divisions that separate the old-line SED clique from the younger technocrats. Hence, Ludz sees the imposition of SED control organs, such as the Workers' and Peasants' Inspectorate, into the East German industrial system as an

[3] Chalmers Johnson has perceptively examined this important dichotomy in his examination of "goal" versus "transfer" culture. See "Comparing Communist Nations," in Johnson, ed., *Change in Communist Systems* (Stanford: Stanford University Press 1970), 1-32.

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attempt by the strategic clique to maintain its dominant political control over the activities of the technicians in the nationalized economic system (pp. 155-56).

Subsequently, Ludz places the interrelated dynamics associated with organizational, elite, and ideological change in East Germany in an empirical context, in an attempt to validate the gradual emergence of a technically aware stratum in various sections of the party and state apparatuses. The core of his analysis involves an examination of recruitment into the SED's Central Committee. Ludz collected biographical data on 275 full and candidate members between 1954 and 1963, a period of time that covers three SED Congresses (IV-VI). However, the frequent omission of recruitment data for 1954 reduces the power of Ludz's generalizations on the transformation of the Central Committee membership over a nine-year period. Indeed, only 16 of the study's 49 tables contain biographical data for the entire period in question. Nonetheless, Ludz's basic findings on changing patterns of recruitment into the Central Committee are instructive. As might be expected, leadership within the Committee moved away from the group born between 1890 and 1909 and toward persons born during the interwar period (1920–1929). Moreover, the emerging group of leaders on the Committee is increasingly composed of individuals possessing "professional-technical" backgrounds: "The Central Committee established since 1963 is undergoing a general process of 'professionalization.' Graduates of trade and technical schools, colleges, and universities have increased to a remarkable degree. Furthermore, the Central Committee has been 'professionalized,' even in a specific sense, by an increasing proportion of members and candidates exercising technical-economic and leading administrative functions" (p. 321).

The importance of Ludz's study outweighs several analytical weaknesses. *The Changing Party Elite* represents the first systematic examination of East German politics by a Western scholar, and for American analysts of the G.D.R., there is little question that its influence has been significant. Having stated these positive observations, I must touch upon several difficulties in the study.

Ludz has too readily made the transition between a limited body of empirical findings and large generalizations about the motivations and behavior of elite groupings in the G.D.R. He cannot be faulted for the absence of interview data *per se*, since most scholars on authoritarian politics are forced to operate in the same empirical vacuum. Nonetheless, the absence of data from interviews should have led him to reduce the breadth of assertions about the existence of generational conflict and

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competition between two elite groups. As the analysis stands, the reader is expected to agree with Ludz that the factual existence of "mixed" and changing elite structures establishes the reality of intra-elite conflict. That proposition is not appreciably strengthened by some interesting observations dealing with generational competition in the arena of economic reorganization (p. 155).[4]

Further, Ludz demonstrates a degree of ambiguity in advancing the main thesis of the book toward the future status and function of newly emerging elites in the G.D.R. On occasion, he appears to be satisfied with the modest generalization that the institutionalized counter-elite has gained influence in selected parts of the policy-making apparatus of the SED. That contention on other occasions balloons into the arresting thesis that *perhaps* the strategic clique will eventually fall under the influence and control of the younger stratum. In terms of advancing the study of East German politics, it would have been preferable for the writer to have generated a clear-cut proposition that could be challenged and elaborated upon by other analysts of the East German Government. Indeed—and in spite of this ambiguous tendency—a number of writers have challenged the more ambitious side of Ludz's thesis, as the discussion of Baylis's study will show.

[4] An outstanding example of this tendency to equate political reorganization with patterns of intra-elite conflict is found in Ludz's discussion of the role of Workers' and Peasants' Inspectorates established by the SED in early 1963. Within the context of guidance and control, the inspectorates were set up in order to check the growing influence of the institutionalized counter-elite within the economically important bureaus of industry and construction:

> The penetration of the large organizational principle into the party apparatus at the beginning of 1963 encountered resistance which had been building up since the beginning of February 1954. This policy was initiated by the strategic clique, with the primary aim of restricting the sphere of decisions in central and regional bureaus of industry and construction (p. 155).

Summarizing the entire argument, Ludz concludes that the nature of intra-elite conflict is a structural problem within the East German political system:

> There is no doubt that the countermeasures of the strategic clique during 1965–1967 were effective in controlling the growing power of the party experts. Indications of this trend to date include: the establishment and expansion of the ABI and the production committees; the restriction of the authority of the bureaus of industry and construction, followed by their gradual and unannounced dissolution; the reorganization and broadened power of the central Ideological Commission; and the establishment of a Commission for Party and Organization Affairs. The deletion of the passage referring to the "production principle" from the statutes of the SED at the Seventh Party Congress in April 1967 is a further sign of the present relative power situation of the SED. The conflict between functionaries and experts has not been decisively solved by these measures. On the contrary, it has become a structural conflict inherent in the system, since the strategic clique must be assured of the cooperation of the experts more than ever before (pp. 177-78).

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Finally, Ludz's analysis suffers from the lack of a broad historical focus. Admittedly, the nine-year period chosen for examination is an important one in the evolution of relations between the old-line SED bureaucracy and the younger generation. Nonetheless, a section dealing with the development of intra-elite relations prior to the early 1950's would have been useful, as would a description of how those relations have been influenced by changes within the East German polity after 1963. This shortcoming could easily have been remedied by the explicit inclusion of data on the Central Committee membership of 1967, which is unfortunately—as well as unaccountably—relegated to the appendix. As it stands, the analysis suffers from inadequate attention to broad developmental patterns.

Legitimacy and the Intelligentsia

The Technical Intelligentsia and the East German Elite is a study of political recruitment. Baylis casts his work in the same intellectual tradition as Ludz. The main difference separating them is that Baylis is studying technocratic representation throughout the entire history of the East German polity, beginning in the immediate postwar period (1945–1949) and extending through some changes in the SED's attitude toward the technical intelligentsia in the wake of Ulbricht's departure from power in spring 1971. Baylis explains the separate, though interrelated, emphases reflected in the two works in the summary of his dissertation:

> In a broad sense, both of us seek to examine the relationship between the social and economic transformation of formerly "totalitarian" societies and the changing character of their political elites. Ludz, however, approaches the problem first of all from the perspective of party character, structure, and ideology; his data on the composition of the political elite and on conflicts within it is placed within the context of change in the party. My perspective is on a portion of the elite itself, the technical specialists, and their expanding political influence; changes in party character, structure, and ideology are treated in substantial measure as a reflection or at least a concomitant of this influence. Where Ludz stresses the tension between the inherited vanguard organization, and a newer one which views it as a mass organization integrated into the larger society and focused on social and economic change, I have emphasized the conflicting legitimacy claims of rival groups within the party.[5]

[5] The book is an elaboration of Baylis's Ph.D. dissertation, "Communist Elites and Industrial Society: The Technical Intelligentsia in East German Politics" (University of California, Berkeley 1968); quotation from p. 398.

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In line with these differences, Baylis draws an important distinction between two generations of technical intelligentsia, the "older" (pre-World War II) generation that was employed by the East German leadership during the immediate postwar reconstruction period, and the gradually evolving "new" technical stratum that gained its understanding of politics in the relatively secure environment of the established G.D.R. Baylis observes that the SED was highly pragmatic in using the older group. "Official policy . . . was to woo the old intelligentsia for nonsensitive but vital posts largely on its own terms. It was hoped, of course, that the old intelligentsia would eventually become loyal supporters of the DDR, by virtue of working alongside the working class and through 'comradely persuasion' by colleagues from the party" (p. 30). The crucial task, however, was to win their support for the policy of economic reconstruction. As of this date, the party and the state still provide some members of the prewar generation with generous salaries, pensions, and social status for their professional (as divorced from "ideological" and "political") services rendered to the G.D.R.

The status of the new intelligentsia is different, if only because the SED is strongly committed to winning it over to the regime's conception of socialism within East Germany. Baylis examines the SED's campaign toward the new intelligentsia from two analytical vantage points. First, he focuses attention on the SED's effort to politicize the new generation via the normal pedagogical devices, which combine specialized instruction in Marxism-Leninism with more active learning experiences placed within the framework of youth-group activities (organized by units of the Free German Youth). Baylis devotes substantial attention to university graduates, and their phased transition into professional occupational roles. Though he could not systematically interview this new stratum, he nonetheless concludes that the party treats politicization in a *pro forma* manner in the education of the new technical intelligentsia. Second, Baylis attempts to gain some empirical insight into the current political status of a selected sample of technocrats within the SED apparatus by examining a list of 51 top technical and economic functionaries of the G.D.R. His general findings appear to be in line with those of Ludz, although the restricted size of his sample does not allow him to make the larger generalizations found in the work of his West German colleague. Although he notes that three-fifths of the sample "have served on the Central Committee or held some other major, part-time party position (most usually

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as *Volkskammer* [the East German national legislature] delegate)," perhaps the most important conclusion that emerges is that all members of the group have been affiliated with the SED for a minimum of 15 years. Thus, even for the technical intelligentsia, an extended period of membership within the SED appears to be important (pp. 172-73).

The chief value of Baylis's work lies in its challenge to a variety of traditional assumptions about the influence of technicians on policy in East Germany, particularly their ability (perhaps desire?) to mold the ideological evolution of their society. Though he attempts to answer such questions in terms of larger issues surrounding the evolution of communist authority within the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe, the implicit target of Baylis's assertion is obviously (and unavoidably) Ludz. Baylis takes issue with Ludz on two important counts. In the first place, he questions whether the Central Committee does exercise an important influence on policy within the SED apparatus. At this juncture, and perhaps a bit too subtly, Baylis challenges the argument that the Central Committee has become an increasingly important policy actor within the SED's decision-making apparatus. He discreetly attempts to place himself between Ernst Richert's no longer valid argument that the Central Committee is powerless and Ludz's suggestive hypothesis on the "growing" influence of the Central Committee in the arena of economic policy in the most direct sense, and "perhaps" in the murkier realms of politics and ideology. Baylis appears to be content with the modest observation that the "committee only rarely exercises important powers, although it is more than, in Richert's words, a 'declamation and acclamation organ'" (p. 187). In the second—and in my view more fundamental—place, Baylis takes issue with Ludz's argument that an institutionalized counter-elite is, in the long run, politically competitive with the SED's old-line strategic clique. Borrowing widely from the writings of several scholars on elite politics in Eastern Europe, and particularly from the work of Jean-Paul Picaper, Baylis summarizes his dissent from Ludz:

> While the four representative critiques I have described are far from identical, they are in rough agreement on the central proposition that the technical strategic elite [the politically mobilized segment of the larger "technical intelligentsia"] and the *apparatchiki* are partners in power rather than rivals for it; insofar as conflict exists between them, it is functional for maintaining the system. In part, the complementarity of the two groups is explained by pointing to the socialization and recruitment process members of the technical elite undergo. In part, it is ascribed to the critical "political" functions performed by the *apparat-*

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chiki either for the society as a whole or, more narrowly, in assuring the authority and status of the technicians (p. 267).

Although Baylis's examination is less ambitious than Ludz's, he obviously is attempting to develop an alternative argument to the thesis of elite competition which the latter formulated in the late 1960's. I find Baylis' stress on historical continuity superior to Ludz's constricted treatment of the relationship between the SED and technical groups, but I am concerned about the absence of an alternative argument regarding the present and future role of technocratic and administrative elites in the G.D.R. Perhaps the difficulty lies in Baylis's failure to resolve two opposing arguments: the position that ideologists and technicians *can* work together, and the position that in the long run, "power may gravitate into the hands of the bureaucracy silently and almost unobserved, that the line between political and administrative decisions may become so blurred as to permit the taking of the first in the form of the second" (p. 8).

Continuity and Comparison

Continuities at work within the G.D.R. make the search for structural conflict between elites a difficult and frustrating task for scholars in the West. Indeed, between the time of Ludz's examination (1968) and the publication of Baylis's *Technical Intelligentsia* (1974) there have been changes in the way the SED orients itself toward East German society in general, and toward the technical intelligentsia more specifically. In the party's relationship with the broad population, there are signs that the SED has abandoned elements of its "marginal psychology," as Ludz calls the Leninist dictum governing conspiratorial revolutionary parties in their relations with the public.[6] Most notably, there are cautious trends in the direction of increased cultural pluralism within the G.D.R. Previously proscribed issues (marital infidelity, suicide, criminality) are now being discussed in artistic forums, though not yet in such mass media of communication as television. Baylis is

[6] Ludz describes this concept as follows:

> The party elite must keep intact a residue of its "marginality"—or exclusiveness—in order to preserve a certain distance from its rank and file, as well as from the society as a whole. This principle is an essential ingredient of the exercise of political power. The complete social marginality originally characteristic of the leadership group derives its ultimate legitimacy from the eschatological, or Utopian, dimensions of its ideology, as has been abundantly illustrated in the history of Marxism (p. 32).

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also correct in his assertion that the style, if not the substance, of Erich Honecker's approach to public policy displays an "almost populist concern for the ordinary worker," and a corresponding distaste for the lavish amounts of praise of the technical intelligentsia which Walter Ulbricht displayed in the last years of his tenure as SED chief (p. 257). In general, however, the continuities at work within East German politics are stronger, and are now becoming more obvious, than they were a decade ago.[7]

For the future, what are the prospects for American research on East Germany? I should like to advance several propositions, all of which have to do with the pursuit of a larger comparative focus for studying the G.D.R. Three areas in particular deserve future attention by American writers.

Diachronic comparison. The G.D.R. should be studied in conjunction with other phases and epochs of German history, since the East German political system, like its Western counterpart, is relatively young. Ralf Dahrendorf has reminded us how striking the impact of revolutionary change has been in East Germany, while Geoffrey Barraclough has been equally persuasive in his contention that historical examination of the post-1945 era (the so-called "Point Zero" period) tends to ignore the influence of earlier traditions and values in contemporary German development in the Federal Republic and the G.D.R.[8] In my view, the cross-sectional sociohistorical analysis of East German politics should bring with it a richer understanding of what traditions currently unite or separate the G.D.R. from "other" German systems in the past. On the foundation of such analysis, a more complex understanding of contemporary developmental patterns at work within the two German states should also emerge. Wolfgang Zapf has examined some diachronic aspects of German politics in his study of elite behavior,[9] and Melvin Croan occasionally conducts a seminar at the University of Wisconsin devoted to the study of five German polit-

[7] See particularly Kurt L. Shell's essay dealing with research on East German politics, "Totalitarianism in Retreat: The Example of the DDR," *World Politics*, XVIII (October 1965), 105-16.

[8] See Geoffrey Barraclough, "A New View of German History: Part III," in *New York Review of Books*, XVIII (November 16, 1972), 25-31, and Ralf Dahrendorf's examination of the revolutionary evolution of the G.D.R. in "The Two Germanies: The German Democratic Republic," in Dahrendorf, *Society and Democracy in Germany* (New York: Anchor 1969), 397-411.

[9] Wolfgang Zapf, "Wandlungen der deutschen Elite. Ein Zirkulationsmodell deutscher Führungsgruppen, 1919–1961," in Zapf, *Studien zur Soziologie*, II (Munich: 1965), 11ff.

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ical systems (the Empire, Weimar, the Nazi dictatorship, the Federal Republic, and the G.D.R.). No one has yet performed a broad-level analysis of how these varying political and social dynamics are reflected in the current operation of the East German system.

The European dimension. The SED's goal of building a *national* political system within the boundaries of the G.D.R. should not make us lose sight of the transnational dimension of East German society. On one hand, the G.D.R.'s geographic location places it in the direct line of Western European communication systems. While the SED has placed increased emphasis on its policy of ideological delimitation (*Abgrenzung*) from the West—and especially from the Federal Republic—there is little the Honecker regime can do to effectively insulate the broad population from these influences. In this sense, East Germany is the most Westernized member of the Soviet bloc. On the other hand, the combined experiences of the pre-World War II Communist Party of Germany and the postwar SED have relevance for the political challenges and chances facing aligned parties in the postindustrial West. The relationship between East German communism and the French and Italian variants presents a fascinating opportunity for students of comparative communist systems within the framework of European affairs.

The involvement of the SED in the affairs of aligned parties in the postindustrial societies of Western Europe suggests new and interesting ways of thinking about the evolution of European political organizations as a whole. Regarding SED contacts with Western European Communist Parties, future research might be done on the comparative strategies and communication patterns that link the G.D.R. with a broader dynamic at work within the two parts of Europe.[10]

The G.D.R. as a "developing" polity. The relative isolation of East Germany from the non-Communist international community until the early 1970's has brought with it a tendency to view the G.D.R. in relative isolation from other political systems (*die DDR an sich*). As I have already noted, this tendency has been reflected in the relative absence of a comparative framework for the examination of East Germany within the environment of the Soviet bloc. Because of the

[10] The following significantly highlight some aspects of the G.D.R.'s European identity: Peter Christian Ludz, "The Two Germanys in Europe," in Ludz, *Two Germanys in One World* (Paris: Atlantic Institute for International Affairs 1973), 47-56; Robert Gerald Livingston, "East Germany Between Moscow and Bonn," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 50 (January 1972), 297-309; Ernst Richert, "Zwischen Eigenständigkeit und Dependenz," *Deutschland Archiv*, No. 9 (September 1974), 955-82.

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G.D.R.'s special relationship with the Federal Republic, a number of West German scholars have attempted to develop comparative social and political profiles of the two systems. Aside from this effort, there has been a lamentable absence of thinking about how the East German social and political experience can be compared with patterns of behavior at work within Western Europe. At this juncture, I hope that there will be a shift in emphasis away from the area-study identity held by inquiries into the G.D.R. in the United States. I would like to raise two additional points in this connection.

I believe we have reached the stage where instant theorizing about the nature of the G.D.R.'s political order should be conditioned by a higher degree of analytical and descriptive sensitivity than heretofore. Perhaps the relative absence of hard knowledge about the East German polity justified the tendency in the past to make quick generalizations about the nature of authority in the G.D.R. The frequent remark that East Germany has been communism's answer to Prussia is one of the more famous examples of that tendency. The existing state of knowledge about the behavior of the East German polity no longer justifies such easy generalizations.

Second, as the range and depth of knowledge about the G.D.R. continues to increase, greater attention can be given not only to the question of how East Germany compares with its own "German" past, but—perhaps of greater theoretical significance—also to the ways in which the G.D.R. falls within a larger developmental pattern of post-industrial order. Both Ludz and Baylis have made important contributions to future American scholarship on East Germany with their emphasis on the larger realms of technology, the generational conflict and collaboration, and the problem of political legitimization. There will always be an argument between those analysts who view the G.D.R. as a unique system (even while recognizing the areas of partial parallelism that make East Germany comparable to other systems), and those who see the experiences of this "other German" system as lying within a broader comparative framework. My own view is that the expanded comparative perspective will become increasingly dominant over the exclusivist area-study tradition. The transition from one analytical environment to another will not be an easy one to make, particularly for those American scholars of the G.D.R. who have attempted to make this field acceptable in the past. Still, the commonalities linking East Germany with other political systems are finally beginning to emerge. Perhaps the G.D.R. has finally reached the "take-off" stage for students of comparative politics.

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